


























Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History 
in the Graduate College of the 








 Associate Professor James R. Brennan, Chair 
Professor Antoinette Burton 
Associate Professor Teresa Barnes 
Professor Kristin Hoganson 





This dissertation examines how capitalism, migration and urbanization changed the ways 
in which East Africans provisioned, prepared and consumed their food during the twentieth 
century. This study explores these themes through the experiences of Africans from the interior of 
the region who migrated to the coastal city of Mombasa, where they created a new, working-class 
food system. At the beginning of the twentieth century, these migrants came from rural food 
systems in which food was acquired within the kinship group, the labor being done primarily by 
women who agriculturally worked the land and who then cooked the meals consumed by their 
immediate and extended families. However, wage-labor migration precipitated the 
commercialization of these comestible practices. It replaced a system of gendered food labor 
visibly tied to the natural world with one in which food was commodified and its production 
mystified through less visible capitalist supply chains in which mostly male urban workers 
accessed their food with cash or through rations and, especially during the colonial period, 
prepared it themselves. Through the analysis of the experiences of these migrants, as well as of the 
men who worked as street-food vendors in the city, this study revises the scholarly assumption that 
food remained a domain of knowledge and practice marked nearly exclusively as feminine during 
the twentieth century in Africa.  
This dissertation also offers a lens into a central point of tension in cities across Africa and 
the global south: the contradiction between the bio-medical and aesthetic visions of urban 
modernity promoted by development on the one hand, and the strategies that poor urban residents 
have used to survive in cities not otherwise built to include them on the other. I explore how the 
vendors who sold prepared food to Mombasa’s working classes, operating from roadside 
structures, in restaurants out of their homes and as itinerant hawkers, struggled in a political context 
	 iii 
in which their livelihoods were rendered as “insanitary” and “ugly.” Especially since the 1950s 
when urban development became institutionalized in Mombasa, their businesses have been 
targeted for removal from the city’s landscape through harassment, prosecutions and demolitions. 
The final three chapters follow how these tactics of late-colonial urban governance survived 
decolonization, but also were challenged by vendors and hawkers in the city. I explore these 
themes by examining the gains made by vendors during the early-independence period, the 
reinvigoration of prosecutions and demolitions when cholera became endemic in East Africa 
during the 1970s, and the last chapter considers how the politics of multi-partyism during the late 
twentieth century provided both new opportunities and increasingly exposed vendors to state 









































 A project of this size and duration incurs many debts. My venture into African history 
began at Western Washington University where the courses and mentorship of Louis Truschel, 
first as an undergraduate and then as an MA student, and put me on my path to this dissertation.  
While at Western, Jonathan Miran, a historian of Africa and professor in the Department of Liberal 
Studies, was generous with his time both during an independent study and for hours of long, 
informal conversations in his office that crucially shaped my understanding of African studies and 
the practice and the profession of history, and he was also encouraging as I planned my first trip 
to East Africa. During that first trip to Kenya in 2010, I met and stayed with two amazing families, 
and gained enduring friendships through these experiences. In Mombasa, I was welcomed into the 
home of Mohamed Mchulla and Rukiya Abdulrehman, who introduced me both to their city as 
well as Swahili cuisine with the many amazing meals that came from their kitchen and were 
enjoyed around an always vibrant table of family and other guests. I also owe a special thanks to 
their son, Saidi, now grown, but who as a young teenager guided a then novice visitor around 
Mombasa with great humor and spirit. I always enjoy seeing Mohamed, Rukiya and their family 
on my return visits to the city, and am grateful for the kindness and sense of home they provide 
me every time I come back. On that first trip, I was also invited to spend a week with Ogutu Seth 
Okumu and Rachelle Maria Strawther and their two daughters in their home in Kisumu. Their 
openness to hosting a traveler they had not before met allowed me to see and think about a part of 
East Africa outside the coast that so fascinated me. There is probably some connection between 
that trip and my eventual interest to study the experiences of people who left regions like those 
around Lake Victoria and migrated to Mombasa. Years later, during my dissertation research, Seth 
again put me up in his home, this time for longer, which not only allowed me to interview migrants 
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who had returned to the region from Mombasa, but also let a weary researcher many months into 
being in Kenya to feel part of a family while living a long way from his own. 
 At the University of Illinois, I found an incredibly vibrant intellectual community that has 
provided me not only my scholarly foundation as a historian, but many lasting friendships and 
mentors. I was lucky to be part of a small, collegial incoming class of graduate students in 2011, 
and am grateful for the many conversations and debates, academic or otherwise, that I have shared 
over the ensuing years with Stefan Djordjevic, Stefan Kosovych, Deirdre Ruscitti Harshman, 
Michael Staudenmaiar and Megan White. I was the only Africanist in my small, incoming class of 
2011, but T.J. Tallie and Zachary Poppel, ABD by the time I arrived, provided key advice during 
my early career at Illinois, and thereafter I was joined over the years by many newly arriving 
African history graduate students who provided both friendship and an Africanist cohort. I want 
to especially acknowledge Doug Jones, Robert Rouphail, Beth Ann Williams, and Utathya 
Chattopadhyaya who, though a South Asianist, has had an interest in African history that has 
always made him someone with whom I have greatly enjoyed exchanging ideas. Additionally, 
though we rarely overlapped academically, I would be remiss if I did not mention my great friend 
from my years at Illinois, Beth Eby, herself a burgeoning scholar of indigenous sport history in 
North America, and whose support, kindness and humor have made Champaign such a special 
place. 
 My fellow graduate students were a source of great intellectual and collegial vibrancy, and 
so too were my professors. My advisor Jim Brennan combined an always appreciated availability 
and consistent attention to my queries with a sustained commitment to providing me with 
penetrating feedback on my scholarship. I am without question a better writer and more analytical 
thinker because of the many difficult and challenging questions Jim has asked about my work. I 
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owe him a great debt. I have also been fortunate at Illinois to have a group of professors in addition 
to my advisor who have shown great interest in my development as a historian. Antoinette Burton 
has many roles on Illinois’ campus and a schedule as full as anyone’s, but she always managed to 
answer my questions with a genuine concern and commitment that will not be forgotten. I also 
owe special thanks to Terri Barnes with whom I studied African intellectual history my first 
semester on campus, and who was also there in March 2017 when I defended this dissertation. She 
has provided both intellectual insight and advice about life over the years that I will take with me 
as I leave Illinois. Prita Meier and Kristin Hoganson also joined Jim, Antoinette and Terri on my 
dissertation committee, and I want to thank them for their interest in and perspectives on my 
research. 
 Illinois provided a large portion of my intellectual network while preparing for and then 
researching and writing this dissertation, but I have also been fortunate, during my time in Kenya, 
to meet and befriend a bevy of other researchers who have had an indelible impact on me. I met 
Caleb Owen and Samar al-Balushi while we were all studying Swahili in Mombasa in 2012. I seem 
to cross paths with them both nearly every time I am in Kenya, and I hope that continues for 
decades to come. I also want to recognize the other friends and researchers I have met in Kenya 
with whom history has only been one of the topics we have discussed across many conversations, 
including Dave Bresnahan, Ngala Chome, Tom Cunningham, Zeb Dingley, Wangui Kimari, Paul 
Abonyo Odhiambo, Emma Park and Erik Timmons. Additionally, I first met fellow Kenya 
researcher Sophia Balakian and her husband Michael Don while we were all doing coursework at 
Illinois, but my best memories of our friendship are of meals at Asmara Restaurant in Nairobi 
filled with light lager and conversation.  
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I was also extremely fortunate to be supported by two great research assistants while in 
Kenya, Onesmus Mutua in Mombasa and Mercy Nyambok in Nyanza. Both provided friendship, 
intellectual rigor and were instrumental in providing invaluable connections for interviews that 
have shaped this dissertation in meaningful ways. Thank you. I would like to thank the many 
interviewees as well who were generous with their time and agreed to share their experiences with 
me. I additionally want to express my gratitude to the archives and libraries and their staffs in 
Kenya, the United Kingdom and the United States that have provided much of the primary and 
secondary material upon which this dissertation is based. Richard Ambani at the Kenya National 
Archives in Nairobi deserves special thanks and recognition for the help he has provided me and 
many other researchers of Kenya’s history, as well as for his consistent role over the decades in 
working tirelessly to preserve the records of his country’s past. I would also like to thank the staffs 
of the McMillan Library, the Media Library at the Daily Nation and the Kenya National Archives 
in Mombasa. In the UK, a thank you is due to the staffs at the National Archives and the Bodleian 
Library at the University of Oxford, especially Lucy McCann at the latter who has been incredibly 
generous with her attention to my many questions. In the United States, the staff and resources of 
the University Library at the University of Illinois have been incredibly valuable to me in 
completing this dissertation, and more recently those of West Virginia University Libraries have 
been of great assistance as well. 
 I am also grateful to the multiple sources of funding that have made this dissertation 
possible. My research abroad was funded by a Pre-Dissertation and an ABD Fellowship from the 
Department of History at Illinois, as well as a Dissertation Travel Grant from Illinois’ Graduate 
College. After returning from research, time for writing was provided while I was a Nicholson 
Fellow at the Illinois Program for Research in the Humanities, and then during a Dissertation 
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Completion Fellowship from the Graduate College at Illinois. I also want to thank Athman Lali 
and the School for International Training in Mombasa for providing me an affiliation during my 
time researching in Kenya. 
 I grew up in the Pacific Northwest, and formed friendships there that remain strong today 
even as I have spent the past six years outside the region. Aaron, Andrew and Josh: all three of 
you have studied history at various points in your lives, and each in your own way have pushed 
me intellectually and are a part of the support system that has helped me throughout my life. I look 
forward to many debates and conversations about history and other topics in the future, whether 
we all end up living in the same place again or during the reunions we will have in lieu. 
 Finally, my family. My brother Miles and sister Erin have been unceasing in their support 
and love, and I am inspired by their own careers in mountain guiding. My wife Heather impresses 
me every day with the intellect, hard work and compassion with which she pursues her own career 
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through a near 10-month separation that was required for this research, only seeing me once during 
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For my parents, Doug and Irene, it seems almost trivial to confine to a few sentences the 
incredible sense of support that I have received from them over my 34 years of life. Their guidance 
and unconditional love is the reason I was able to be in a PhD program at Illinois in the first place, 
and then to make it through and complete the degree. I dedicate this dissertation to you both, Mom 
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     The plan for this dissertation was that it would be deposited some time before April 10, 
2017, the due date for my first child. As with many plans in life, this one had to be revised. Lucy 
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diaper changes and late nights, but her birth has also made these last days of my dissertation all 
the more meaningful. I cannot wait to see where your own interests lead you, Lucy, but I also look 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between five and 6:30 a.m., workers in mid twentieth-century Mombasa would wake, and 
begin preparing for another day. The start of shifts varied throughout the city, but at the port, one 
of the centers of working life for Africans in Mombasa, the day commenced at 7 a.m. Some of 
these waged workers, almost all of them men, lived with their wives or other female kin, who 
would spend their early morning lighting the jiko (stove), burning preciously valuable wood fuel 
to cook the morning chai (tea). If the household budget that week allowed, the tea would be creamy 
and sweet from milk and sugar, but people often had to make do only with the flavor the leaves 
had imparted on the boiling water. Many workers, though, would have skipped such breakfasts in 
the crowded confines of shared rooms, readied themselves and walked quickly out onto 
Mombasa’s streets, which would have been cooler than usual during these early-morning hours, 
though the humidity of the coast was always present. At the same time or perhaps even earlier than 
these men had awaken, hundreds of male and female street-food vendors had already left their 
homes, taking their places in parks, on streets and other plots where they had established squatting 
rights or, if mobile hawkers, they would be walking their usual routes.1 These vendors and hawkers 
filled Mombasa’s each morning not just with smells, but a cacophony of comestible noise. At 
vendors’ stalls, wood was cracked, stacked and burned to make smoldering coals. Pots boiled with 
escaping air-bubbles popping, cooking coffee, tea and uji, the porridge staple of the upcountry 
working-class that labored in coastal Kenya’s largest city. Coffee hawkers walked on Mombasa’s 
sidewalks and along its roads, pushing their carts and clicking their enamel cups in their pockets 
																																																						
1 I use “street food” here and throughout to encompass both food and drink. In Kenya, as well as other parts of the 
world, beverages rich in calories are as much a part of what one “eats” for a meal as anything else, whether 
pastoralists who drink milk and blood from their livestock or others drinking sugary tea and coffee. For beverages as 
food, see Sidney Mintz’s classic examination of sugary tea consumption by the British working class in Sweetness 
and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Penguin, 1986). Jon D. Holtzman draws on Mintz’s 
insights in his examination of Samburu tea consumption in his “In a Cup of Tea: Commodities and History among 
Samburu Pastoralists in Northern Kenya,” American Ethnologist 30, no. 1 (2003): 136-55. 
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to alert people out of sight that a hot, caffeinated beverage was available for a few cents. Elsewhere, 
inside their homes, Arab and Swahili women dropped fresh dough into boiling caldrons of oil, 
cooking and adding crispy textures to a wide variety of fried snacks, including the popular 
mahamri, a cardamom-infused doughnut. These were then delivered to duka shops and to hawkers 
who would sell them on the streets throughout the city. While the city’s workers walked to what 
was mostly likely a day of heavy labor under the humid heat of the East African coast, if they 
could afford it, they would buy a hot, caloric beverage and fried snacks from these street-food 
proprietors to fill them for the long morning that was ahead.2 
By noontime, these breakfast eateries were joined by lunch vendors, termed vibanda in 
Swahili, which were run primarily by upcountry migrant women resident in Mombasa.3 As 
workers took their meal break, they would stream out to these eateries, some licensed and in 
municipal stalls, but most illicitly squatting on private and state land. The workers, many of them 
also migrants from upcountry, would hand over some change, and feast on starch-rich meals, trying 
to replace the calories lost during the morning.4 Lunch was the busiest period of the day for street-
food vendors, with thousands of city residents away from their home kitchens but needing prepared 
food to sustain them through long shifts. After work, letting out at 4 p.m. on the docks, some 
leisure time was available to laborers, but appetites would soon require them to think of their 
dinner. This meant that, for the African women married to wage-earning men, their work day did 
not end at 4 p.m. as it did for their husbands. As one commentator observed at the time, “Married 
																																																						
2 This general picture of Mombasa’s working-class food system at mid-century presented is constructed through an 
aggregation of research in Mombasa’s municipal minutes and labor reports held in the Kenya National Archives and 
The National Archives in the United Kingdom. For specific citations, see Chapter Three. 
3 Kibanda (s.)/vibanda (p.) literally means shed, but this term is generally applied to many structures, among them 
roadside food eateries. They are also referred to as hoteli (hotel, restaurant) and kioski/vioski (kiosk), though I have 
never heard them referred to as mkahawa, the word for café/restaurant. 
4 This general picture has been constructed through research in Mombasa’s municipal minutes and labor-survey 
reports in the Kenya National Archives. See footnotes below and throughout for more specific references to these 
documents. 
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men would expect their wives to prepare at least one good meal per day.”5 For these women, likely 
in addition to hawking work of their own during the day, they would then spend their late-afternoon 
and early evening preparing the staple, likely an ugali of maize-meal, and either meat, fish or 
vegetables as a relish to accompany it.6 However, many men did not live with wives, either because 
they were unmarried or their spouses lived on their rural shamba (farm). Many of these men lived 
in all-male households they shared with friends and relatives, and as a group they would take turns 
preparing the evening meal. Though cooking ugali was a near nightly affair, sometimes on the 
way home from work, people would purchase an already fried fish as the relish from a bevy of 
hawkers who sold them throughout the city. Few ever ate as much or in the variety they would 
have ultimately desired, but every day this urban social structure of food provision and preparation 
was mobilized and enacted to feed the tens of thousands of mostly poor African migrants who 
lived in Mombasa during the middle of the twentieth century. 
Food, Capitalism and the City 
This dissertation will examine the decades-long history that created this working-class food 
system of the mid-twentieth century, and how transformations during that time altered it in ways 
that have been lasting up to the present. Consequently, this dissertation is firmly rooted in the 
urban history a specific place, Mombasa, and its location as a port city on the coast of East Africa, 
but it also tells a story about the effects of processes that have been reordering the world in earnest 
since the eighteenth century. The core question of this dissertation is: how did the interrelated 
processes of industrial capitalism, migration and urbanization change the ways in which East 
																																																						
5 M.N. Deverell, “A Social Investigation into Mombasa,” in H.S. Booker and Deverell, Report on the Economic and 
Social Background of Mombasa Labour Disputes (Cyclostyled, 1947), 66, (ABK/11/6), Kenya National Archives, 
Nairobi (hereafter KNA-Nairobi). 
6 Ugali, the ubiquitous staple in Kenya, is a dish made by boiling and stirring ground grain with water until the 
grains have cooked through and the mixture thickens. Part utensil, part filler, ugali is ideally accompanied by a 
relish of a multitude of varieties. Historically, many grains have been used for cooking ugali, including millet and 
cassava, but by mid-century maize meal had become the most common, especially in cities. 
	 4 
Africans provisioned, prepared and consumed their food during the twentieth century?7 The 
answer to this question requires a global history of the local. While global history can and should 
be concerned with the movement of peoples across continents, oceans and borders, we must also 
not lose sight of the reality that most people in world history did not travel such distances, and 
were often in the recent past constrained or incentivized to stay within colonies and nation-states, 
but were no less entangled in global processes.8 This dissertation is about one city in Eastern 
Africa, and the migrants who travelled relatively short distances to work there, but their societies 
were being remade by a system that is now the dominant form of economic and social organization 
around the world. 
While historians of global capitalism have for some time recognized the need to incorporate 
the study of food systems into their analyses, in some ways the powerful insights of the initial 
work in this field has clustered those that have followed around a specific, and I would argue 
limited, set of questions. Sidney Mintz’s 1985 Sweetness and Power created the commodities 
school of food history, a study in which he showed how the production and consumption of sugar 
in the Atlantic world was both emblematic of and played a key generative role in the history of 
early-modern and then the transition to modern industrial capitalism.9 In the decades since, a bevy 
of important studies have extended this line of inquiry, showing how cod, bananas, maize and 
																																																						
7 I refer to “industrial” capitalism here and throughout not in its literal sense of large industry but in the theoretical 
one. That is, an individual or corporation owning the means of production, whatever they may be, with workers 
adding value to commodities through their labor, and where, after wages are paid plus whatever transaction costs are 
entailed in selling the commodity, the surplus value thus generated in excess returns to the owner as profit. This 
mode of production is distinct to merchant capitalism in which the primary modes of value creation and 
accumulation are through the differentials created by unequal relationships of exchange. Consequently, within this 
understanding, in East Africa, the sisal plantation was every bit as much a space of industrial capitalist production as 
was the urban factory. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I (New York: Penguin, [1867] 
1990), throughout, but especially, 245-426.  
8 In this approach, I take inspiration from the work of Donald R. Wright and his world history of a small region of 
The Gambia, even if his study at times veers towards overly structural explanations. Wright, The World in a Very 
Small Place in Africa: A History of Globalization in Niumi, The Gambia (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2015). 
9 Mintz, Sweetness and Power. 
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other such comestible commodities have been central to the creation and transformation of the 
world economy.10 However, as E.P. Thompson, following Karl Marx, has shown, the transition to 
industrial capitalism was not simply about the production and circulation of new goods cum 
commodities to new places, but it was also a social and cultural revolution, a profound reordering 
of society and the nature of labor.11  
The social and cultural history of capitalism that Thompson play a key part in inspiring has 
been far from an understudied field, but what is missing within it is far-reaching research across 
world history that would allow for a globally-comparative understanding of how these processes 
transformed the structures through which food has been provisioned and prepared for people 
moving from rural peasant societies into the cities and onto the plantations of industrial 
capitalism.12 We still require much more explanation for how people created new institutions and 
organized family and kin to structure the ways in which food was acquired, cooked and consumed 
as paternalism faded and the wage and cash generated through trade came to ever more 
																																																						
10 See, for example, John Soluri, Banana Cultures: Agriculture, Consumption, and Environmental Change in 
Honduras and the United States (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), James C. McCann, Maize and Grace: 
Africa’s Encounter with a New World Crop (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), and Mark 
Kurlansky, Cod: A Biography of a Fish that Changed the World (New York: Penguin, 1998). Kurlansky’s book, a 
work of popular history full of insights that academic historians would do well to consider, was a commercial 
success, and has inspired many more such books in the “commodities school” aimed at popular audiences. 
11 E.P. Thompson’s social, cultural and intellectual history of the transition to industrial capitalism in eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century England is found throughout his books and articles, but is perhaps contained in its most 
compact form in his collection of essays in Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New 
York: The New Press, 1993). Marx, Capital. 
12 Notable exceptions that prove the rule include, in African history, Patrick Harries, Work, Culture and Identity: 
Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, c. 1860-1910 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1994), and, in 
European history, Peter Scholliers, “Workers’ Time for Cooking and Eating in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century 
Western Europe,” Food and Foodways: Explorations in the History and Culture of Human Nourishment 6, no. 3-4 
(1996): 243-260, and John Burnett, “Eating in the Open Air in England, 1830-1914,” in Eating Out in Europe: 
Picnics, Gourmet Dining and Snacks since the Late Eighteenth Century (New York: Bloomsbury, 2003), 21-37. 
Additionally, the historically-geared anthropology of Jon Holtzman goes a long way towards creating an analytical 
basis for thinking about how capitalism changed diets and food practices in rural East Africa among pastoralists, but 
the transformations for the largely agricultural peoples who migrated to cities and became nearly entirely dependent 
on wage labor or cash from trade for their food, the subject of this dissertation, remains largely unstudied in African 
history. See his “Eating Time: Capitalist History and Pastoralist History among Samburu Herders in Northern 
Kenya,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 1, no. 3 (2007): 436-48, and Uncertain Tastes: Memory, Ambivalence, 
and the Politics of Eating in Samburu, Northern Kenya (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). 
	 6 
fundamentally define social relations. Such a historiography is crucial, this dissertation argues, 
because food is the most important and consistent element of labor across cultures and time in 
world history. People work to eat, whether they grow, catch or slaughter the food themselves or 
perform other forms of labor in exchange for food in kind or as wages with which to purchase it. 
People cannot survive without food. The other basic provision gained through labor is shelter, but 
people can live, and often do if with difficulty, without it. The need for food is the basis of why 
those who work do so, even if some receive compensation and profits for their labor in excess of 
this subsistence that allows them to then accumulate other material and symbolic goods and 
resources. Therefore, if food is the fundamental basis of labor, and the transformation of labor in 
the productive process was the key to industrial capitalism, we must then know far more about 
how capitalism remade the relationship between labor and food.13 
 The relative absence of such a historiography of food grounded in a history of capitalism 
and labor comes not from a lack of attention to the study of food in the academy. A fast-growing 
field, “food history,” though its questions are not new, has solidified into a categorized genre of 
historical writing during the past 10 to 20 years.14 A field consistently in interdisciplinary 
conversation with anthropology and sociology, the new food history has detailed changes in the 
restaurants and dining practices of elites and middle classes, the cultural history of cuisines and 
how they have been shaped by migration, nation-making and environmental change, as well as the 
																																																						
13 There are, clearly, exceptions to this explanation of food and labor, such as people with inherited wealth who 
work only to acquire symbolic capital or to simply accumulate more wealth absent any relationship to subsistence, 
but these cases would be the extreme exceptions rather than the rule for the vast majority of people in world history.  
14 In addition to older research into the history of global food commodities referenced above, food was a consistent 
area of interest for the scholars who made up the Annales school of European social history during the 1970s and 
1980s, though the sorts of questions I raise in the previous paragraph were overshadowed by a focus on agricultural 
change, food supplies and cuisine. See Robert Forster and Orest Ranum, eds. Food and Drink in History: Selections 
from the Annales Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations. Trans. By Elborg Forster and Patricia Ranum (Baltimore, MD: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1979). For an overview of the growth of the field of “food history” in recent 
decades, see Kyri W. Claflin and Peter Scholliers, “Introduction: Surveying World Food Historiography,” in Writing 
Food History: A Global Perspective, eds. Claflin and Scholliers (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 1-10. 
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ways in which the global consumption of comestible commodities has altered local and global 
ecologies.15 All of these sub-genres have deepened our knowledge of how food has been 
foundational to world history, but an analysis of how capitalism and the migrations and 
urbanizations it precipitated recreated the food systems of working people remains scattered in the 
literature.16 
 While historians have only on occasion considered the questions at the base of this study, 
they have been asked with far more frequency by the journalists, activists and interdisciplinary 
scholars who make up the “food justice” movement. While many authors writing on food justice 
have, with good reason, focused their efforts on understanding corporate food-production systems 
in the agricultural, meat and fishing industries, a growing number are also concerned with how 
racialized and classed political economies of urban life, especially in the United States, have 
shaped the dietaries and consumptive practices of the poor. America’s urban (and in some places 
rural) poor have little time to cook because of the long hours their low wages require them to work 
and, even if they did, the impoverishment of their neighborhoods has led to the withdrawal of 
grocery stores seeking higher profits in suburbs, leaving marginalized city residents with few 
																																																						
15 This literature is too vast to cite in full, but for the history of elite restaurants in France, see Rebecca L. Spang, 
The Invention of the Restaurant: Paris and Modern Gastronomic Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), for cuisine history, see Arjun Appadurai, “How to Make a National Cuisine: Cookbooks in 
Contemporary India,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 30, no. 1 (2009): 3-24, and for commodities-
consumption-environmental, Soulari’s above referenced Banana Cultures is representative, and for a journalistic 
account linking past and present and as full of insights as Kurlasky’s Cod, see Paul Greenburg, Four Fish: The 
Future of the Last Wild Food (New York: Penguin, 2010). This last sub-field combines the insights of Mintz with 
those of Alfred Crosby who was pathbreaking in his analysis of how the creation of the Atlantic World utterly 
transformed global food, among other, ecologies. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural 
Consequences of 1492 (Westport, CT: Praeger, [1972] 2003). 
16 Much more is needed along the lines of Scholliers’ 1996 article-length study in which explains the relationship 
between short lunch breaks and the emergence of street-food industries around work sites in nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century Europe, or the brief section in Steven Rockel’s cultural history of migratory caravan labor in 
nineteenth-century East Africa where he describes how new institutions and gendered relations for the provision and 
preparation of food had to be improvised during these periods in motion. Scholliers, “Workers’ Time,” and Steven 
Rockel, Carriers of Culture: Labor on the Road in Nineteenth-Century East Africa (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 
2004), 141-4. 
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options beyond small “convenience stores” that sell highly-caloric food with little nutritional 
benefit. When eating outside the home, the options are generally limited to fast-food restaurants 
with a selection that is as nutritionally dubious as those of the convenience stores. Within this 
literature, crucially and to its great insight, labor and exploitation are at the center of the analysis. 
Large, and often vertically-integrated, corporations control the production, preparation and supply 
of food in these communities. Poor consumers, with limited time or opportunity to do otherwise, 
eat processed food prepared by equally-impoverished workers, whether those who initially cooked 
it in rural factories or the part-time, minimum-wage laborers who heated it up and sold the food 
directly to the customer. Through this geographic and economic constellation, billions of dollars 
in profits leave these poor communities and are accumulated in centralized corporate headquarters. 
However, this iniquitous social configuration has not gone unchallenged, and labor and food-
justice movements have responded and organized to struggle for better grocery access, more 
equitable wages in fast-food restaurants, theorized and practiced new forms of urban agriculture, 
and engaged in a variety of other strategies.17 
 The vast majority of attention to such urban geographies of dietary inequality has been 
focused on American and European cities.18 However, in recent years, a group of Africanist 
scholars have tried to shift the approach in “food-security” studies on Africa from a primary 
																																																						
17 The food justice literature is vast and growing, but, for fast food, see Eric Schlosser, Fast Food Nation: The Dark 
Side of the All-American Meal (New York: First Mariner Books, [2001] 2012). For an introduction to food justice 
and the issues being addressed by the movement and well as its strategies, see Robert Gottlieb and Anupama Joshi, 
Food Justice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). For the corporate food system creating the processed foods sold 
in convenience as well as grocery stores, see Michael Pollan’s classic The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History 
of Four Meals (New York: Penguin, 2007). Additionally, labor organizing among fast-food employees, despite 
working in an industry designed quite specifically to combat class consciousness through corporate-engineering of a 
contingent and “disposable” labor force, has been nonetheless rising steadily in recent years, and been central to and 
linked with more general workers’ movements such as the “Fight for 15.” See the organization’s Website at 
<fightfor15.org>.  
18 For a seminal example from the research on European cities, see N. Wrigley, “Food Deserts in British Cities: 
Policy Context and Research Priorities,” Urban Studies 39, no. 11 (2002): 2029-40. 
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emphasis on available quantities of food to one in which spatial inequalities and regimes of labor 
and stratification are seen as, in fact, being far more decisive in determining food access for the 
urban poor. While studies of “food deserts” in North American and European cities have identified 
the withdrawal of diverse grocery access as key to these structural inequalities, Africanists have 
quite accurately pointed out that the premise of analyzing the location of stationary “supermarkets” 
in the study of urban African food systems borders on irrelevancy. Like marginalized Americans 
and Europeans, poor Africans struggle to find adequately nutritious food as a result of structural 
disadvantages, but the central problem is not one of a lack of access to supermarket grocery stores. 
Instead, their food insecurity comes from urban economies that do not provide them the income, 
to an extent even greater than their poor contemporaries in the West, to buy what they need. The 
urban poor in Africa tend to be quite mobile within the city during the day, often travelling long 
distances to their worksites, and passing by outdoor markets and supermarkets where they can 
purchase their staple grains in bulk perhaps once each month, while on a daily basis they buy 
produce and other food items from mobile hawkers who move throughout the city and go to where 
their customers are: worksites, transportation choke points, and public spaces in poor communities. 
When this system is operational, even poor Africans live or commute in closely proximity to areas 
where they can buy fresh produce from hawkers and vendors. Most of the time, therefore, the key 
question is whether they can actually afford nutritionally diverse diets, and often they cannot. 
However, despite the centrality of income as the most important factor, municipal authorities often 
exacerbate the situation by conducting “clear outs” of the hawkers and vendors who sell food 
throughout African cities, and in so doing temporarily sever critical linkages in the food-supply 
systems of the urban poor.19 
																																																						
19 This new scholarship is bundled together in the June 2014 special issue of Urban Forum, and forms an important 
scholarly baseline, though their focus is primarily on Southern Africa. See, especially, the introductory essay by 
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 This study will build from the insights of these scholars considering the relationship 
between income, urban policy and the food systems of the poor in present-day African cities, but 
also push it in new directions. In particular, in addition to applying such questions to history that 
have been to date posed primarily in studies of contemporary societies, I will also examine the 
ways in which working-class eateries in urban Africa have figured into the food systems of the 
African poor. The new Africanist scholarship on food deserts commits considerable attention to 
the supply of foodstuffs to households where they will be cooked, but little acknowledgement or 
theoretical elaboration is made of the reality that Africans, not to mention poor communities across 
the global south, have in fact also been heavily reliant on inexpensive street food as a central 
component of their diets.20 As with hawkers of foodstuffs, the existence of these mobile vendors, 
who sell freshly-prepared food at prices made cheap by their low overhead costs and oft avoidance 
of licensing fees, makes any direct comparison to their sociological equivalent in the United States, 
the fast-food industry, difficult to sustain. Instead, Mombasa’s street-food vendors generally have 
been independent operations that provide opportunities for the poor to generate income either 
similar to or even in excess of what they would make working for wages. Rather than extracting 
surplus value from the consumption of poor communities, as in the American fast-food model, the 
economic accumulation of these small-scale proprietors tends to stay within the working-class 
neighborhoods of Mombasa, with perhaps a portion sent back to family on a small, rural farm if 
the vendor is a migrant. Moreover, while the doughnuts and tea of the mornings, as well the bulk 
of the maize-based ugali served during the afternoon and evenings may be of some nutritional 
																																																						
Jane Battersby and Jonathan Crush, “Africa’s Urban Food Deserts,” Urban Forum 25, no. 1 (2014): 143-53. This 
journal collection has also recently been expanded into an edited book: Battersby and Crush, eds., Rapid 
Urbanisation: Urban Food Deserts and Food Security in Africa (Thun, CH: Springer, 2016). 
20 Ibid., and, for the ubiquity of street-food in urban India’s past and present, though not framed within the food-
studies questions posed in this section, see Jonathan Shapiro Anjaria, The Slow Boil: Street Food, Rights and Public 
Space in Mumbai (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016). 
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concern, the overall variety and freshness of the additional relishes that include beans, meat, fish 
and greens makes the “fast-food” of Mombasa a categorically different institution than that found 
in the United States. The issue, though, as with purchasing foodstuffs, is whether people can afford 
them and if the eateries are available at all, given that they often have not been throughout the 
twentieth century when municipal authorities have arrested street-food vendors and demolished 
their structures. 
 This dissertation, therefore, emerges from food-studies literature, but less that written by 
historians and more from the interdisciplinary scholarship concerned with food justice. While the 
questions animating this study have only occasionally been posed by historians in general, those 
working in African history have only approached them obliquely, if at all. Moreover, I see my 
approach as one quite different than that recently proposed by James C. McCann in his survey of 
African food history. McCann, in introducing the subject, writes that two approaches exist for 
studying the history of food in Africa, the first which examines “the daily struggle for sustenance, 
whether in the African origins of humankind or, in modern times, in the famines that have 
devastated regions of Africa such as Ethiopia, Niger, and Sudan,” a perspective he sees as having 
its importance but that also “emphasizes struggle and heartbreak at the expense of recognizing 
Africa’s fundamental energy and creativity in the history of its cooking and solutions to life’s 
problems.” McCann, instead, suggests a different approach, one in which historians examine 
“cooking and cuisine as a creative composition at the heart of all cultural expressions of ourselves 
as humans” and explores “cuisine in Africa as something conceived, cooked and consumed, first 
around home fires, cooking pots, griddles, and spits, and later in market stalls and restaurants and 
	 12 
at political events where food expressed power.”21 This approach, and the binaries its rests upon, 
are antithetical to a food-justice approach to African history. First, to equate “the daily struggle for 
sustenance” only with human origins and famines sidesteps the undeniable reality that the majority 
of people who struggled with food insecurity in twentieth-century Africa did not do so because of 
famines, but rather because of the political economies of depravation that colonial capitalism and 
the world economy of decolonization imposed on millions and now billons of not only urban but 
also rural Africans. More theoretically, McCann’s dividing of one approach that examines “daily 
struggles” from another that celebrates “energy and creativity” fails to recognize that the incredible 
and indeed inspiring ingenuity of the impoverished Africans who are at the center of this 
dissertation was embedded in the daily struggle for survival in a city wracked by limited economic 
opportunity and a violently-coercive government. 
																																																						
21 James C. McCann, Stirring the Pot: A History of African Cuisine (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2009), 2. 
Food history remains an understudied topic in African history, but is built upon earlier work and has been growing 
with an increasing number of recent studies. However, African food history remains almost entirely focused on rural 
Africa. The two exceptions include Jane Guyer’s 1987 edited volume, which asks crucial questions about capitalism, 
food and urbanization, but is mostly concerned with food supply rather than how workers’ food was actually being 
acquired and prepared in cities. The only other book dedicated to urban African food history is Jeremy Rich’s 2007 
work on food in Libreville in Gabon, but he too is, despite a suggestive title, more interested in food supply, as well 
as the culture of colonial cuisines, rather than the above referenced issues central to this dissertation. Diana Wylie’s 
important research into racism and food in South Africa contains sections on urban food, but she is primarily 
interested in how nutritional science contributed to ideologies of white supremacy, rather than, as she concedes, a 
social history of food systems. Jane I. Guyer, ed., Feeding African Cities: Studies in Regional Social History 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), and Jeremy Rich, A Workman is Worthy of His Meat: Food and 
Colonialism in the Gabon Estuary (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), and Diana Wylie, Starving on 
a Full Stomach: Hunger and the Triumph of Cultural Racism in Modern South Africa (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 2001). In rural studies of African food systems, other than those by colonial nutrition science, 
academic interest in the subject began with Audrey Richards’ Hunger and Work in a Savage Tribe (London: 
Routledge, (1932) 2009). More recent research on the history of rural food systems in this broader sub-region of 
Africa include Elias C. Mandala, The End of Chidyerano: A History of Food and Everyday Life in Malawi, 1860-
2004 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2004), as well as the restudy of Richard’s Hunger and Work by Henrietta L. 
Moore and Megan Vaughan, Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern 
Province of Zambia, 1890-1990 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1994), as well as Kathryn de Luna’s much needed 
work on pre-colonial African food history, Collecting Food, Cultivating People: Subsistence and Society in Central 
Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).  Much more research is needed outside the now relatively well-
studied areas of Central-Southern Africa. Holtzman’s above cited work is among the few that explicitly study rural 
“food history” outside Central and Southern Africa. 
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 Therefore, the historiographical antecedents to this study in African history come not from 
those researching food per se, but instead the historians who have examined the interrelated 
histories of capitalism, urbanization and labor. However, by taking this approach, this dissertation 
can bring these literatures together to create a new subfield within the historiography of food in 
Africa, one that examines how capitalism, migration and urbanization changed consumptive 
practices and the labor of food. More specifically, my most direct scholarly debt in African history 
comes from the feminist historians who combined gender analysis with historical materialism to 
rewrite the economic and social history of urban Africa through the experiences of African women. 
These scholars made clear that, despite the general trend that labor migration to African cities was 
for many decades predominantly male, women also lived lives of labor, struggle and even 
accumulation in the cities of twentieth-century Africa.22 While in rural areas, love and labor were 
structured through kinship-based patriarchies in which men accessed food, sex and other aspects 
of what Luise White calls the “comforts of home”; in cities, women, excluded from wage labor, 
were able to earn income through commercializing and selling these labors, goods and services to 
migratory men. These scholars, and especially Claire Robertson and Gracia Clark, have shown 
how women created food systems for the working classes in twentieth-century African cities, 
selling foodstuffs as hawkers and starting a variety of small-scale eateries.23 These market 
proprietors sold food both in whole ingredient form as well as cooked for easy consumption by 
																																																						
22 For Kenya, see Janet M. Bujra, “Women ‘Entrepreneurs’ of Early Nairobi,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 
9, no. 2 (1975): 213-234, Margaret Strobel, Muslim Women in Mombasa, 1890-1975 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1979), Luise White, Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1990), and Claire C. Robertson, Trouble Showed the Way: Women, Men, and Trade in the Nairobi Area 
(Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1997). For West Africa, see Robertson’s earlier work on Ghana, Sharing the 
Same Bowl?: A Socioeconomic History of Women and Class in Accra, Ghana (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1984), and, also writing about Ghana, Gracia Clark’s Onions are my Husband: Survival and Accumulation by 
West Africa Market Women (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), and, for Southern Africa, see Teresa 
Barnes, “We Women Worked so Hard”: Gender, Urbanization and Social Reproduction in Colonial Harare, 
Zimbabwe, 1930-1956 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999). 
23 White, Comforts of Home, and Robertson’s Sharing the Same Bowl?, 106-12, and Trouble Showed the Way. 
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working-classes that were in motion throughout the day, while additional research into prostitution 
and concubinage has also shown that women would also at times combine sex, shelter, and 
prepared food for men away from their rural homes in Africa’s cities.24 Together, these studies 
have demonstrated that, as the migration that industrial capitalism engendered in Africa forced 
men to seek food outside their kin group, African women used these new social and economic 
conditions to build urban economies of food provision and preparation, earning income that 
allowed them to survive in the city. 
African cities, this historiography makes clear, have been socially structured through 
struggles within a racialized political economy that was also gendered. My own methodology in 
researching the history of Mombasa is grounded in this insight, but also draws from more recent 
research in African history that has incorporated the study of masculinity more fully into the 
analysis, and I see as creating an approach to gender studies closer to what Joan Scott meant when 
she wrote that “gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived 
differences between the sexes,” and “is a primary way of signifying relationships of power.”25 In 
the case of twentieth-century urban Africa, and Mombasa in particular, this dissertation will 
examine the extent and historically-contingent nature of how migration, urbanization and the 
commercialization of society re-gendered how food fit into the region’s regimes of labor and its 
economic relations. 
																																																						
24 White’s work on prostitution is the best known, but previous work by Burja and Strobel was also crucial in 
centering these women and those who were concubines in Kenya’s urban labor history. White, Comforts of Home, 
Burja, “Women ‘Entrepreneurs,’” and Strobel, Muslim Women. 
25 The work on masculinity in Africa has only unevenly incorporated political economy into its intersectional 
analysis, for example being more present in the work of Lisa Lindsay and less so in that of Andrew Ivaska. Andrew 
Ivaska, Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar es Salaam (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2011) and Lisa A. Lindsay, Working with Gender: Wage Labor and Social Change in Southwestern Nigeria 
(Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003). For masculinity more broadly in African history, see Linsday and Stephen F. 
Miescher, eds., Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003). The Joan Scott quote 
is from her “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” American Historical Review 91, no. 5 (1986), 
1067.  
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In considering how these processes affected East Africa’s socio-economic structures, one 
of the more radical changes in the region during the twentieth century was that, while living as 
migrants in the city, men cooked. While McCann is in a certain way right to point out that food 
was gendered as a nearly exclusively female domain of knowledge and practice in Africa, this only 
holds when referring to the pre-colonial past. However, when examining the relationship between 
food and gender historically, rather than representing it as a functionalist reality, we can see that 
the twentieth century significantly complicated the ways in which the labor of food was 
gendered.26 At the end of the nineteenth century, most of the food in the interior of East Africa 
was produced and prepared within the kinship group, and this was primarily done by the labor of 
women who agriculturally worked the land and then cooked the meals eaten by their immediate 
and extended families. Men fished and tended livestock, but, as most cuisines were in the main 
vegetarian and composed of foods grown and cooked by women, comestible culture and its relation 
to the natural world were domains rendered in rural ideologies as feminine. However, the 
materiality of migration to colonial plantations and cities made the performance of these gendered 
social structures nearly impossible for most. Especially during the early decades of colonialism, 
almost all the wage-labor migrants were men. In these circumstances, African men created a 
migratory masculinity in which it became permissible for them to cook, for themselves and each 
other while not living with women who were kin. However, in such situations, the kinship 
structures that had mediated access to food in rural areas did not simply dissolve under the weight 
of capitalist modernity, but instead were remade to fit new circumstances. In migrant households, 
generation often replaced gender, with young male relatives and friends cooking for older, more 
established men in exchange for free or cheaper rent and food. In other migratory homes without 
																																																						
26 McCann, Stirring the Pot, 9-10. 
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an elder patron, African men shared cooking responsibilities as co-equals, taking turns preparing 
the evening meal.27 
These migratory changes caused by wage-labor migration were a radical break from 
previous understandings of the relationship between gender and the labor of food, but they were 
also elastic. Migration stretched the everyday social structures of rural Africa out into new forms 
when forced by the demographic realities of the city or plantation, but, when the opportunity arose, 
migratory families were again reconstituted with the aim to more closely align them with the 
expectations of rural patriarchies. From the 1940s, more and more women increasingly came to 
Mombasa and lived with husbands or other men and, once they were in these homes, kitchen labor 
again became gendered as feminine. However, as in the way a rubber-band never truly returns to 
its original shape once stretched, so too the reconstructed urban forms of feminized kitchen labor 
were never quite the mirror of those in rural societies.28 For example, some women did not earn 
cash income, but instead lived in housing paid for with their husbands’ wages, or that was provided 
through work, and they prepared food purchased by him or acquired as rations from his employer. 
																																																						
27 To support his argument that food and food knowledge have been nearly exclusively gendered as feminine in 
African history, McCann dismisses the domestic cooking practices of men in cities in his introduction and thereafter 
does not return to their history. He argues that: “In African societies bachelors do cook—but not creatively and 
rarely well.” Creativity and food quality are deeply cultural and contextual concepts, and I would suggest that 
neither McCann nor I are in a position to ascertain how such “bachelor” food was perceived by those who cooked 
and ate it in the past, but, more fundamentally, that tens of thousands of men in Mombasa alone, not to mention 
millions more across the continent, cooked and ate their own food during the twentieth century while in migration, 
suggests to me that we should reconsider the rather functionalist and ahistorical position that food was only a 
“feminine” domain. McCann, Stirring the African Pot, 9. 
28 The nature of food labor in rural societies was changing too, though less in gendered terms. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, purchased and processed food became part of rural diets, especially sugar, maize meal and soda. 
However, the overwhelming conclusion from my oral interviews was that the labor of preparing food remained the 
task of women, and that most families still grew the majority of the food they ate. The provisioning and preparation 
of food in rural areas had changed, but not nearly to the extent as in the commercialized contours of cities like 
Mombasa. Detailed studies of such rural histories of food are rare in East Africa, and especially for the societies 
central to this study, the Kikuyu, Kamba, Luo and Luhya, but Holtzman’s ethno-history of food amongst the 
Samburu is exemplary, and more like it are needed. Holtzman, Uncertain Tastes. My conclusions about the nature of 
change in rural food systems outside the Sambaru’s comes from aggregates of oral interviews with migrants in 
Mombasa from November 2014 to January 2015 and with returnees in Nyanza Province near Lake Victoria during 
February 2015. 
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In these homes, male wages purchasing the food of the house new not only for the way it 
commercialized the acquisition of food, but also because in rural areas it was women, through their 
agricultural labor, who provisioned food supplies for their kin. The political economy of a stratified 
wage system, though, meant that few African families could be constituted as such, and so most 
women continued to provision at least part of their families’ food. The difference, though, was that 
now instead of growing it, they acquired the food through purchase with the cash they earned 
through trade. 
While history revealed migratory men cooking in their own homes to be a practice of 
necessity rather than a long-term change in views about how domestic food should be gendered in 
households with both men and women, a different form of cooking has had a more enduring impact 
on masculinity and food labor in Mombasa. The writing thus far on street-food vending in African 
history is centered on women in the trade, probably in large part because most of the histories in 
which they have appeared were engaged in the important task of recovering the experiences of 
urban women in Africa.29 However, in Mombasa, from as early as the 1930s, and with certainty 
from the 1950s, men also became central participants in the street-food industry. The roots of 
women and men cooking and selling food on Mombasa’s streets are found in the city’s political 
economy as, from the 1930s up to the present, endemic unemployment has narrowed opportunities 
for wage labor and, given the stratified nature of the urban economy, even those who had such 
jobs often did not earn enough to maintain a basic level of subsistence. As a result, men, alongside 
																																																						
29 The most thorough scholarship on women street-food vendors in Africa is on Ghana, with a study by Robertson 
on Accra and another by Clark on Kumasi, but even in these works they are a minor focus with Robertson interested 
in urban women broadly and Clark on a large variety of market women. Robertson, Sharing the Same Bowl?, 106-
12, and Clark, Onions are my Husband. For Kenya, we have only fragmentary mention of street-food vendors in 
larger studies. The brief appearances of street-food vendors in Kenyan historiography can be found in Strobel, 
Muslim Women, 129, 135, Willis, Mombasa, the Swahili and the Making of the Mijikenda (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1993), 197, and Robertson’s 1998 book on Nairobi markets, which includes prepared food sellers throughout, but 
her primary focus is on women selling foodstuffs, rather than cooked food. Robertson, Trouble Showed the Way. 
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the women who were already de facto excluded from wage labor, looked to trade as a way to 
generate income in the city, and many became operators of working-class eateries. The written 
records are clear on this, and oral history supports them. For example, men were so predominant 
in the street-food industry during the second half of the twentieth century that many oral informants 
could not actually remember any women working as food vendors from the 1960s to the 1980s. 
Archival evidence clearly shows that women were a significant part of the street-food industry 
during those decades, but such memories are indicative of the large presence of men cooking and 
selling food on Mombasa’s urban landscape. During the twentieth century, therefore, the gendered 
ideology of food labor that emerged through the material struggles of urban life was one in which 
men avoided domestic kitchen labor except if forced while on their own, but, if cooking for profit, 
they saw no incompatibility between their masculinity and preparing food for the working men 
and women of the city. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, these street-food vendors and their clients 
created an urban food system that allowed them to mutually survive in Mombasa despite the 
constraints imposed on them by a gendered racial capitalism. Laborers and other poor residents 
needed access to prepared food while they were away from their home kitchens for work because 
they were unable to afford the meals sold in the more expensive restaurants of the middle and 
upper classes. The cheaply-priced tea, coffee, doughnuts, ugali and the bevy of meat and vegetable 
relishes that vendors sold allowed the working poor to purchase prepared food in the city. For the 
proprietors, cooked food vending offered a trade with low capital start-up and operating costs. The 
hawking of cloths and other household goods required both significant capital and connections to 
wholesalers, as well as the financial ability to have capital extended for significant periods of time 
in order to maintain an adequate stock of goods to attract customers. Alternatively, a food vendor’s 
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start-up costs included a jiko stove and crockery. A person could decide to provide a table and 
build a make-shift structure, but these amenities were optional. Moreover, while an eatery’s start-
up capital remained invested for the duration of the business, daily inputs in the form of maize 
meal, wheat flour, sugar and fresh ingredients would, theoretically if business was good, be 
converted that day into profits. Robertson’s study of Accra showed that the retail trade of hawking 
cloths and other household goods presented the opportunity to make higher profits in the long-run 
than in the prepared-food industry, but nonetheless, in places like Mombasa, the low risks and 
capital requirements of street-food vending made it an attractive way for poor men and women to 
establish themselves in the city.30 Street-food was an institution of survival, for the customers who 
otherwise could not afford meals while at work and for the vendors who had few other 
opportunities to earn a living in the stratified and stagnant economy of Kenya’s largest coastal city. 
The mid-twentieth century, though, was a time of transition and transformation not only 
for how food labor in homes and eateries was re-gendered, but also for the relationship between 
the state and the people living in Mombasa and cities throughout the British Empire. During a 
period that John Lonsdale and D.A. Low have called the “second colonial occupation” and 
Frederick Cooper later showed was the moment when “development” as a form of governance 
first emerged, British officials were imagining a new kind of colonial city.31 The plans for urban 
development that crystalized during this period, Cooper has argued, were a response to an imperial 
crisis in which African workers organized and rose against the appalling conditions of labor that 
																																																						
30 For Robertson’s analysis of household goods versus the street-food trade, see Sharing the Same Bowl?, 110. 
31 John Lonsdale and D.A. Low, “Towards the New Order,” in History of East Africa, Part III, eds. Lonsdale and 
Low (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 1-64. For Cooper’s work on the history of development, see his On the 
African Waterfront: Urban Disorder and the Transformation of Work in Colonial Mombasa (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987), Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and, for this period in French-controlled Africa, see his Citizenship 
between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2014). 
	 20 
colonial capitalism imposed on them. Starting during the 1930s and continuing until 
decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, across Africa and the wider British Empire workers were 
striking and making demands for improved material conditions, and Mombasa was a key node in 
this wider global movement of colonized labor. With strikes during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, 
workers in this East African port town showed that they had the incredible power to grind a 
significant portion of imperial commerce to a halt, since Mombasa was a major choke point 
through which goods arrived and left the region. In response, the British theorized and sometimes 
implemented a wide array of “stabilization” plans to turn Africans from a perceived inchoate mass 
into individuated and legible “modern workers,” better paid, with improved housing and, indeed, 
a diversified and nutritious diet. This, theorists of development thought, would make workers more 
upright, invested in colonial society, efficient, and easier to control.32 
Cooper’s work is foundational to the historiography of development in Africa, and to this 
dissertation. However, this study is also part of a growing field of research examining what 
Cooper’s specific focus on changing British colonial ideas about labor, urban life and African 
society could not: the actual social history of the effects of these policies.33 I will show how the 
constructions of family and food that the state intended to socially engineer in Mombasa only 
loosely correlated, if at all, to the ways Africans in the 1940s and 1950s distributed kitchen labor 
in their changing forms of family and kinship at mid-century. The effects of development were 
uneven for waged workers, as some people did receive small increases in their real wages during 
the 1950s, but, since they were starting from a baseline of poverty, it is unclear just how much this 
																																																						
32 Cooper, On the African Waterfront, and his Decolonization and African Society. 
33 The literature on the social history of development in Africa includes Lisa A. Lindsay, Working with Gender: 
Wage Labor and Social Change in Southwestern Nigeria (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), and Caleb Edwin 
Owen, “Lands of Leisure: Recreation, Space, and the Struggle for Urban Kenya, 1900-2000,” (PhD Dissertation, 
Michigan State University, 2016). The dissertation in progress of Robert Rouphail, also at the University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign, considers the social and cultural history of how cyclones shaped development in colonial 
Mauritius. 
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slightly higher spending power improved their material conditions.34 These workers in some 
analyses could be seen as a “labor aristocracy,” but, as Cooper points out, more detailed study of 
this category of supposedly advantaged workers has revealed them to be “often not so well off 
after all.”35 If the effects of development on household incomes and resources to commit to food 
were ambiguous at best for waged workers, for street-food vendors, the plan for a new Mombasa 
presented an existential threat. From the late 1940s until the end of colonialism, the proprietors 
who sold prepared food and drink to Mombasa’s working classes had to suddenly confront a 
municipal government that was imagining a future for the city in which they did not exist.
 Development is both a generative and destructive process. It seeks to create a new world, 
but in so doing it must also destroy the old. In the ordered, developed city, food would be prepared 
in licensed businesses and institutions that followed strict sanitation guidelines. Street-food was 
the old world, rendered an anachronism that needed to be disposed of to create the new.36 
Theoretically, at least some of the old street-food vendors were to have a place in the newly-
developed, prepared-food system, but following the state’s vision for the industry was a near 
impossibility for many proprietors, as licenses and rents would add capital requirements they could 
not afford and the limits the state wanted to place on their mobility would negate the advantage of 
being able to move adaptively as consumer markets in the city shifted location.37 As a result, street-
food vendors continued their trade illicitly and the state created, in response, what would be a 
lasting form for how municipal authorities administered the people selling prepared food and 
																																																						
34 For wages and working-class purchasing power in relation to food in 1940s and 1950s Mombasa, see Table 8 and 
Table 9 at the end of Chapter Three. 
35 Cooper, On the African Waterfront, 276. 
36 My thinking here is influenced by Richard Pithouse’s research into the politics of shack settlements in South 
Africa. Pithouse, “A Politics of the Poor: Shack Dwellers’ Struggles in Durban,” Journal of Asian and African 
Studies 42, no. 1 (2008): 63-94, and his “Thought Amid Waste,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 47, no. 5 
(2012): 482-497. 
37 This was especially important for street-food vendors who sold food to workers on construction sites, which 
created temporary spaces of working-class consumption across the city. 
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drinks in the city. Throughout the 1950s, the government began conducting raids and clear-outs in 
which they arrested, prosecuted, and fined vendors and, if they had a structure, it was demolished. 
This violent expansion and exercise of state power was not limited to either Mombasa or street-
food vendors, but was a generalized attack on the trading activities of the poor in urban Kenya. In 
her study of Nairobi, Robertson refers to this same period in the capital city as the “First Hawkers 
War.”38 Independence, for these traders, marked both a rupture but at the same time also revealed 
that these colonial practices of urban governance would be lasting ones. African hawkers and 
vendors, in their independent republic, were able to mobilize news discourses of citizenship and 
rights that were circulating globally and used their power as voting constituencies to shape urban 
policy in ways that had been impossible under the racial authoritarianism of colonialism. However, 
the institutions of urban administration built during the 1950s, and the ideas about the aesthetic, 
sanitary and licensing structure of the city that was implicit within them, have endured and, as a 
consequence, so too has the reality that selling food and drink on Mombasa’s streets has meant 
risking arrest, prosecution and having one’s business demolished. 
Since independence in 1963, much has changed in Mombasa, but what has remained 
constant has been a political economy unable to pay workers enough to spend more on their food 
and that does not provide many income-generating alternatives for the people selling meals to their 
fellow poor urban residents. Irrespective of the many debates that have emerged in the post-
colonial city over the aesthetics and sanitation of its street-food vendors, the reality is that they are 
necessary. This relationship between an asymmetrical political economy of impoverishment and 
the crucial place of street food in the social structure of the city has been neither historically, nor 
																																																						
38 The extent of this urban development-based repression seems to have actually been even greater in Nairobi, as the 
“First Hawkers War” overlapped and was in many ways a targeted extension to traders of the British state’s coercive 
and violent tactics during the Mau Mau war, which was focused, in terms of urban areas, on Nairobi. Robertson, 
Trouble Showed the Way, 104, 130-45. 
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is presently, unique to Mombasa.39 As such, the experiences of these street-food vendors in this 
coastal East African city fit into the much wider and global study of what has been referred to as 
“informality,” a corpus of housing and trading practices that, seemingly, occur outside the 
“formal” sphere of state-sanctioned activities. While historians have only haphazardly 
incorporated the urban residents defined as “informal” into their analyses, in part because of the 
bias towards trade unionism and waged workers as the subjects of labor and economic history, an 
interdisciplinary scholarship primarily concerned with the contemporary societies of the Global 
South has been for some time studying these trading and housing practices, and arguing over the 
usefulness of the category of “informality” itself.40 Without rehearsing what has been an extended 
debate, the important point take from these scholarly discussions is that the formal/informal divide 
fails almost entirely to describe what have in fact been far more complex social and economic 
systems, and the history of street food presented in this dissertation provides further evidence for 
this conclusion. In Mombasa, neither households nor people could generally be described as 
existing in either the formal or informal sector, but they have instead, according to the logic of the 
binary, lived in a duality that challenges the saliency of maintaining such an analytical divide. 
Many men worked for wages, but these being insufficient they also took up a trade to supplement 
that income. Moreover, women who lived with a male partner with a salary often could not survive 
																																																						
39 In Africa, see Robertson, Sharing the Same Bowl?, 106-12, Clark, Onions are My Husband, and for South Asia, 
Anjaria, The Slow Boil. 
40 Again, among historians, the materialist feminist scholars cited throughout this introduction were the pathbreaking 
exception in this regard, focused as they were on the economic activities of women largely excluded from wage 
labor. For debates about informality in the Kenyan context, see Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The 
Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism (Berkeley: University of California, 1974), 267-8, and his “Interpreting 
African Underdevelopment: Reflections on the ILO Report on Employment, Incomes and Equality in Kenya,” 
Manpower and Unemployment Research in Africa 7, no. 2 (1974): 12-28, written in response to the International 
Labour Office’s report on labor and the Kenyan economy, the first extended study of “informality” in the country. 
Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya (Geneva: 
International Labour Office, 1972). My approach is drawn in part from Robertson’s criticisms in Trouble Showed 
the Way, 24-5. For a recent and useful engagement with the debates on informal urbanism, see Garth Myers, African 
Cities: Alternate Visions of Urban Theory and Practice (New York: Zed Books, 2011), 71-103. 
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on that alone, and so they too would engage in trade to increase the income of the household. 
Additionally, the cheap food that informal vendors sold to poor workers allowed the formal wage 
system to function. Particularly during the post-colonial period, these very trading activities that 
were rendered as informal were in various ways formalized by the state, but often through quasi-
legal, patrimonial relationships of bribery, dependence and obligation that linked together vendors, 
police and officials that allowed street-food to continue to provide income and feed the urban poor. 
Therefore, the “informal” sector, in Mombasa, has been intrinsically part of the “formal” one. They 
have been, in short, inseparable. Rather than painfully trying to sort through which socio-economic 
practices were “formal” or “informal,” the far more crucial task is to analyze how these various 
micro-economies and social relationships have created an urban system in which some aesthetics 
and forms of trade and survival have been deemed legitimate, and others not. 
The formal/informal binary thus fails as a tool for understanding a complex urban web of 
socio-economic networks and structures, but it does actually tell us quite a bit about how elites 
have sought to define the city politically. Consequently, the formal/informal divide is far more 
usefully understood in political, rather than economic, terms. Urban authorities and other elites in 
Mombasa have often leaned on this binary as well as other categorical languages of duality such 
as sanitary/insanitary, licensed/unlicensed or beautiful/ugly as a way to read urban landscapes and 
structure their political arguments. These are discursive, cultural binaries, ideas about the city, but 
ones that have had real material consequences for those deemed informal, insanitary, unlicensed 
or ugly. Being marked as such has meant exposure to harassment, arrest, prosecution and the 
demolishing of whatever business or home a person had managed to build. This struggle over the 
meaning of the formal or informal in Mombasa has been, in effect, a conflict over who has a right 
to be in the city, whose existence is “legitimate.” The dividing line has not been stationary, but 
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constantly moving and shifting because of the struggles of hawkers and vendors to expand the 
parameters of “legitimacy” in the city. Despite their many gains, street-food vendors have 
continuously and consistently had to exist within a political context guided by an attitude towards 
their livelihoods aptly described by columnist David Makali in 2002: “Woe unto you if you are 
poor, ugly and, therefore, undesirable. The message is violently clear: Kenya’s urban centres are 
not for you.”41 
This is a dissertation about a revolutionary rupture in East African food systems. Before 
the twentieth century, the vast majority of people living in the region acquired their food outside 
commercialized systems of exchange. By the end of the century, living in one of the regions now 
many cities meant that food was a fundamentally commercial experience. One first acquired cash 
as wages or through trade, and only then could it be converted into food. This is a story of 
capitalism in the twentieth century, and as such it is one deeply embedded in a racialized, gendered 
and classed political economy. During the colonial period, to be black was almost certainly to be 
poor, and to be a black woman was to be excluded from even the few opportunities that black men 
had. After independence, occasions for advancement did increase for black Africans, but fewer for 
women and most people remained poor. These structural asymmetries shaped the cultures and 
family structures that Africans were able to create in commercialized Mombasa to provision and 
prepare their food. Since food is the most basic social and biological resource, the study of the 
food systems of the poor seems inevitably to be an examination of depravation and struggle and, 
in a sense, it is. However, this history also shows us the incredible ingenuity and creativity of the 
poor who have made Mombasa their home. Many people living on below-subsistence wages or 
earnings managed to survive and street-food vendors, despite a half century of a state trying to 
																																																						
41 David Makali, “Of Capital Gains and Hawker Losses,” Daily Nation 26 January, 2002, Newspaper Collections, 
McMillan Library, Nairobi. 
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expel them through violence and coercion, have remained a central part of Mombasa’s social and 
economic life. Such recognition of the perseverance of these communities, though, should not be 
taken as acceptance of their condition. The poor of Mombasa, and everywhere, deserve better, and 
during the years of research and writing for this dissertation the parts of Kenya that fall within the 
thematic expertise of this author seem to be on the verge of another transformation, the 
consequences of which portend little that will actually help to improve the lives of everyday 
people. I hope this dissertation will be of interest to other scholars, but more crucially that it reveals 
something about how Kenya’s urban food systems work so they can be better formulated in the 
future to nourish everyone who lives in the city and provide income to those who need it without 
the threat of state violence. In my conclusion, I will consider what Mombasa’s, and the world’s, 
past tells us about the present and future of Kenya’s food systems. 
Scope of the Study and Chapter Outline 
 Food systems are vast structures. Early in this research project, I had designs of researching 
and writing a comprehensive study linking production to the practices of preparation and 
consumption in twentieth-century Kenya. However, I quickly realized that an examination of that 
scope would be well beyond what one dissertation could accomplish, and that a tightly-focused 
study of the history of a particular set of structures and processes within Kenya’s food system 
would produce better quality research.42 As such, this is not a dissertation about how the entirety 
of Kenya’s or even Mombasa’s food systems changed during the twentieth century, but rather 
quite specifically an analysis of how capitalism transformed the ways in which migrants from the 
interior of East Africa provisioned, prepared and consumed their food while in Mombasa during 
the twentieth century. 
																																																						
42 I am currently, in a separate project, researching the production side of East Africa’s food systems through a 
history of how capitalism and the modern state have changed fishing in the region. 
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I chose these parameters for a variety of reasons that require brief explanation. First, though 
African food history in general is lacking, the detailed study of how capitalism changed the 
practices of preparation and consumption is almost entirely absent, especially in regard to the 
eateries of the working classes.43 Food production is where almost all the scholarship has been 
focused. The history of agricultural change in Africa is as well studied as any topic, livestock have 
had their historians, and fishing is increasingly emerging as a subject of inquiry.44 However, the 
transformations in how Africans prepared and ate their food in cities remains understudied even 
after this dissertation, and much more comparative work in East Africa and the rest of the continent 
is needed. Second, I chose Mombasa because, despite being a central node in the East African and 
Indian Ocean economy, the city has received relatively little attention from urban historians in 
recent years. The period from the 1970s to the early 1990s produced a rich variety of research on 
the city, but it has faded somewhat from scholarly view over the past two decades as Dar es Salaam 
and Zanzibar have gained the bulk of the attention from urban historians interested in the East 
African coast.45 Before Prita Meier’s just-published history of architecture in Mombasa (and 
																																																						
43 Again, the only sustained histories of working-class eateries are in the separate studies by Robertson and Clark, 
and for both of them these institutions are only a minor focus in their work. Robertson’s most detailed analysis is of 
those in Accra in Sharing the Same Bowl?, 106-12, and of passing mention of especially uji (porridge) sellers in 
Nairobi in her Trouble Showed the Way. Clark studies prepared-food vendors as part of her wider study of market 
women in Onions are My Husband. 
44 The history of agriculture in Africa is too vast to cite in any meaningfully representative way, though, despite my 
above exceptions taken with McCann’s Stirring the Pot, his book on the history of maize in Africa is an exemplary 
example of the agricultural history of food. McCann, Maize and Grace. For cattle, while it is true that their place as 
currency has held an important place in history and anthropology, much more could be known about how ideas and 
practices changed as beef consumption became more prominent in African societies during the twentieth century. In 
Kenya, for cattle as currency, see Gavin Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African 
Petit Bourgeoisie (New Haven: Yale University Press), 200-40, and for changing practices of consumption, 
especially around dairy, see Holtzman, Uncertain Tastes. For fishing, see David M. Gordon, Nachituti’s Gift: 
Economy, Society, and Environment in Central Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), and my own 
research on fishing in East Africa that will be published in the coming years. 
45 For the work on Mombasa from the 1970s to the early 1990s, see Karim Kassam Janmohamed, “A History of 
Mombasa, c. 1895-1939: Some Aspects of Economic and Social Life in an East African Port Town during Colonial 
Rule,” PhD Dissertation, (Northwestern University,1978), Strobel, Muslim Women, Frederick Cooper, From Slaves 
to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890-1925 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1980), which is predominantly about rural agriculture, but also has key insights into the 
relationship between rural communities and the growth of Mombasa, Cooper, On the African Waterfront, and Willis, 
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Zanzibar), the only recent and sustained monographs on the city have been Kai Kresse’s 
philosophical ethnography of the city and Dillon Mahoney’s study of craft traders, but both were 
primarily focused on the present.46 As such, part of my goal in this dissertation is to contribute to 
a much-need, multivalent twentieth-century history of Mombasa through the lens of its food 
systems. Finally, I chose to study the experiences of “upcountry” migrants in Mombasa because, 
despite the fact that they have been the majority population of the city for nearly a century, their 
experiences have remained mostly secondary in the academic study of the Kenyan coast.47 While 
I share the fascination of other scholars who have researched the intricacies of the histories of the 
three most-studied groups, Arabs, the Swahili, and the Mijikenda, we nonetheless need to know 
far more about the social, cultural and economic lives of the people who made up the majority of 
the city’s population for most of the twentieth century.48 
																																																						
Mombasa. On Dar es Salaam, see the recent work from Burton, African Underclass, Ivaska, Cultured States, James 
R. Brennan, Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2012) and the 
forthcoming from Emily Callaci, Ujamaa Urban: Street Archives and City Life in Socialist Tanzania (Durham: 
Duke University Press, forthcoming). The work on urban Zanzibar includes Laura Fair, Pastimes and Politics: 
Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945 (Athens, OH: Ohio University 
Press, 2001), Garth Myers, Verandas of Power: Colonialism and Urban Space in Africa (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
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and Jonathon Glassman, War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar 
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around the racial politics of urban life in Zanzibar City. 
46 Mombasa has, though, appeared in focused articles and chapters or as a part of a wider analyses, but my goal is to 
provide a concentrated examination of the history of the city across the entirety of the twentieth century. See Owen’s 
recently-finished dissertation on leisure in urban Kenya, which incorporates Mombasa. Owen, “Lands of Leisure,” 
as well as Brennan, “Lowering the Sultan’s Flag: Sovereignty and Decolonization in Coastal Kenya,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 50, no. 4 (2008): 831-86, and chapter two in Jeremy Prestholdt, Domesticating the 
World: African Consumerism and the Genealogies of Globalization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2008), and his “Politics of the Soil: Separatism, Autochthony, and Decolonization at the Kenyan Coast.” Journal of 
African History 55, no. 2 (2014): 249-270. Prita Meier, Swahili Port Cities: The Architecture of Elsewhere 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), Kai Kraisse, Philosophising in Mombasa: Knowledge, Islam and 
Intellectual Practice on the Swahili Coast (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), and Dillon Mahoney, The 
Art of Connection: Risk, Mobility, and the Crafting of Transparency in Coastal Kenya (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2017). 
47 The best research to date on upcountry Africans in Mombasa remains Janmohamed’s 1978 dissertation, which 
was a comprehensively-oriented study of the social and economic history of early twentieth-century Mombasa. 
Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa.” Even Cooper’s 1987 work on transformations in labor in the city, with the 
majority of those laborers being Africans from upcountry, was more about colonial policy than the social lives of 
Africans in Mombasa. Cooper, On the African Waterfront. 
48 The South Asian community in Mombasa also remains an understudied group in the city’s urban history. 
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This dissertation contains an introduction, a conclusion, and six researched-based chapters. 
Chapter One examines the initial period of large-scale, wage-labor migration to the Kenyan coast, 
and in it I argue that migrant food systems during the early-colonial period were shaped by a labor-
compensation structure that emerged dialectically between the legal context of the British Empire 
and the need to adapt colonial conditions of employment to turn of the century East African 
economic and social structures. For much of this period, employers paid their workers a wage, but, 
as required by the Masters and Servants Ordinance, they also supplied them with housing, medical 
care and a food ration (posho). In providing posho, colonial employers followed a legal structure 
built out of centuries of negotiation between employer classes and workers in Britain and 
throughout the Empire, but in this chapter I will also consider how Africans would have understood 
and translated these new conditions of compensation, wage plus a ration, as both an extension of 
familiar forms of dependency and obligation and, in other ways, a radical new system for 
(unequally) distributing social resources. 
Chapter Two examines how the Great Depression led to a further deterioration of the diets 
and nutrition of workers living in Mombasa, and how this changing economic context precipitated 
transformations in public eating culture and in the gendering of cooking in East Africa. I examine 
wage data and draw inferences from other available evidence to argue that African workers were 
paid below subsistence wages and how, paired with more limited access to food rations by the 
1930s, this meant that many struggled to access food that was either nutritious or even adequate in 
quantity. This chapter also considers the ways this political economy of racialized wage labor 
transformed the gendered nature of food preparation, creating a migratory masculinity in which 
men were cooking their own food in shared, all-male households. I also examine how these poor 
laborers created a new consumer class in Mombasa that needed to buy prepared food while at work 
	 30 
and away from their home kitchens, and that other urban residents responded by operating 
businesses as hawkers selling tea, coffee and snacks, and roadside and in-home restaurants offering 
full meals. During this time, the prepared food industry was worked mostly by women, but I argue 
that men were also increasingly starting to join, and so began the incorporation of cooking 
commercially in public into the masculinity of African men in Mombasa. 
Chapter Three is the hinge upon which the remainder of the dissertation turns. I examine 
how the 1940s and 1950s were decades of major transformation in Mombasa’s food systems. 
During this period, more and more women came to Mombasa which precipitated another change 
in how food preparation was gendered in the city as, when women lived with men, it was now 
presumed they would return to the kitchen, reflecting the patriarchal gendered norms of the rural 
societies in the interior. However, I also argue that gender in Mombasa was elastic, and that as 
these patriarchies became reconstituted in the city, they were similar to their rural counterparts, 
but crucially different in certain respects. This chapter explores these themes during a period when 
“development” became the new form of colonial governance in Kenya, part of which meant the 
state wanted to create “modern workers” with households in which men earned wages that 
supported wives and children. However, this chapter argues that such configurations of family 
were formed by only a select few, and more common were households in which women worked 
as traders to supplement male incomes and so, as a consequence, most women were provisioning, 
as well as preparing, much of the food that their households consumed. 
This chapter also shows how the period from the late 1940s through to the 1950s utterly 
transformed the relationship of street-food vendors with the state. Urban development entailed not 
only reworking the households of African workers, but changing the legal, aesthetic and bio-
medical landscapes of the city. During these decades, the formal/informal divide emerged as 
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political categories of urban life, and the municipal government set out on targeted campaigns to 
prohibit trading of any kind that occurred outside the licensed purview of the state. With these 
clear-outs, the state created a bundle of tactics—arrests, prosecutions, and demolitions—that 
became institutionalized as a form of municipal administration. Nonetheless, despite the intensity 
of the attacks on their livelihoods, many street-food vendors survived this period with their 
businesses still operational, and they remained central to the city’s social system. 
For the remaining three chapters of the dissertation, we leave the household and focus 
primarily on how people were acquiring their food while outside their homes, and the businesses 
that provided these services. This is for two reasons. First, the archival record has left behind an 
incredibly rich source of granular-level information about the history of street-food in Kenya, 
making possible a detailed understanding of how the industry changed through shifting regimes of 
state enforcement in post-colonial Mombasa. With this available evidence, I strategically decided 
to narrow my focus to these eateries, and through this provide the most comprehensive history to 
date of street food in Africanist historiography. Second, by writing a history of street food, this 
dissertation is still also analyzing the history of how migrant communities ate their food, as they 
were very much dependent upon these vendors for a large portion of the food they ate. Therefore, 
the final three chapters are a history of how, where and to what extent street-food proprietors 
operated their businesses in Mombasa, and so consequently also is a story of the ways poor 
Africans in the city were able to acquire their food in the unequal political economy of urban 
capitalism. 
 Following this approach, Chapter Four, then, examines how independence changed the 
context in which street-food vendors struggled for their place in Mombasa. I show how, during the 
1960s and 1970s, the advent of Kenya as a republic opened new possibilities for how the city’s 
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comestible landscape would be constituted. During the colonial period, everyday Africans had 
almost no direct political representation. However, once a republic, poor Africans were able to 
organize themselves into political constituencies and, in the case of prepared-food vendors, were 
able to pressure officials into creating new, legalized licensing categories allowing the sale of food 
on Mombasa’s streets. Pushing back against the notion that the end of colonialism merely signaled 
“flag independence,” this chapter argues that the 1960s and early 1970s were years of contradiction 
in which radical new possibilities for vendors in Mombasa were interspersed with the reality that 
colonial ideas about urban planning and the view that street food was incompatible with the city’s 
“modernity” remained part of the municipal council’s agenda. 
Chapter Five is concerned with how, after securing new legal statuses during the 1960s and 
early 1970s, vendors had to re-accommodate themselves to everyday state violence as they became 
wrapped up in the global ecology of cholera, as the Seventh Pandemic struck Kenya in 1972. 
During “cholera campaigns,” street-food became identified as the most visible vector of the 
disease, and vendors had their businesses again outlawed for extended periods, and demolitions 
and prosecutions again became a central part of how municipal authorities governed the city. Since 
cholera is often spread through the consumption of food contaminated with the bacterium, the 
chapter concedes that certainly some people were most likely infected by eating street food. 
Nonetheless, rather than the existence of people selling prepared food on the street, the much more 
fundamental reason Mombasa was vulnerable to cholera outbreaks was because the state had been 
unable to maintain and expand sanitary water and sewerage infrastructures in the city to keep pace 
with the rapid increase in its population. However, the expense and time of such projects meant 
the far easier way for officials to show that they were concerned and working to alleviate the risks 
of cholera in the city was to shut down street food, and engage in public and spectacle-generating 
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arrests and prosecutions of vendors and the demolition of their structures if they disobeyed the 
order.  
The sixth and final chapter of my dissertation examines how Mombasa’s street-food 
vendors became entangle in the shifting political terrain of multi-partyism in late twentieth- and 
early twentieth-first century Kenya. This was another period of political contradiction for street-
food vendors in that it was both a time in which they had unprecedented access to “legitimate” 
status within the city, while also being increasingly vulnerable to violent attacks from the state. 
Poor communities, street-food vendors among them, were able to build patrimonial dependencies 
with officials who wanted their support in Kenya’s increasingly competitive multi-party elections, 
but President Daniel arap Moi’s ruling party also used the long-standing techniques of demolitions 
to “cleanse” urban geographies of potential opposition voters. Situating vendors in this political 
context, this chapter examines both how they built patrimonial relationships with officials to secure 
their position in Mombasa during the final years of the twentieth century, but then concludes by 
examining what may have been the largest intervention into urban life in Kenya since Operation 
Anvil during the Mau Mau war.49 From December 2001 to February 2002, MP Shariff Nassir, a 
close ally of Moi and part of the ruling party, engaged in a desperate and violent attempt to clear 
opposition supporters from Mombasa by trying to demolish all trading structures in the city, 
destroying the businesses of thousands of the city’s poor. However, despite this devastation, I 
conclude by showing that Nassir had not destroyed the political economy that incentivized people 
to work in the street-food industry. Vendors began re-building almost immediately, and within the 
year they were once more a prominent feature of Mombasa’s landscape. 
																																																						
49 Operation Anvil being the exercise in which the British expelled tens of thousands of Kikuyu, Embu and Meru 
from Nairobi in 1954 and then imprisoned many of them in concentration camps. 
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The conclusion to this dissertation reflects on what this history tells us about the present 
and future of Mombasa’s and Kenya’s food systems. 
A Note on Sources and Method 
 I came to a surprising realization early in my research for this project. I initially thought 
that I would include middle-class and elite consumptive cultures alongside those of the working 
classes in my analysis. However, after a brief survey of the archival evidence, I was startled to 
find, contrary to common perception, that it was the experiences of the poor rather than the 
advantaged that were prevalent in state records. In retrospect, this should not have been surprising. 
The Kenya state, both during the colonial and post-colonial period, was interested in documenting 
the populations it wanted to control. Elites were assumed to live respectable social lives, but the 
ruling classes were suspicious of the institutions and cultures of the poor, a view of society far 
from unique to Kenya. As a consequence, throughout the twentieth century the Kenyan state has 
been meticulously documenting the households and cultural lives of African workers, less for 
posterity and as a resource for social historians, but as a means of executing various governing 
agendas. Upon realization of the trove of documentation available for a working-class history of 
food in Mombasa, I decided to leave the history of elite and middle-class food systems either for 
my own future projects or those of other historians.50 
 The forms of documentation one finds in the archive on working-class food systems change 
over time with the shifting concerns of the state. The first chapter relies heavily on labor inspection 
reports of plantation and urban workers that had extensive information on the food rations 
																																																						
50 Despite the prominence of documentation of working-class food systems, evidence remains for research into more 
elite ones, but the source base would look quite different. Little is available in the archives, with few restaurant 
licenses, no apparent sociological studies or and few correspondences that deal with how elite cooking and 
comestible consumptive practices changed. However, oral interviews are one avenue, and another are the bevy of 
published materials available with relevant information in the form of novels, memoires, cookbooks and even 
restaurant guides. 
	 35 
provided. These inspection reports were produced in large volumes because the state, anxious to 
maintain the small African work force they had in a period of labor scarcity, wanted to be sure that 
at least minimum standards were enforced so that employers could retain enough of a reputation 
to recruit workers. As labor scarcity turned to over-saturation, the state seemed content to withdraw 
its inspectors, and these reports fade away during the 1920s. Therefore, the second chapter relies 
not on these inspections, but instead on evidence derived from over 300 pages of interviews with 
managers, owners and workers that were conducted in support of a labor report done to study the 
1939 general strike in Mombasa. The third chapter is partially concerned with placing food and 
development into a wider imperial context, and so partially draws from studies and 
correspondences about nutrition concerning the United Kingdom and other parts of Africa, but, as 
the focus returns to social history in the chapter, I then use evidence from sociological studies done 
on workers and their families in Mombasa during the 1940s and 1950s. For my examination of 
street-food, I also use these labor studies, but additionally incorporate the records of the Mombasa 
municipal government, as its councilors and officials were the ones primarily responsible for 
sanitation and business licensing in the city, and so street-food came under their purview. The 
remainder of the dissertation, with its shift in focus towards street-food, is based for the most part 
on the minutes and correspondences of the Mombasa Municipal Council. 
 I also make use of oral interviews.  From November 2014 to February 2015, I conducted 
over seventy interviews in Mombasa and Nyanza Province near Lake Victoria with the help of two 
research assistants, Onesmus Mutua (Mombasa) and Mercy Nyambok (Nyanza). These interviews 
were conducted primarily in English and Swahili. I did most of the interviewing in both languages, 
but my research assistants would help with translation on occasion when needed. Additionally, 
small portions of a few of the Mombasa interviews were done in Kamba, which Mutua translated, 
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and in Nyanza some interviews were done entirely in Duluo, which Nyambok translated. In 
general, I have used these interviews to create aggregate pictures of social structures and how they 
changed over time, asking similar questions of people of various ages about how food was prepared 
and consumed both in their rural homes and while in Mombasa. I interviewed migrants, as well as 
street-food vendors about their businesses, and often these were the same people. In general, this 
is a history based on archives, but one infused by key information from interviews in which people 
















PREPARING THE POSHO: AFRICAN WORKERS, FOOD RATIONS AND CAPITALISM 
ON THE EARLY-COLONIAL KENYAN COAST 
 
The nature of labor and the economy changed radically on the Kenyan coast during the 
first two decades of the twentieth century. Slavery was abolished in 1907, weakening the power 
of Arab and Swahili planters to control the working lives of the now ex-slaves.1 During the same 
period, tens of thousands of African migrants from upcountry arrived on the coast as wage laborers, 
some working on plantations, and others in urban jobs in the port city of Mombasa.2 
Simultaneously, legal regimes both in rural and urban areas unevenly shifted from usufruct to 
freehold title. These processes, fostered and promoted by the colonial state, set in motion the rapid 
restructuring of the East African coast along capitalist lines.3 However, as decades of scholarship 
have now made clear, simply recognizing the broad contours of an emerging capitalist society in 
East Africa tells a fundamentally incomplete story about how the economies and social structures 
of Africa changed during the early years of colonialism. Jonathon Glassman, in the final pages of 
his social and cultural history of conflict on the Swahili coast during the nineteenth century, looks 
ahead to the colonial period and observes that “Conquest was not a single transforming moment, 
but a protracted, drawn-out process.”4 European colonial administrators and employers wanted to 
create an economy and labor system based on alienated private property and a proletarianized 
working class, but their ambitions never matched their capacity to enact change.5 
																																																						
1 Frederick Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 
1890-1925 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). 
2 Karim Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa, c. 1895-1939: Some Aspects of Economic and Social Life in an East 
African Port Town during Colonial Rule,” PhD Dissertation (Northwestern University, 1978). 
3 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters and Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa.” 
4 Jonathon Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856-
1888 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995), 270. 
5 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, 18. 
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For many Africanists interested in the form that colonial capitalism took on the African 
continent, the English working class that E.P. Thompson so carefully documented has dominated 
their scholarly models of class formation and capitalist development. However, the economic and 
social lives of English workers during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not emerge out 
of the predictable machinations of capitalist formation, but instead through conditions specific to 
England and as the outcome of contingent struggles between labor and capital. The uneven 
integration of capitalism into African societies was no less contingently created. As Frederick 
Cooper has argued, the insight of Thompson’s study about the making of the English working 
class lies not as a roadmap explaining class formation and how capitalism has affected the cultures 
of all working people around the world, but rather as evidence that only deep empirical studies of 
actual productive processes and relations of labor over time can reveal glimpses into the 
unevenness and unpredictability of how capitalism has spread globally.6  
The trajectories of such economic and social processes are tied to the nature and extent of 
the asymmetries between competing groups, as well as the ideologies that inform their actions. In 
the case of coastal East Africa, colonial officials desired a racially-inflected capitalist economy, 
but those they tried to incorporate into it had their own ideas of how society was to be organized. 
As Glassman suggests, the languages and concepts “of generosity and patronage, patriarchy and 
community” that structured debate and perceptions of the social order during the nineteenth 
century endured through colonial conquest, and were repurposed during the twentieth in “a new 
phase in the ongoing struggles of ordinary men and women to gain more meaningful control over 
																																																						
6 On the inadequacies of an overreliance of English models for African history, see Frederick Cooper, “Work, Class 
and Empire: An African Historian’s Retrospective on E.P. Thompson,” Social History Vol. 20, no. 2 (May, 1995): 
235-241. For E.P. Thompson’s arguments about the contingency of class formation, see his preface in The Making 
of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage, 1963), 9-14. 
	 39 
their lives.”7 However, while social histories of colonialism and capitalist transformation have 
been central pillars of Africanist research since the late 1970s, the ways in which these processes 
remade the mechanisms through which Africans acquired and consumed food has been largely 
absent. This is a conspicuous omission since food, fundamental to social and physical 
reproduction, is intrinsically tied to the processes of production and exchange in any society, 
capitalist or otherwise. From the turn of the twentieth century, Africans in increasing numbers left 
rural social structures in which food was produced, prepared and consumed through political 
economies predicated on relations of gender, generation and kinship. On plantations and in cities, 
they had to enter into new relationships to acquire food, which at times were overtly commercial, 
but other times not. By studying how African labor migrants acquired and consumed food on the 
Kenyan coast during the early decades of colonial capitalism, we can further, to borrow Cooper’s 
phrase, “strip away some of the layers of mystification that surround many discussions of 
‘development’ and ‘modernization’ as well as of ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘proletarianization.’”8 
Colonial capitalism was a radical project of social engineering by the state and private 
employers. However, their desire to enact it had to be accommodated to the economic, political, 
cultural and physical geographies of the African societies they wanted to control. Relationships 
between Europeans and Africans in the colonial period were asymmetrical, but they were not 
unidirectional. Africans who migrated to the early-colonial coast had to negotiate new 
relationships in order to acquire food, and though this often meant entering into commercialized 
transactions, these new forms of exchange were also refracted through the precolonial ideologies 
“of generosity and patronage, patriarchy and community.” These ideas had real consequences for 
the ways in which Africans interpreted their conditions of labor, how and for what they struggled, 
																																																						
7 Glassman, Feasts and Riot, 270. 
8 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, 18-19. 
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and, in turn, the ways the colonial state and other employers had to reorient their expectations over 
what kind of economy and society could be made in East Africa. 
Antecedents: Slavery, Wage Labor and Posho in Nineteenth-Century East Africa 
 Writing in 1980, Frederick Cooper observed that despite the vast corpus of meta-theories 
of capitalist expansion in colonial Africa, little had been written about the African workplace itself, 
“the question of how workers work.”9 Similarly neglected at that time was the question of how 
workers lived; how they remade anew rural social systems as wage laborers, or how they innovated 
new ones in the cities, labor compounds and on plantations in colonial Africa.10 More than three 
decades of scholarship since have begun to fill this gap, but still only murkily understood are the 
types of institutional structures that were necessitated in order to feed the hundreds of thousands 
of Africans who went to work for a wage during the nineteenth, and even more so, twentieth 
centuries.11 
 On the coast of Kenya, the British did not need to create afresh a system for feeding 
laborers, but instead only to modify and expand the one that already existed in the region. This 
was because wage labor was not new to colonial East Africa, and pre-colonial patrons, employers 
and workers had already developed, through struggle, a system for provisioning food. Wage labor, 
																																																						
9 Ibid., 9. 
10 Charles van Onselen was a pathbreaking exception in this regard, in particular his Studies in the Social and 
Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914: Vol. II, New Nineveh (London: Longman, 1982).  
11 The social and cultural history of African workers, both inside and outside the workplace, has now grown 
significantly. A small sample of important works in which food is at the edges, though not centrally investigated, 
include Rebecca Ginsburg, At Home with Apartheid: The Hidden Landscapes of Domestic Service in Johannesburg 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), Patrick Harries, Work, Culture and Identity: Migrant Laborers 
in Mozambique and South Africa, 1860-1910 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1994), Luise White, Comforts of 
Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), and Keletso Aktins, The 
Moon is Dead? Give Us our Money! The Cultural Origins of an African Work Ethic, Natal South Africa, 1843-1900 
(Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1993). For works dealing specifically with food history and labor, most of the 
research has studied the infrastructures of urban food supply, though this field remains in its infancy despite first 
gaining some attention during the 1980s.  See Jeremy Rich, A Workman is Worthy of His Meat: Food and 
Colonialism in the Gabon Estuary (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), and Jane Guyer, ed., Feeding 
African Cities: Studies in Regional Social History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). 
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done by both the enslaved and free, developed alongside the expansion of commerce in East Africa 
that came with the intensification of slave-based plantation agriculture, producing mostly cloves 
in Zanzibar and Pemba, and coconuts and grain to the north around Mombasa and Malindi. These 
activities fed caravan transport between the coast and interior, bringing manufactured and other 
commodities to upcountry areas, and slaves and ivory back to the coast. Enslaved Africans, 
primarily taken from the interior near Lake Nyasa and further north in Nyamwezi, predominantly 
worked on plantations, but also formed part of a motley urban and regionally itinerant workforce. 
Slaves were “lent out” as wage laborers, which meant they earned income, but also had to pay 
their master a fixed sum from their wages or a percentage, often 50 percent of more, and then kept 
the remainder. Coastal Africans tended to not to be wage laborers, but these “upcountry” enslaved 
Africans did work alongside other free workers, mostly ex-slaves, Comorians and Hadrami 
Arabs.12 
 These workers, free and unfree, were embedded within the dependencies of a coastal 
society in which the patriarchal patron extracted labor from slaves and other dependents, but was 
also responsible for their maintenance and protection, and this included one’s daily food. Slaves 
on plantations were often responsible for provisioning their own meals, made from food grown on 
farms (mashamba) allocated to them from their owner’s land. However, the food that slaves 
working off the plantations received depended on their location within the geography and political 
economy of the coast and wider East African region. To be enslaved was not a uniform, singular 
experience, as slaves were differentiated among one another, which in turn mediated the 
obligations owed. Mahamali port laborers held one of the highest slave statuses. Their work was 
																																																						
12 Stephen Rockel, Carriers of Culture: Labor on the Road in Nineteenth Century East Africa (Portsmouth, NH: 
Heinemann, 2006) and Frederick Cooper, Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1977), 120-22, 182-190. 
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the hard manual labor of loading and unloading dhow boats in the harbors of East Africa, but they 
also articulated an identity of superiority over other slaves. Their separation was marked by the 
regularity of their work as dockhands, that they received better food as maintenance than other 
slaves, and that they sometimes lived and ate their meals with their owner. The other way slaves 
worked for wages was as vibarua, or casual workers. Vibarua slaves ranged from day-laborers 
doing the odd jobs of a port town, to highly skilled artisans who could accumulate enough from 
their earning to sometimes purchase property. Hired mostly out to Europeans and South Asians 
who could not legally own slaves, they were paid directly and only sometimes provided food by 
their owners depending on the arrangement. Rationed food meant they had to relinquish higher 
percentages of their cash earnings, but this may have been a strategy when foodstuffs were scarce 
from famines or hard to obtain for other reasons.13 
 These wages and rations were tied to labor, but labor in nineteenth-century East Africa was 
inexplicable outside the power structures of family, kinship and community. Posho (food rations), 
or for plantation slaves, land from which one could grow food, were owed to all dependents within 
the household, and this included not only mahamali and vibarua slaves working for wages, but 
also domestic slaves, wives, children, and soldiers, both slave and free.14 They all owed the patron 
deference and service to varying degrees, but his, and sometimes her, power rested on dolling out 
maintenance to these dependents, with the possibility of desertion or conflict if unable to do so.15  
																																																						
13 Cooper, Plantation Slavery, 182-190 and Kaje wa Mwemye Matano, Published Interview, in Three Swahili 
Women: Life Histories from Mombasa, eds. Sarah Mirza and Margaret Strobel (Bloomington: Indian University 
Press, 1989), 33-35. 
14 Bi Kaje, Published Interview, in Three Swahili Women, 31-2, and Ludwig Krapf, A Dictionary of the Suahili 
Language (London: Trubner, 1882), 308.  
15 Jonathon Glassman details the conflicts between patrons and their dependents when debts and increasingly 
elaborate feasting made it more difficult for obligations to be fulfilled during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Glassman, Feasts and Riot. 
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 During the second half of the nineteenth century, the geography of obligation expanded as 
it followed the caravan trade in to the interior, and temporarily proletarianized porters, some 
enslaved and others free, needed to be provisioned as they traveled sometimes as far as Lake 
Victoria and even eastern Congo. By the 1890s, the obligation of posho expanded to include, and 
was more centered around, porters and sailors, who were the mobile laborers of the transport 
economy. During this period, the verb form of posho meant “to give a ration to, to maintain, to 
habitually feed someone,” but also, more specifically, the noun posho indicated that it was food 
given “to porters and sailors … a road ration.”16 By the final decades of the nineteenth century, 
Arab and Swahili caravans were joined by European missionaries and explorers who organized 
some of the largest expeditions in the region, but they were as bounded as coastal patrons were to 
the obligation to provision their porters with food.17 This embeddedness of European employers 
in coastal political economies of dependence was something that these missionaries and explorers 
would share with the plantation owners and other colonial employers who would follow them. 
 Whether provisioned by Europeans or coastal patrons, these road rations became structured 
into the workday. As Stephen Rockel details in his social and cultural history of porterage in 
nineteenth-century East Africa, porters would receive their ration when they camped at the end of 
a day’s march. They received a ration of one kibaba (1.5 pounds) of grain, which was varyingly 
sorghum, millet or maize. This was most often cooked into the staple porridge ugali, though coastal 
porters were provisioned with rice. Depending on where they stopped, these grain rations would 
be supplemented with the purchase of vegetables and meats from locals who lived near the 
																																																						
16 These are sections translated from a Swahili-French dictionary. The above quoted pieces were originally written 
in French as “Donner la ration à, entretenir, nourrir habituellement qqu,” and “ration des porteurs et des matelots,” 
and “ration de route.” For full definitions and words with related roots, see C.S. Sacleux, Dictionnaire Swahili-
Français (Paris: Institut d’Ethnologie, [1891] 1939), 759. 
17 Cooper, Plantation Slavery, 187. 
	 44 
campsites. Though predominantly male, some wives of the porters were also in the caravan. In 
these situations, rural gender norms would be reproduced, with women cooking, but most porters 
were grouped into all-male kambi, and through this structure of temporary kinship, they would 
take turns cooking, stop-by-stop. These male African porters, improvising new temporary bonds 
of kinship and friendship while on the move, and stepping outside normative gendered boundaries 
of cooking, were anticipating the the migratory realities to which many African men would have 
to accommodate themselves during the twentieth century.18 
Wage Labor, Abolition and Food in the Early-Colonial Coastal Economy 
 If the caravans commissioned by European missionaries and explorers were the 
antecedents to the coming colonial wage-labor system, then the building of the Uganda Railway 
can be seen as signaling its beginning. The railway itself, once built, set the foundation for an 
export economy that would funnel coffee, tea, sisal, grain and other commodities out of Kenya to 
be sold on the global market. However, to construct the railway, the state had to embark on a 
massive project of not only technical, but also social, engineering. The railway required a large, 
mobile labor force, but the British looked towards the labor system of its older, rather than newest, 
colonies. The majority of the construction labor was done by South Asian indentured workers, a 
system of unfree labor that was reinvigorated after abolition when the British replaced enslaved 
with indentured workers. However, East Africans were also engaged locally as the railway snaked 
throughout the region, and this included its beginning in the port-town of Mombasa. As people 
along the coast entered into new labor relationships with European employers, both in constructing 
the railway and in other positions as the early decades of colonialism unfolded, the novelty of 
																																																						
18 Stephen Rockel, Carriers of Culture, 141-49. 
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colonial wage labor was tempered by its embeddedness in an older system of work, one with deep 
roots in East Africa. 
 As with slaves, wives, children and other dependents during the nineteenth century, the 
East Africans who worked on the Uganda Railway were provisioned with rations. Rations were 
not provided in addition to a subsistence wage, but were given in the place of higher pay. Like 
vibarua slaves, waged workers received food, but it cut into their cash earnings.19 Speaking with 
historian Margaret Strobel during the 1970s, Kaje wa Mwemye Matano remembered her uncle, 
Muhamadi bu Rashidi, taking a post as an overseer during the construction of the railway during 
its Mombasa phase. In remembering his compensation, Bi Kaje recalled that he was more 
concerned with the food than the pay. “They were paid in lots of rations and small wages” and, 
though the money was not much, there was “lots of food.” However, though Bi Kaje remembered 
her uncle being content with this arrangement, Bu Rashidi’s satisfaction with the rations as 
payment may have been more a reflection of his high status. His perspective was most likely not 
shared by those who worked below him, particularly since Bu Rashidi received a comparative 
bounty of rations. Bi Kaje recalled that her family was “given half a sack of rice and half a sack of 
flour, or one frasila of flour and a half sack of rice, and half a frasila of sugar, and a quarter frasila 
of lentils, and shark, spices for sauce, salt, pepper, all spices and wheat flour too, and ghee—a tin 
for two people.”20 If the posho for the laborers who worked below Bu Rashidi was anything like 
that provisioned to African workers in later decades for which we have better sources—maize 
meal, salt, and limited supplemental vegetables—they likely were not as happy as their overseer 
to have their wages suppressed in exchange for meagre rations. 
																																																						
19 For vibarua slaves, see the discussion in the above section, and the corresponding citations from Frederick 
Cooper’s Planation Slavery. 
20 Bi Kaje, Published Interview, Three Swahili Women, 41. 
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The Uganda Railway was finished in 1902, but this was only the start of state infrastructure 
projects across Kenya. The colonial government wanted Africans to build its colony, and this was 
paired with a more general and growing desire for African labor on plantations, and as dock hands, 
domestics and manual laborers in Mombasa. However, the state and other private employers failed 
spectacularly to convince coastal Africans to work for wages. After abolition in 1907, former 
slaves generally chose to not replace one master with another who now paid them a wage. Instead, 
most ex-plantation slaves moved onto land that former slaveholders could not tend now that they 
had lost their control over labor. Former slaves would occasionally do waged work for brief 
periods, in down agricultural seasons or if cash was needed, but these brief forays into the labor 
market did not satisfy British designs to create a landless working class. At the same time, the 
Giriama, Digo and other rural coastal peasants also preferred to work for a wage for limited 
durations, maintaining their autonomy by keeping their farms and working for an employer only 
when necessary.21  
By the 1910s, the colonial state, frustrated by its failure, looked to “upcountry” Africans 
as potential laborers. Coastal Africans had access to enough land to avoid dependence on wages, 
but the high levels of settler expropriation of rich farm land in upcountry areas, paired with the 
heavy taxes all Africans faced as well as aggressive recruiting practices, “induced” many more 
upcountry Africans into wage labor. Some of these workers were escaping rural patriarchs and 
wanted money to purchase consumer goods or fund bride-wealth payments, but many were also 
engaged as forced labor, while others had their options narrowed to the point that the only choice 
																																																						
21 The Giriama, Digo and other coastal groups would later articulate their identity and be classified as “the 
Mijikenda,” a larger ethnic affiliation, but that designation would be anachronistic for the early colonial period. See 
Justin Willis, Mombasa, The Swahili, and the Making of the Mijikenda (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). The 
broader context of labor and abolition in the above paragraph comes from Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, 235-
253, and Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa,” 344-351. 
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remaining was to work for a wage. These migrants who went to Mombasa and the wider coast 
were a polyglot group made up of Kikuyus from central Kenya, Luo and Luhya from Nyanza along 
Lake Victoria, and the Kamba from the semi-arid savannah between the coast and central 
province.22 
The upcountry migrants who came to Mombasa were leaving rural societies in which 
access to food was mediated less by monetary transactions and more by structures of gender, 
generation and kinship. These food systems were diversely constituted, but they also contained 
commonalities. During the first half of the twentieth century, women across rural East Africa were 
the primary producers and preparers of food. As has been detailed, African women have 
historically been the primary farmers across the continent, with few exceptions. What they 
produced, they also prepared. As James C. McCann has argued for Africa more broadly, the 
acquisition and combinations of ingredients and preparation techniques were forms of knowledge 
over which women had control, and passed down generationally.23 This was largely true in pre-
colonial and rural Africa during the twentieth century, though at times generation would take the 
place of gender when idiosyncratic situations called for it. Childhood was the first formative period 
during which the techniques of cooking were learned and performed across rural East Africa. 
Before each meal, young girls gathered firewood to heat the pot and would slowly, day-by-day, 
learn the fundamentals of preparation as they watched and assisted their mothers. Young boys 
usually avoided this labor, except if there were no girls in the family, or if their sisters had already 
left the household to marry. In those situations, young boys would perform the comestible labor 
that had been gendered as female. The second and final phase of comestible training came as part 
																																																						
22 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, 235-253, and Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa,” 344-351. 
23 For this argument and women as agricultural producers of foodstuffs historically in Africa, see James C. McCann, 
Stirring the Pot: A History of African Cuisine (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2009). 
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of the process of marriage, which, in particular for the Luo, was less a single event than a series of 
rituals playing out over many months. Among other requirements for Luo marriage, women were 
trained in cooking by their mothers-in-law. Though they now had their own home, new wives 
would cook for about five months in their mother-in-law’s kitchen. After this was complete, the 
newly married woman cooked in her own home, but only for herself for four more days, while her 
husband continued to eat his mother’s food. After the four days were finished, the husband would 
come with other village men, consume a feast she had cooked, and thereafter the marriage was 
sealed (in Dholuo, oriso chwore).24 
The cuisines these migrants ate before they left for the coast varied, but nearly all of it was 
prepared from ingredients produced within the kinship group by gendered labor, with women 
farming and men tending stock animals. Agriculturalists and pastoralists did trade their respective 
foodstuffs, especially during times of shortages, and the Luo along Lake Victoria would trade dried 
fish regionally as far as central Kenya. However, the majority of the food one ate was grown, 
slaughtered or caught a short distance from home.25  
The Kikuyu were predominantly vegetarians, with two main dishes, irio and ucuru. In 
central Kenya, the production and preparation of food was gendered, and so too was the food itself. 
Both men and women ate irio, but men consumed a porridge made of maize, beans and plantains, 
while women had the same but with leafy greens usually added to theirs. Ucuru, similarly, was a 
gruel made from millet flour and water, though women would receive salt in their portions. 
																																																						
24 These conclusions are drawn from oral histories conducted in Mombasa, Kenya. November 2014-January, 2015, 
and Nyanza Province, 2015, and from H. Hartmann, “Some Customs of the Luwo (Or Nilotic Kavirondo) Living in 
South Kavirondo,” Anthropos 23, 1/2 (1928): 263-275. 
25 These aggregated generalities have been drawn from many dozens of interviews with labor migrants in Mombasa 
and migration returnees back in Nyanza Province who remembered back to their childhoods and how food was 
produced and prepared. Oral Interviews, Mombasa, Kenya and Nyanza Province, Kenya, November 2014-January 
2015. For foodstuff trading patterns in colonial Nyanza, see Margaret J. Hay, “Economic Change in Luoland: Kowe, 
1890-1945,” PhD Dissertation (University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1972). 
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Women, obligated to do, but also controlling, production and preparation, had fit more nutritious 
and flavorful ingredients into their staples. In addition to these main dishes, Kikuyu would often 
supplement them with grilled maize, yams, sweet potatoes and plantains.26 Like the Kikuyu, the 
Kamba were also primarily vegetarians. Their staples were composed of maize, millet and beans, 
and they ate bananas and sugar cane, though less frequently. Meat was consumed, but more out of 
happenstance or for ceremony. The Kamba did practice pastoralism more intensely than the 
Kikuyu, but their goats and cattle were valued more as currency than food.27 The Luo, and to a 
lesser extent, the Luhya, ventured furthest and most regularly outside of plant-based diets. The 
Luo especially, located on the shores of Lake Victoria, consumed large amounts of fish, in 
particular ngege (tilapia) and ningu (a small, fingerling fish). Luhya also consumed fish, but 
primarily of the dried variety acquired from the Luo in exchange for agricultural foodstuffs.28 The 
men who left their homes to migrate to Mombasa had been consumers of food in these rural areas 
of East Africa, eating that which their wives, mothers and other female relatives produced and 
prepared for them. 
Such is a useful outline of rural African food practices during the first half of the twentieth 
century, but until we have a larger collection of micro-regional food histories of rural East Africa, 
which is well out of the scope of this chapter and dissertation, these findings must remain at a 
frustratingly general level.29 However, in general terms, we can provide some provisional themes 
for thinking about how rural food systems were changing during the colonial period. Maduka shops 
																																																						
26 J.B. Orr and J.L. Gilks, Studies of Nutrition: The Physique and Health of Two African Tribes (London: His 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1931). 
27 H.R. Tate, “Notes on the Kikuyu and Kamba Tribes of British East Africa,” Journal of the Anthropological 
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 34 (January-June, 1904), 136-7. 
28 Drawn from my article manuscript in progress, “Fishing Nets and Fertile Waters: Social Conflict, Rural Authority 
and Ecological Change in Colonial Kenya’s Nyanza Province,” and Hay, “Economic Change.” 
29 More is needed along the lines of Jon Holtzman’s historically-rich ethnography of food and comestible practices 
among the Samburu in his Uncertain Tastes: Memory, Ambivalence, and the Politics of Eating (Berkeley: 
University of California, 2009). 
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run by South Asians became common throughout rural East Africa during the colonial period, and 
so mass-produced foodstuffs became increasingly available.30 People purchased and incorporated 
tea, processed sugar and salt, and bottled soda into their diets, while processed grains were also 
available, if more expensive than growing them oneself. Additionally, environmental and 
agricultural changes shaped surpluses and shortages of ingredients. In Ukambani, bio-veterinary 
medicine during colonialism drastically expanded the cattle population, but this also in turn 
bottomed-out cattle prices and contributed to soil erosion.31 A scarcity of productive agricultural 
land and a surplus of cattle likely led to higher meat consumption in Kamba diets. In the reverse, 
for Nyanza, the increasingly commercialized fisheries of Lake Victoria devastated fish stocks 
during the first half of the twentieth century, which created scarcity from what had only recently 
been abundance, limiting peoples’ access to both ngege and ningu.32 However, these changes were 
also marked by continuities. Oral interviewees generally agreed that at mid-century, women 
continued to cook nearly all the food in rural households, female children did the related chores, 
and most of the ingredients in the meals they ate were usually grown or caught within a short 
distance of the pot in which they were prepared.33 
 
The African migrants who arrived on the Kenyan coast as laborers during the 1910s found 
themselves within a new capitalist labor regime that was in many ways markedly similar to the 
paternalist system of dependency and obligation that had preceded it. The Masters and Servants 
																																																						
30 The rural, South Asian duka owner, though mostly in a post-colonial context, is a central figure as the character 
“Abdullah” in Ngugi wa Thiongo’s classic novel of decolonization in Central Province, Petals of Blood (New York: 
Penguin, 1977). The remembrance of a nearby duka was common across the memories of oral informants. Oral 
Interviews, Mombasa, Kenya and Nyanza, Kenya, November 2014-February 2015.  
31 See the Veterinary Department Annual Reports, 1920s-1930s. McMillan Library, Nairobi. Also available in the 
African and Commonwealth Collections, Bodleian Library, Oxford University.  
32 Drawn from my “Fishing Nets and Fertile Waters.” 
33 Aggregated from oral Interviews in Mombasa and Nyanza Province in Kenya, November 2014-Feburary 2015. 
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Ordinance, a labor code that had roots both in metropolitan Britain and its Empire, was designed 
to create a capitalism that was still tempered by a paternalist ethos.34 In Kenya, if workers were 
hired more than a day’s journey from their home, the employer was obligated to provide housing, 
medical care, and, indeed, food. Workers would be paid a wage, but they also were dependents, 
and needed maintenance. 
As upcountry migrants arrived on the coast in increasing numbers during the 1910s, they 
had to acquire food outside the rural structures that had previously provided it. Theoretically, 
following from the Masters and Servants Ordinance, they would all receive posho rations. From a 
rural cuisine marked by variety and freshness that a gendered political economy had prepared for 
them, male migrant workers had to confront dietary monotony, and their own lack of training in 
cooking. Even colonial officials who were otherwise not particularly sympathetic to African social 
needs regretted the comestible situation in which African laborers found themselves. W.J. 
Simpson, a medical doctor and the architect of racial segregation in Mombasa, observed in 1915 
that back in their homes upcountry Africans had “a varied diet, which is well cooked,” but on the 
coast “they are brought close together in large numbers” and “are without their wives; and the food 
is of a different kind, monotonous, and for them not always properly cooked.”35 
Despite such generalities, the situations in which labor migrants founds themselves, and 
the ways such changes necessitated a reworking of comestible practices, varied greatly and was 
tied to the geography of their workplace, as well as the particularities of their individual employers. 
During the 1910s, most upcountry Africans worked on plantations, rather than in Mombasa. In the 
long term, the European plantation sector on the Kenyan coast, with the exception of sisal, was a 
																																																						
34 Douglas Hay and Paul Craven, eds. Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955 
(Chapel Hill: North Carolina, 2014). See, especially, the chapter on Kenya by David Anderson. 
35 W.J. Simpson, Sanitary Matters in the East African Protectorate, Uganda, and Zanzibar (London: Colonial 
Office, 1915), 6. Library of the Kenya National Archives, Nairobi. 
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failure, but during the 1910s it was still sputtering along and for thousands of Africans their 
experience of labor migration was mediated through these colonial institutions. Frederick Cooper 
notes how former slaves and other coastal peasants, if they were to work for a wage, avoided these 
European plantations because they preferred the flexibility on Arab and Swahili ones, even though 
they paid lower wages. Europeans plantations, Cooper argues, “kept labor under contract and 
severe discipline” and, so exacting was the work, that it bore “a remarkable similarity to the 
customary work rules of Malindi’s slaveowners in the nineteenth century.”36 
Cooper’s comparison of European plantations to those of the slaveholders during the 
nineteenth century is apt, but he fails to push the analogy far enough. The central strength of 
Cooper’s work on labor in coastal East Africa, whether of slaves or squatters, is the way he 
demonstrates that structures of domination and control did not exist in functional timelessness, but 
rather as points of conflict. The dynamism of slaves, ex-slaves, and coastal peasants who reworked 
as best they could the inequities of slavery and then colonial capitalism is adeptly analyzed. 
However, in Cooper’s narrative, upcountry migrants during the 1910s seem stuck and motionless 
under the domination of European planation capital.37 
European managers on plantations did mirror the slaveholders of the nineteenth century in 
their exacting demands and efforts at tight discipline, but they also shared being exposed to the 
initiative of African workers over whom they had only precarious control. Like the slaveholders 
of the nineteenth century, many European estate managers lived and tried to supervise African 
workers in relatively remote areas, far from the nexus of colonial control on the coast, Mombasa. 
Cooper notes how Arab and Swahili planters during the nineteenth century had to enter into 
negotiated dependencies with myriad obligations to slaves in order to control them in a political 
																																																						
36 Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, 187. 
37 Ibid., 187, 235-253. 
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context in which state power was minimal at best, and often absent entirely. While colonial 
policing even during the 1910s was more pervasive than that of the Sultanate the previous century, 
the state’s ability to predictably and consistently apply force in rural areas was spotty and 
haphazard. Plantation workers were exploited and lived in desperate circumstances, but they were 
also able to shape the trajectory of labor and life on European plantations, and at times even 
resorted to violence to do so.38 Upcountry workers were in the majority on isolated plantations 
and, adding to this the overall shortage of labor on the coast, plantation workers did have 
significant bargaining power.39 
The composition of the monotonous posho rations Africans received was one space over 
which these workers directed their struggle. Like wage-working vibarua and mahamali slaves in 
the nineteenth century and those who worked on the Uganda railway at the turn of the twentieth, 
posho was provisioned as part of the payment structure for upcountry plantation workers during 
the 1910s. The composition of posho varied, but along the coast it was approximately 1.5 lbs. of 
either rice or mealie meal (maize flour), along with salt. Workers’ posho was issued daily, but 
wages were more sporadic. Plantation wages tended to be paid based upon a 30-day punch-card 
that had to be completed before payment and, therefore, wages were in effect withheld until 30 
days of work had been recorded. Some plantations actually did not pay workers until their contracts 
were finished, for three and even sometimes up to six months. Consequently, posho was the more 
immediate, and daily, form of compensation workers received for their labor.40 So ubiquitous was 
the reality and idea of the posho ration that Archibald Church, in writing his colonial memoire 
																																																						
38 Such as the revolt by Somali workers at Powysland Plantation in Kilifi, a town north of Mombasa. Their revolt 
was partially inspired by anger over rations being withheld and not having enough time to prepare them. Detailed in 
(PC/Coast/1/9/12), Kenya National Archives (KNA), and the subject of a future article I will write.  
39 Aggregated from labor inspection files in PC/Coast/1/9, KNA. 
40 Inspection of Labour Camp, East African Estates, Ltd. Kinonde. 19 October, 1915. (PC/Coast/1/9/38), KNA, and 
Labour Inspection, Gogeni Estates, c. 1916 (PC/Coast/1/9/38), KNA. 
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during the 1920s, quipped of the standardized monotony of the “two pounds of posho and salt” 
(quotes around the phrase in his text) that workers received each day.41 
The immediacy of posho, and the temporal distance of the wage, meant struggles over food 
became a central location of daily conflict on coastal plantations. To escape the monotony of starch 
and salt, workers grew their own vegetable gardens (shamba) both to supplement their posho with 
a greater diversity of ingredients, and to produce surpluses they could sell for cash.42 At Gazi-
Gogoni Estate, south of Mombasa, a state inspector in 1917 noted that “the employees have in 
addition the advantage of cultivating their own shambas, … which they are quick to take 
advantage.”43 So productive were these home and market gardens that, during wartime food 
shortages in 1918, an inspector noted that “it is not too much to state that without foodstuffs 
brought in by [plantation workers] to the Gazi market the Gazi people would have been in 
difficulties for food during the present shortage.”44 These mashamba provided workers with more 
satisfying meals, but also a level of autonomy from the disciplinary strictures of plantation life. 
Colonial employers wanted a stable and disciplined plantation workforce, but in trying to create it 
they formed a system rife with contradictions which were seize upon by African workers. 
Principally, the 30-day punch-cards were meant to bind Africans to one employer, and to force 
regularity upon them by incentivizing them to work quickly to receive their pay. However, this 
would not work if Africans were able to subsist on their posho, since it would allow them to live 
on plantations without the need to purchase food commercially, and in consequence to work for 
wages when they chose and to complete their contract over the period of time they preferred. To 
																																																						
41 Archibald Church seems to have actually overestimated by a half pound the posho that workers actually received. 
See his East Africa, A New Dominion: A Crucial Experiment in Tropical Development and its Significance to the 
British Empire (Westport, CT: Negro Universities Press, [1927] 1970), 181. 
42 Inspection Report, Gazi-Gogoni Estates, September, 1917 (PC/Coast/1/9/38), KNA, DC, Inspection of Labour 
Camp, East African Estates, Ltd. 18 April, 1916, (PC/Coast/1/9/38), KNA. 
43 Inspection Report, Gazi-Gogoni, September, 1917, (PC/Coast/1/9/38), KNA. 
44 Inspection of Gazi Rubber and Fibre Estates, 20 March, 1918, (PC/Coast/1/9/38), KNA. 
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combat this, plantations generally denied posho when workers did not work, but the allocation of 
mashamba farms, itself a concession to make life more bearable on the plantation, in turn 
undermined the denial of posho. One exasperated inspector in 1915 argued that “As most men 
have or can have shambas the loss of posho is absolutely inefficient as a punishment.”45 Workers, 
living on the plantation, could produce food for their own consumption and generate cash income 
outside of the regular labor on the estate. Plantation owners had tried to discipline Africans to be 
regular workers, but these migrants recognized the contradictions in these efforts and instead 
repurposed them to open small, but significant, spaces of autonomy in a draconian work 
environment. 
The relative isolation of the plantation from consistent access to food markets meant posho 
was a necessity for rural employers. Newly arrived upcountry migrants without connections in the 
coastal peasant communities needed reliable access to food while they worked. However, those 
who went to Mombasa, or even to the plantations that surrounded the city, had their relationship 
to food more overtly commercialized through the experience of migration. The presence of these 
migrants, in turn, also further commercialized the comestible landscape of Mombasa. 
Just to the north of Mombasa island, Europeans planted sisal with Kikuyu migrants 
working the fields and Kamba the machinery. Management paid cash wages on the usual 30-day 
ticket, provided a mixed ration, and even tried to incentivize regularity by giving a bag of rice if 
one worked six continuous days. However, different from the more rural plantations, workers at 
Nyali also had the option to take their rations in cash, though when food became cash it too was 
fixed to a longer schedule. “In lieu of rations,” the inspector of the estate noted, “a man may have 
Rs. 2/30 per month.”46 In more rural areas, some plantations did try to shed the obligation of 
																																																						
45 DC, Inspection of Labour Camp, East African Estates, Ltd. Kinonde. 19 October, 1915, (PC/Coast/1/9/38), KNA. 
46 Inspection of Nyali Sisal Estate, 17 March, 1915, (PC/Coast/1/9/32), KNA. 
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providing food, but they were limited by their geographical location, as was noted that on a 
plantation well west of Mombasa near Voi, as they gave “rations in cash when [workers] can buy 
food,” but “otherwise the ration [was] to be of a varied nature of local produce only.”47 For 
plantation workers, their proximity to Mombasa correlated to the extent to which one’s comestible 
practices were being commercialized. 
For Africans working outside the plantation sector, the question of whether they acquired 
their food through paternalist obligations or cash-based transactions depended on the type of work 
they did as well as their employers. On the docks, dominated by Arab and Swahili workers, but 
also joined by some upcountry Africans, the pay was the highest in East Africa, and also came 
with a ration. On a rate basis, dock workers were paid approximately three-times more per shift 
than planation laborers, though the average number of dock shifts per worker each month during 
the 1910s ranged from only two to seven days per worker.48 Consequently, dock workers had often 
had greater and more immediate access to cash than most others did, but, with posho provisioned 
only a small number of days per month, they likely had to more commonly use their wages to 
acquire their food. 
The other major employer in Mombasa outside the docks was the colonial state, and it did 
provide posho to some workers. However, other state employees, similar to dock hands, had to 
rely on cash for their daily meal. When seeking to hire workers to cut the bushes in Mombasa, the 
Medical Officer of Health reported that they would be paid monthly, but also that “Twelve cents 
per diem are given [to them] daily with which to purchase posho and this is deducted at the end of 
the month.”49 With market facilities and other food options in the city, employers did not always 
																																																						
47 District Commissioner, Voi, to the Provincial Commissioner, Coast. 6 November, 1917, (PC/Coast/1/9/38), KNA. 
48 PC, Coast. Labour for Mombasa Port, 22 November, 1915 (PC/Coast/1/9/26), KNA, File: Returns from Port 
Labour Office, 1917-19 (PC/Coast/1/9/46), KNA, and Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters, 249. 
49 Medical Officer of Health, Mombasa, to the PC, Coast, 6 February, 1918 (PC/Coast/1/9/59), KNA. 
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supply posho, which therefore often made urban labor relations more overtly commercial. 
Working in these conditions, state employees, dock workers and others earning cash income in 
Mombasa were the beginning of a growing consumer class of poor urban residents who needed 
food for purchase, both as food stuffs and as already prepared meals. Women who were excluded 
from wage labor were already earning their income with this work during the 1910s, but during 
the 1920s and 1930, as the unemployment became an increasing hardship in Mombasa, many more 
people, and many of them men, would turn to the work of providing food to these workers as a 
way to survive in the colonial city.50 
Conclusion 
 The labor migrants that came to the Kenyan coast during the 1910s were the first generation 
of long-distance, African wage laborers in colonial Kenya. By studying how these migrants 
acquired their food, we see how the capitalism that was made in Kenya was a composite, drawing 
as it did on the paternalist system that had structured inequality during the nineteenth century. 
Especially on plantations, Europeans had to enter into a complex matrix of obligations to employ 
African workers, providing not only housing and medical care, but also posho, as well as shambas 
on which more foodstuffs could be grown. In urban Mombasa, life was more commercialized, and 
since food could be more easily purchased from shops, markets and hawkers, employers could 
create more distance between themselves and their workers, pay them a wage, and there the 
obligation ended. However, even for those employers that paid only in cash, the language of 
rationing and obligation was still there. African workers were given cash “in lieu of rations” or 
“rations in cash.” To employ was to pay a wage, but also to be obligated to maintain. 
																																																						
50 See Chapter Two, especially, as well as the subsequent chapters in this dissertation that explore these themes. For 
women working in the early-colonial food economy in Mombasa, see Margaret Strobel’s Muslim Women in 
Mombasa, 1890-1975 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 129, and Willis, Mombasa, 197. 
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 Outside the city, European wage-labor plantations were not run radically different than 
those that had held slaves in bondage before 1907. African workers, like the slaves before them, 
faced an asymmetrical workplace in which the field of struggle was bounded within a framework 
of dependency and obligation. Both slaves and waged Africans had limited access to the structures 
of power, but used what they had to carve out spaces in which they could, to quote Jonathon 
Glassman again, “gain more meaningful control over their lives.” In this essay, we have seen how 
among these efforts were the simple daily acts to make the posho taste a little better with a few 
ingredients added from the garden. That workers consistently and ardently tended to these plots 
after long days of hard labor should tell us how significant, indeed, a good-tasting meal was to 
















Image 1: Migrant Workers in Mombasa, 1907 
   
Waged workers in 1907 who migrated to Mombasa from an unidentified “upcountry” area, and employees of the 
























Source: We know that some upcountry Africans were already arriving as migrants by 1900, but they were 
not counted in population estimates, indicative of the small size of their communities. However, by 1906, 
their numbers had increased to the extent that they were statistically bundled with Swahilis (see Table 2 
below) to create the new category of “Africans,” a population group that was 2,600 people larger than the 
number of “Swahilis” in 1900, suggesting that more and more upcountry migrants were coming to 
Mombasa. For the 1910s (see Table 3), both “Swahili” and “Africans” were dropped in favor of “Natives 
(Resident)” and “Natives (Non-Resident), the former combining upcountry Africans with Swahilis and the 
latter for Mijikenda who split their time between the city and their rural coastal homes. Karim 
Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa, c. 1895-1939: Some Aspects of Economic and Social Life in an 












































   































































































Map 1: Mombasa Island, 1890 
 
   
 
The densest urban population at the end of the nineteenth century was on the south-eastern side of the island, 
with the nearby dhow port. The soon-to-be constructed deep-water port was built on the southwest side of 




IMPOVERISHED MEALS: RACE, GENDER AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOOD 
IN DEPRESSION-ERA MOMBASA 
 
 Before colonialism, East Africa was already part of the global economy. Nineteenth-
century East African consumers purchased cloth produced in New England factories, and enslaved 
Africans along the coast were forced to grow cloves that were sold throughout the Indian Ocean 
World. People living in East Africa both affected and were affected by fluctuations in these and 
other international markets.1 However, as wage labor and processes of commercialization spread 
during colonialism, the region and the economic lives of its people became increasingly more tied 
to the rhythms and disruptions of global capitalism. This was especially true for Mombasa. A port 
town, employment for many, as well as the state of countless ancillary industries, was dependent 
on the extent to which their region demanded imports and whether the rest of world desired their 
exports.2 After the stock market crashed in the United States in 1929, the circulation of imports 
and exports into and out of Mombasa fell off during the early 1930s, and as a result migrants and 
other urban residents were forced to endure the consequences of a systemic failure they did not 
cause.3 As the previous chapter showed, life as a labor migrant on the Kenyan coast before the 
1930s was difficult indeed, as low wages, monotonous food, and insufficient access to what was 
anyway substandard housing were its common features. However, this chapter will show how the 
Great Depression of the 1930s created conditions in which these migratory workers were pushed 
even further into a position of material depravation, ever the more compromising their ability to 
																																																						
1 Jeremey Prestholdt, Domesticating the World: African Consumerism and the Genealogies of Globalization 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) and Frederick Cooper, Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of 
Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). 
2 Karim Kassan Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa, c. 1895-1939: Some Aspects of Economic and Social Life in 
an East African Port Town during Colonial Rule,” PhD Dissertation, (Northwestern University, 1978), 341. 
3 Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa,” 287. See below for more on unemployment during the 1930s. 
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access the food they needed, but also how they developed strategies to survive in the urban world 
of Mombasa that otherwise offered few opportunities. 
 Historians have made clear that the Great Depression of the late 1920s and 1930s was 
indeed a global one, and how people far from Wall Street had to confront the devastation wrought 
by the decisions made by distant financial elites.4 Scholars are also beginning to write the social 
history of the Depression in Africa, but generally our understanding of how this affected people in 
their daily life on the continent remains thin, and particularly so for urban areas.5 As a 
consequence, while food-lines in Europe and the United States remain as indelible images that 
evoke how hunger and want filled Western cities, the history of how economic depression further 
destabilized already precarious urban livelihoods in Africa remains understudied. In the specific 
historiography of colonial Mombasa, our best social historians were not always consistently 
concerned with periodization, providing mostly broad composites of daily life under colonialism 
with inadequate attention to change over time.6 Frederick Cooper in his 1987 work on labor in 
colonial Mombasa is more interested in the specificities of particular historical moments, but he 
concedes in the introduction that his focus is not on “the daily lives of workers.” Instead, in 
																																																						
4 See Dietmar Rothermund, The Global Impact of the Great Depression, 1929-1939 (New York: Routledge, 1996) 
5 Moses E. Ochonu has written a social and political history of the Great Depression in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, 
though his focus is primarily on rural areas. See his Colonial Meltdown: Northern Nigeria in the Great Depression 
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2009). John Lonsdale has written persuasively on the combined effects of first 
the Great Depression and then the Second World War on Kenya, but his attention to urban areas is limited, and 
reserved primarily for the 1940s. Lonsdale’s work actually has more relevance to Chapter Three, and is addressed 
more extensively there. See his “The Depression and the Second World War in the Transformation of Kenya,” in 
David Killingray and Richard Rathbone, eds., Africa and the Second World War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1986), 97-142. 
6 This would be the case with two otherwise pathbreaking works of urban history, Margaret Strobel’s Muslim 
Women in Mombasa, 1890-1975 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) and Janmohamed’s “A History of 
Mombasa,” both of which have proved invaluable for reference in the writing of this dissertation. Part IV of Justin 
Willis’ book on ethnicity, urbanization, and work in early-colonial Mombasa promises in its title to explore up to 
1934, which would have covered the most difficult years of the depression, but, though much better on change over 
time, he largely only addresses the 1920s. See his Mombasa, the Swahili and the Making of the Mijikenda (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), 171-199. 
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Cooper’s study of labor strikes and the resultant change in colonial labor theory, African workers 
during the 1930s appear only briefly at moments of protest.7  
This chapter, then, provides an urban social history of Mombasa during the 1930s through 
the lens of how the Depression affected peoples’ ability to acquire food. However, this fills not 
only an empirical gap, but helps us to understand why the 1930s in particular were the period 
during which Africans began to formally organize against the inequalities of the British Empire. 
By going behind the picket line, we can see in the daily lives of Africans the ways in which the 
city’ racialized political economy structurally imposed depravation and, specifically, hunger and 
malnutrition, and from this emerges a more intimate knowledge about why Mombasa’s workers 
were so determined to protest this system during the 1930s and the decades that followed. 
 While colonial capitalism engineered a society that impoverished most Africans living in 
Mombasa, migrants and other urban residents also devised strategies to mitigate the economic 
hardships that such a system imposed. In rural areas, gendered and generational kinship labor had 
provided the essentials of life, but in the city people had to create new institutions to find shelter, 
amity, pleasure, and, indeed, food. From the 1970s, scholars have focused our attention on the 
ways many women made their livelihoods by supplying these needs and desires for people in urban 
Kenya. Women, working as prostitutes and concubines, provided food, sex and affective pleasure. 
In moving beyond the moralizing tones of much of the literature on prostitution and concubinage, 
these authors argued instead that this work was a critical mode of capital accumulation for women 
who were otherwise excluded from much of the wage-labor economy. These women were able to 
actually make more money than many wage-earning men and became significant property holders 
																																																						
7 Frederick Cooper, On the African Waterfront: Urban Disorder and the Transformation of Work in Colonial 
Mombasa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 42-60. 
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in Nairobi and Mombasa by selling to migrants what Luise White has called the “comforts of 
home.”8 
However, the “comfort” sector that is the least understood in the literature is the one, this 
chapter argues, that actually provided such amenities most often and to the most people in colonial 
Mombasa, and also served as a critical source of income for many. During the 1930s, the city saw 
the rapid growth of people selling prepared food and drink to the city’s working classes, with 
roadside vendors and in-home restaurants offering full, prepared meals, and hawkers providing 
tea, coffee, and small snacks. Prostitutes and concubines certainly made up a portion of the 
industry, selling mostly sex and some food, but they were in reality only a small part of it. The 
very poor could only afford a prostitute on occasion, if at all, and concubines could only be housed, 
fed and paid by people with consistent and higher salaries, a quite small proportion of the African 
population in the city. Therefore, it was these purveyors of inexpensive prepared food, coffee and 
tea, what I am referring to in shorthand as street-food vendors, that sold the comforts of home on 
a regular, daily basis to the majority of Mombasa.9 
Historians have only rarely addressed street-food vendors or more generally how migrants 
acquired their daily food and, when they do, they have tended to conflate femininity with the 
preparation of food.10 However, a closer examination of just how migrants acquired their meals 
																																																						
8 For Nairobi, see Janet M. Bujra’s “Women ‘Entrepreneurs’ of Early Nairobi,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 
9, no. 2 (1975): 213-234, and, for colonial Mombasa, Strobel, Muslim Women, 138-147. Luise White has produced 
the most empirically rich and theoretically elaborated study of prostitution in any part of Africa, in her Comforts of 
Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). There is also brief mention of 
Mijikenda women using concubinage as a way to live in the city and escape rural patriarchies. Willis, Mombasa, 
168, 186. 
9 See Note One in the Introduction for my use of “street food” as encompassing both prepared beverage and food 
vendors. 
10 For most scholars, this conflation has been implicit. However, James C. McCann quite explicitly marks African 
food preparation as nearly universally feminine, and dismisses the cooking of men as incidental, writing that 
“Cooking and food preparation is an application of both knowledge and accumulated experience that has historically 
be a fundamentally oral skill, and one quite specific to women” and that “cooking constitutes a particular body of 
gendered knowledge—Africa’s cooks, who built distinct repertoires of methods, processing, and presentation, were 
women. In African societies, bachelors do cook—but not creatively and rarely well.” The latter sentiment, 
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each day reveals this to be an inaccurate premise, and one that overlooks the quite radical 
transformation in how labor migration precipitated a re-gendering of comestible social relations in 
East Africa. During the 1930s, among migrant communities in Mombasa, most of the food that 
most men ate was actually being cooked by other men. The city’s migrants, who were primarily 
men during the 1930s, either prepared their own food, ate something cooked by a male housemate 
or household dependent, or they purchased it from a vendor who, increasingly, may have also been 
a man.11 We knew already that men cooked for wages inside European, South Asian, Swahili and 
Arab households, but the re-gendering of food preparation was far more widespread than the small 
number of isolated male cooks in elite kitchens.12 Nearly all African men who migrated to 
Mombasa had to learn to cook not only for themselves, but, often, also for each other.  
The pathbreaking work on prostitution and concubinage in urban Kenya has provided us 
the tools with which we can now think about how rural domesticity was urbanized in colonial East 
Africa. This chapter will build on these insights, but while also employing a methodological 
approach in which gender history is not only the study of the assumed category of “women,” but 
rather, as Joan Scott puts it, of historically-contingent structures that are “a primary way of 
																																																						
especially, underplays the extent to which men were cooking in colonial Mombasa and likely elsewhere on the 
continent, but also that men, beginning during the 1930s and especially from the 1950s, came to form a large 
proportion of the people cooking and selling food commercially to the African working class, so much so that many 
people I interviewed actual only remember men selling prepared food in Mombasa until the 1980s. Women certainly 
did work as street-food vendors before then, but such memories are indicative of how prominent men were in the 
industry. James C. McCann, Stirring the Pot: A History of African Cuisine (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 
2009), 5, 9-10. Strobel mentions street-food vendors briefly, but makes no mention of men in the industry, Muslim 
Women, 127-131. The best work we have on food vendors is on West Africa, and specially Ghana. See Claire C. 
Robertson, Sharing the Same Bowl?: A Socioeconomic History of Women and Class in Accra, Ghana (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1984), 106-12, and Gracia Clark, Onions are my Husband: Survival and Accumulation by 
West Africa Market Women (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
11 We do not have demographic data sorted by sex in Mombasa before 1947, but anecdotal evidence throughout the 
archival record suggests that men were the large majority of the migrant African community before the 1940s. 
Additionally, in 1947, for when we do have data, women were still only 34 percent of the “African” population in 
Mombasa after a period during World War II where it seems clear many more women were migrating to the city. 
See Chapter Three for demographic changes in Mombasa after 1940, as well as Table Seven for 1947-62. 
12 For men working as cooks inside elite households, see Dane Kennedy, Islands of White: Settler Society and 
Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), Strobel, Muslim 
Women, 127-131.  
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signifying power … based on perceived differences between the sexes.”13 We need a history of 
urban East Africa that both examines how women strategized modes of survival, and that accounts 
for how the gendered terrain on which they struggled was changing in light of political, economic 
and demographic transformations. Men in rural areas accepted a gendered order of kitchen labor 
in which it was rendered as female when it meant they were supplied with food, but the realities 
of urban life made it clear that such a binary vision of who cooked and who did not could no longer 
be sustained. As cooking became a survival skill in cities not only for women but also for men, 
migratory masculinity had to expand to incorporate the preparation of food as an act that was, at 
least when away from a rural home, permissible. 
Race, Inequality and Food in 1930s Mombasa 
The story of the Great Depression in Mombasa is part of a longer one about the changing 
dynamics of power between labor and management on the East African coast. During the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, employers in this region had difficulty adequately staffing 
plantations, urban industries and in finding government laborers, but the 1920s saw the balance of 
scarcity tilt much more in favor of management as the city’s population grew and more people 
needed work.14 Where before workers had been scarce, now it was jobs. With workers’ bargaining 
power eroding, employers seized the opportunity and lowered wages during the 1920s and, 
combined with general inflation, real wages and working-class spending power fell significantly 
by the end of the decade.15 However, this deteriorating situation became markedly worse with the 
Depression. With the global economy retracting, the total inward and outward tonnage of 
																																																						
13 Joan Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” American Historical Review 91, no. 5 (1986), 
1067. 
14 The population of Mombasa grew from 19,600 in 1913, to 30,000 in 1922, and to 42,500 by 1931. As the 
population expanded, so to did the African proportion of it. Mohamed, “A History of Mombasa,” 257 and Willis, 
Mombasa, 185. For labor scarcity in general during the 1910s, see the labor files of the same decade in 
PC/Coast/1/9, Kenya National Archives, Nairobi (KNA-Nairobi). 
15 Justin Willis, Mombasa, 184-85. 
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shipments in Mombasa’s Kilindini Harbor dropped by 38 percent from 1929-32, and with it the 
jobs of unloading and loading, as well as those in ancillary industries.16 For those workers who 
still had jobs, their wages were cut, and thousands more were under- or unemployed.17 All the 
while, migration to the city increased as opportunities in rural areas were also declining. Across 
Kenya’s agricultural areas, nascent processes of increasingly stratified class formation were 
underway, as older systems of dependency and obligation gave way to free-hold property rights 
and the accumulation of land, enriching some and relegating others to wage labor, either on 
plantations or in cities. As this unfolded, notes John Lonsdale, “so the value of land rose while the 
worth of clients declined.”18 The effects of this process pushed Luo and Luhya in Nyanza Province 
into labor migration, and the rural poor were even worse off in Central Province where settler 
expropriation reduced the land available to Africans, and in Ukambani where the overgrazing of 
rapidly expanding cattle populations was leading to soil erosion.19 Therefore, whatever people may 
have heard about difficulties in Mombasa, the prospect of earning what were still the highest wages 
in East Africa convinced many people that the risk of migration was worth it. However, with all 
these new migrants and a declining economy, a surplus of workers was created in the city that 
allowed employers to suppress wages and unemployment to continue even after the economy 
slowly recovered from mid-decade.20 Our evidence is thin and inconsistent, but what we have 
																																																						
16 Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa,” 287. 
17 Cooper, On the African Waterfront, 42-57. 
18 Lonsdale, “The Depression and the Second World War,” 127. For more on rural class formation, see Gavin 
Kitchen, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petit-Bourgeoisie (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1980). 
19 Ibid,. For the effects of overgrazing and soil erosion in Ukambani, ample documentation exists in a multitude of 
colonial reports, far too many to cite in a footnote, but for one example see V.A. Beckley, Soil Deterioration in 
Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1930), McMillan Library, Nairobi.  
20 See Graph 5 and Graph 6 for population growth in Mombasa and Africans as an increasing percentage of the city. 
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suggests that African spending power continued to decline during the 1930s, which resulted in 
lowering their ability to purchase food both in terms of quantity and nutritionally-diverse quality.21 
Of course, that Africans bore the most extreme effects of the Great Depression in Mombasa 
was not a result of the natural order of things, but rather because of racialized conceptions about 
what Africans required to live, which shaped wage structures in the colonial city. The ideological 
justification for this unequal system was a racial conceptualization of the “cost of living” within 
the British Empire. Mombasa was a diverse, cosmopolitan city during the 1930s, the majority of 
residents being Africans from upcountry and other rural coastal areas who had migrated to the city 
as workers, but there were also significant Arab, Swahili and South Asian communities, as well as 
a small European population.22 Each group entered a labor market shaped by employers’ 
perceptions of race and what each perceived racial group “needed” in terms of expenses in order 
to live in Mombasa. In rationalizing this system, officials and employers proffered that African 
wages only need match what they assumed the cost of living to be in rural areas. The theoretical 
underpinnings of this cost-of-living schema were derived from British racial discourses on social-
evolutionary civilizational hierarchies. That is, African workers, according to the logic of the wage 
system, only required compensation that was appropriate to their place in the social evolution of 
world history. Still at the stage of peasant farmers in the colonial imagination, Africans did not 
need the higher wages of “more advanced” groups like “Asiatics,” primarily referring to Arabs 
																																																						
21 Testimony of [no first name given] MacIntyre, Mombasa Municipal Engineer, to the Mombasa Labour 
Commission of Inquiry, 1939. (AG/8/119), KNA-Nairobi. For the dock-work sector as one example, wage increases 
and decreases were actually uneven across different forms of port labor during the Depression, but overall incomes 
fell for these workers during this period as decreasing tonnage moving through the port meant fewer days of work 
were available to casual laborers. See Cooper, On the African Waterfront, 32-3. 
22 For example, in 1931 Africans were approximately 50 percent of the population, Arabs 15, South Asians 30, and 
Europeans just under three percent. Swahilis were inconsistently categorized by colonial surveyors and the 
government more generally, and individuals that would have identified as Swahili, or more likely by their specific 
“twelve tribes” communal identity, were probably inconsistently either categorized as African or Arab. 
Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa,” 258. For more on the demography of Mombasa during the 1930s and 
throughout the twentieth century, see the relevant tables presented in this dissertation that are listed on page xiii. 
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and South Asians with the latter usually paid more, and certainly nowhere close to the salaries of 
those “most advanced” Europeans, whose habits of “civilization” required high wages to be 
maintained. A 1945 report looking back at how Africans had been compensated in previous 
decades, remarked that “African labourers’ wage-rates have been based on a scale commensurate 
with the standard of living customary in the native communities to which they belong, and 
responsibility has not been accepted for the payment of wages on a scale appropriate to the needs 
of a civilized man.”23 
Therefore, the operating premise of wage structures in Mombasa was that Africans would 
make less than Europeans, South Asians and (some) Arabs, irrespective of the value their labor 
provided. However, the social historian of Mombasa faces a dearth of data when trying to make 
precise pronouncements about just how much Depression-era declines in African income affected 
this racialized income structure and the consequent ability of poor urban Africans to acquire food 
in this capitalist city.24 Granular wage and cost-of-living data is almost non-existent for much of 
the 1930s, but the comparative flood of documentation that was produced after the 1939 general 
strike in Mombasa provides the best opportunity to discern rough estimates for how economic 
decline affected the diets of African workers. Following this strike, what became known as the 
Willan Commission studied wages and the living conditions of workers in the city. In support of 
its official report, the commission conducted interviews that produced 300 pages of testimony by 
																																																						
23 For a summary of colonial theories of African wage rates in Kenya, with specific attention to Mombasa, see 
Report of Committee of Inquiry into Labour Unrest at Mombasa, Part II (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1945), 
throughout, and the quote and more explicit commentary found on page 49, (ABK/18/82), KNA-Nairobi. Wage-
rates are also addressed in Part I. See Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Labour Unrest at Mombasa, Part I 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1945), (331.11, REP), Library of the Kenya National Archives, Nairobi. See also 
Cooper, On the African Waterfront, 53-4. 
24 I found this to be true in my research on the 1930s in the archives, and Cooper, in his own history of labor in 
colonial Mombasa, seems to have found little information on wages and actual cost of living for workers in the city 
during the 1930s. See his quick overview and limited data on the 1930s as opposed to the comparatively rich 
information he provides on the 1940s and 1950s. For the 1930s, see Cooper, On the African Waterfront, 26-57. 
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employers, officials and employees about working-class life and labor during the 1930s. The 
problems of empirical extrapolation from such testimony that comes from the contested terrain of 
labor negotiations are multitude, not the least being that both sides were providing quantitative and 
qualitative information meant to buttress arguments about whether to raise, lower or maintain 1939 
wages. Nonetheless, the claims and counterclaims of this testimony provide invaluable data for a 
period of Mombasa’s history for which we have almost no formal documentation of the day-to-
day lives of workers and how their position within the city’s racialized political economy 
structured their spending power and thus access to food. This section will draw on the testimony 
for the Willan Commission to carefully reconstruct these debates and negotiations in order to see 
what they tell us about Mombasa’s social structure, as well as to better understand how global 
economic depression further entrenched urban Africans into a position where they struggled on a 
daily basis to acquire nourishing meals. 
The Willan Commission was formed after the 1939 General Strike that had followed many 
other work stoppages by both casual and kazi ya mwezi (monthly) laborers throughout the 1930s.25 
Within the broader concern to study workplaces and workers’ lives to avoid such labor conflict in 
the future, the commission engaged in what Frederick Cooper has called the “Battle of the 
Budgets,” debating the levels of wages and in-kind compensation that were required for Africans 
to survive as workers in Mombasa. These arguments were very much structured through the logic 
of a racialized cost of living, as African budgets were calculated by Europeans “who would have 
not dreamed of living the life for which they were budgeting.” Their vision was one of basic 
survival, compensation that would allow workers “to buy maize meal, fuel, potatoes, a bit of meat, 
																																																						
25 Cooper, On the African Waterfront, 42-57, and Anthony Savage and Donald C. Clayton, Government and Labour 
in Kenya, 1895-1963 (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 222-25. 
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and very little else.” These debates were central to the material conditions of African workers, as 
they came to shape “the definition of a legitimate wage” in colonial Mombasa.26 
During the Battle of the Budget after the 1939 strike, estimates over the cost-of-living in 
the city varied radically from person to person.27 D.L. Norman, the District Commissioner of 
Mombasa, offered that Africans could live on 22/50 per month, a figure that should be considered 
alongside the reality that South Asian workers averaged 80/- per month. Mr. Sonhai, a building 
contractor and employer of African construction workers, felt that actually 10/- a month was 
enough for Africans, with 5/- for food and the other 5/- for housing, apparently concluding that 
food and shelter were the only expenses of a household. The Willan Commission itself 
recommended that a minimum wage of 18/50 per month as a base salary before housing expenses 
would be adequate for African workers. However, the missionary Father Lawless, who was based 
out of the working-class neighborhood of Makupa, provides an impressionistic data point that such 
wages were below what people needed to achieve daily nourishment in Mombasa, noting that “20/- 
is really a menial wage for a single man” and that workers have “got to get a certain amount of 
meat, fish and vegetables besides the ordinary posho [maize-meal porridge].” By implication, 
Father Lawless was suggesting that 20/- was not enough to purchase a diet beyond basic posho. 
Despite this perspective, the Father was nonetheless fairly conservative in his suggestion for a 
more adequate wage, estimating that an increase to 25/- per month for a single man, and 35/- for 
those living with their families, would be sufficient.28  
																																																						
26 Cooper, On the African Waterfront, 42-54. 
27 This conclusion differs from that of Cooper on the nature of this initial Battle of the Budget in 1939 in which he 
concludes that cost-of-living models presented to the commission were limited to the Medical Officer of Health, 
District Commissioner and, on the side of the workers, labor activist Makhan Singh, but, as will be shown below, 
close study of the testimony to the commission, rather than only focusing on its report, show a variety of voices 
arguing for differing levels of how much income was needed to live in Mombasa. Ibid., 53. 
28 Testimony of Mr. Sondhi, contractor, and Father Lawless, to the Mombasa Labour Commission Inquiry, 1939. 
(AG/8/119), KNA-Nairobi. 
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Others had a much higher sense of the cost of living than did officials, employers and 
missionaries. Makhan Singh, the General Secretary of the Labour Trade Union of East Africa, 
figured that workers needed at least 50/- per month to live in Mombasa. Additionally, Shariff 
Adrus bin Mohamed, a sarang (labor recruiter) at the African Wharfage Company who worked 
with Africans at the port, thought that hard laborers needed at least 60/-, but, given the severity of 
their labor, felt they could eat up to 100/- of food per month.29 Our data for this decade is too thin 
to determine in precise terms exactly how much this would have changed household budgets in 
relation to the overall cost of living in the city, but it was a rhetorical effort to move beyond the 
conservatism of Father Lawless who was only able to imagine a raise of 5/- above what even he 
admitted was the inadequate amount of 20/- per month. Bin Mohamed, who as a sarang also 
worked as a port laborer, was trying to envision the expenses of a diet would nourish the bodies of 
workers who lost large amounts of calories during days of hard labor. However, most employers, 
with a different set of economic incentives, had a radically different conception of the money that 
African workers needed to purchase their daily food. Their estimates for food per-diems ranged 
between 4/- and 8/- per month, obviously a mere fraction of Bin Mohamed’s figure of 100/-. 
Others, with less motivation to keep African compensation suppressed, had higher estimates. Ali 
bin Namaan, a headman at the port, thought that workers should have at least 30 cents per day for 
basic food, but 1/- a day would be closer to adequate, while Said bin Oman, a local mudir, felt 
those living and working in the peri-urban area of Changamwe needed 15/- per month for their 
food.30 
																																																						
29 Cooper’s observation that “unofficial attempts to present a budget figure were limited to those of the [above 
mentioned] Indian labor leader, Makhan Singh,” understates the situation, as many Arab and African workers 
argued for the need for higher budgets in front of the 1939 Mombasa Labour Commission of Inquiry, as this chapter 
shows. Testimony of Mr. Sondhi, contractor, Father Lawless, and Shariff Adrus bin Mohamed, of the African 
Warfage Company, to the Mombasa Labour Commission Inquiry, 1939. (AG/8/119), KNA-Nairobi. 
30 The testimony of Giddeon Harrison, of the Native Clerk Office Inspector of Works, Railways, Dewji Kawa Shah, 
Manager of Aluminium Works, Ali bin Namaan, Head at the port, R.K. Desai, of the Vegetables Growers 
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While many European commentators were suggesting that Africans could live on a total 
compensation of little more than 20/- per month, the reality was that most workers in Mombasa 
made far less. By 1939, with the economy recovering but population growth still keeping the labor 
market saturated, the average African wage in Mombasa was 13/- per month, and some were paid 
as low as 6/- monthly.31 These lowered wages were compounded by the tendency of employers to 
no longer pay posho food rations in addition to cash income. Though the Masters and Servants 
Ordinance still required it, enforcement of this ordinance by the 1930s was minimal, and the 
evidence suggests that it was only provided to the extent that employers saw such in-kind payments 
as required to retain workers. With the Depression and increased migration to the city producing 
an oversaturated labor market, employers did not often feel such pressure, either to provide these 
in-kind payments or, without them, the wages required to obtain the necessities of life. While lower 
wage earners were the most exposed to the decline in real wages, even those middle-income 
earning Africans felt their compensation was below what was required to live a life they deemed 
stable and comfortable in the city. For example, Giddeon Harrison, a Mijikenda with 90/- a month 
office job, reflected that while poorer laborers certainly could not live at the rate of 4/- a month for 
food,” he also explained that even on his salary he struggled to have a workable household budget, 
as he spent 70/- per month on food to feed himself, his wife and two children. Pushed by his 
interviewer that this seemed an enormous amount to spend on food, Harrison replied: “But what 
can I do? If I do not get good food my family will get sick.”32 Reading this testimony closer, we 
can see that Giddeon, part of the small middle class of urban Africans, was not satisfied to just eat 
posho, but wanted the ability to dedicate 70/- a month to buy “good food” to maintain his family’s 
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31 Testimony of Makhan Singh at the Mombasa Labour Commission Inquiry, 1939. (AG/8/119) KNA-Nairobi. 
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health. If Giddeon found it difficult for his family to have a diverse and healthy diet on the 90/- he 
was paid, those living off the average 13/- per month must certainly have struggled to eat much 
beyond boiled maize-meal.33  
People like Harrison were the exception with the large majority of Africans in Mombasa 
living off far lower wages than his, but he was also part of a small strata of African and Arab 
workers in the city who had the resources to occasionally provide their families with “good food.” 
Saidi bin Awath and Mbarak bin Ali, Arab workers at the port, sometimes made an above-average 
income, but as casual laborers their income was inconsistent, relying on the shipping schedules in 
which some months they worked 20 days and other times only four, meaning a monthly take-home 
ranging from 8/- to 40/-, with these totals being slightly higher if they worked night shifts. In their 
testimony, they asked for 90/- per month for food, and when told that this was a “ridiculous” and 
“absurd” amount, they responded in the same way Giddeon had, advocating that they and their 
families deserved diverse nourishment. Bin Awath told the interviewers that a 90/- per month 
salary was needed to “have good food and milk for the children.” In reality, neither man made 
close to that amount, and Bin Awath explained that when work was slow he would survive by 
spending “50 cents a day [on food] if I have no money.”34  
Some workers at the port had more security, such as the serangs who were mostly Arab. 
They were manual laborers, but also had the responsibility to recruit casual workers each day. 
They made a base salary of 12/- per month, and then 3/- for each shift they worked, though they 
too were vulnerable to the fluctuations in shipping schedules. Shariff bin Mohamed, a serang, 
																																																						
33 The 13/- average for African workers across Mombasa derived from the Willan Commission testimony is also 
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noted how some days he ate well, others not, recalling the ways the insecurity of his work 
determined how much money he had for food: “If I do not get anything I spend 12 cents, but if I 
have got work I spend 2/-.” As even inexpensive prepared meals cost 30 cents, we can assume 
days without work were hungry ones.35 
The majority of Mombasa’s working class, therefore, lived primarily on maize-meal posho 
or other grains with minimal relish supplements, and even the small, middle-income classes of 
Africans and Arabs were dissatisfied enough with the food their wages allowed them to buy that 
they used that as a point of negotiation in the aftermath of the 1939 strike. Nonetheless, Mombasa’s 
workers, despite colonial opinion to the contrary, did desire a diet filled with more variety and 
food that better sustained them, as well as gave them affective pleasure, and they devised what 
strategies they could to acquire it. To close the gap between what they were paid and what they 
needed and wanted, some workers entered into cyclical debt relationships. Such a strategy actually 
fits both into an urban economy that was becoming increasingly monetized, as well as rural East 
African social structures. African workers needed money and so they created financial 
relationships with South Asian duka (grocery) owners, a situation not radically different than when 
people surrendered a level of autonomy for security as was common in rural societies. These 
workers became tied to shop owners, and the owners to them in an asymmetrical financial 
dependency. John Josiah Stevens, the senior supervisor for the Kenya Landing and Shipping 
Company, explained that some Africans “go to the dukas and say if you provide me with food I 
will pay you at the end of the month and then they spend more than they earn and get into debt 
with the duka and have to keep going to him.”36 Abdulla Mohamed, a Digo man who lived in the 
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Majengo neighborhood, employed such a strategy. Though more fortunate than many in that he 
was able to link together enough shifts at Vacuum Oil Company as a casual worker to earn around 
40/- per month, since his salary also fed his wife and two children he spent almost the entirety of 
his wages on food, costing him between 30/- and 40/- per month. To make his family life in the 
city work, Mohamed established a debt-relationship with a duka owner in which half his store 
expenses would be carried over each month. He explained, “I pay half and then I pay the other the 
following month. … I am always in debt. … If I owe 30/- I pay 15/- … and if I can I give him 
more.”37  
For Milker Mwashiri Mulea, his monthly salary put him in a similar situation, in that his 
salary of 40/- was only enough to cover his housing, water and, since he did not receive a ration, 
food expenses. After these monthly costs, Mulea still needed money to pay for firewood in order 
to cook his food, another part of the preparation process that had in rural areas been produced by 
kinship labor, as young children would gather it from common areas for their mothers.38 Though 
collecting firewood had been possible in Mombasa and its peri-urban areas during the early 
colonial years, by the 1930s it was increasingly an item that had to be purchased, and Mulea was 
acutely aware of this, noting that after spending down his 40/- salary, he still had “to pay for 
firewood and other things.” Firewood cost Mulea an additional 3/60 per month, in addition to other 
life expenses, and so “Sometimes I owe the shopkeeper some money and have to pay that the 
following month.” His co-worker, Rastas Kashoki, was a milk carrier and made only 17/- per 
month without housing, though he did have a per diem of 30 cents a day for food. Upon arrival in 
																																																						
37 Testimony of Abdulla Mohamed to the Mombasa Labour Commission of Inquiry, 1939. (AG/8/119), KNA-
Nairobi. 
38 Information on rural social structures aggregated from interviews conducted with permanently settled migrants in 
Mombasa, Kenya, November 2015-January 2016, as well as with those who returned, done in Kisumu, Kenya, 
February 2016. For more on firewood and urbanization, see Chapter Three. 
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Mombasa, this level of compensation meant he was effectively homeless, sleeping on the veranda 
of the dairy, but by 1939 he had moved into a one-room apartment that he shared with 30 people. 
Altogether, Kashoki had about 26/- per month for all his expenses, approximately the amount that 
Father Lawless thought was adequate for diverse nourishment for the working classes, but well 
below the cost-of-living estimates that had been provided by many other Africans and Arabs.39 
The economic situation of Mulea and Kashoki, with the former receiving no rations and 
the latter only a small cash per-diem, illustrate how the paternalism that had infused East African 
capitalism during the first three decades of the twentieth century was beginning to crumble by the 
1930s. During the early colonial period, with labor scarcity on the coast supporting the bargaining 
power of workers, the evidence suggests that employers largely did comply with the Masters and 
Servants Ordinance, if perhaps only because such in-kind or cash in-lieu payments were needed to 
keep workers on the job.40 However, with the Global Depression of the 1930s and increased urban 
migration, an over-saturated labor market on the coast opened the opportunity for employers to 
shed the obligation of providing food and housing to their employees. In 1939, the Mombasa 
Municipal Engineer explained the labor market of the 1930s, and revealed the ways in which 
African workers had lost the bargaining power that scarcity had provided. He noted: “The point 
about these boys [African men] is that when we want labour, there is a surplus in the town, and 
when we want 20 literally hundreds of boys come after the job.” The Municipal Engineer paid his 
workers 16/- per month with no additional in-kind compensation, compared to the 1920s when 
they were paid a lower base wage of 12/-, but also received food rations, free water and housing. 
Municipal Engineer MacIntyre noted that his workers before the Depression “did not spend 
																																																						
39 Testimony of Mwashiri Mulea and Rastas Kashoki, interviewed together at the Mombasa Labour Commission of 
Inquiry, 1939. (AG/8/119), KNA-Nairobi. See above for cost-of-living estimates by Africans and Arabs to the 
commission. 
40 See Chapter One. 
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anything on food” and when they returned to their rural homes they went back with “goods and 
boxes, and they had cases of luggage and when they left Mombasa they were able to pay for that.” 
Moreover, employees of the Municipal Engineer during the 1920s not only had food, housing and 
water provided while workers the following decade did not, their base income of 12/- may have 
been, in real wages, the same or even higher than the 16/- of the 1930s when adjusted for 
inflation.41 The interviewer, presenting this data back to MacIntyre during the 1939 commission, 
told him “I put it to you that [the workers] … are not nearly so well off now … it is very much 
worse.” In response, the Municipal Engineer tacitly admitted that life for Africans had deteriorated 
over the past decade, conceding that “perhaps it was a little worse.”42 In the absence of consistent 
and concrete data, this testimony of an employer incentivized to downplay the difficulties that 
waged workers faced in Mombasa is among the strongest points of evidence we have to argue that 
workers’ spending power and their consequent ability to buy diverse and plentiful food declined 
significantly during the 1930s. 
However, while falling real wages were likely widespread, the retreat of paternal capitalism 
evident in the office of the Municipal Engineer was more uneven across the city. In addition to the 
paternalism of duka debt relations, some employers still provided rations to their workers. Oil 
refineries, the port and other industries continued to pay their employees in food rations or 
provided daily per-diems in addition to a base salary, and a shift at the port sometimes included a 
prepared meal. Nonetheless, these rations and payments in-lieu seemed to always fall short of what 
was needed, and workers found the quality of the prepared food they were served to be of dubious 
																																																						
41 On both the lack of precise information about 1930s inflation levels in Mombasa, but also the likelihood that it 
was “severe,” see Cooper, On the African Waterfront, 54. 
42 Testimony of [no first name given] MacIntyre, Mombasa Municipal Engineer, to the Mombasa Labour 
Commission of Inquiry, 1939. (AG/8/119), KNA-Nairobi.   
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quality.43 In addition to these industrial concerns, those working as domestic laborers also 
continued to be compensated through a composite wage-ration system, and these relations emerged 
from a longer history of slavery and abolition on the East African coast. As Margaret Strobel has 
shown, during the first decades after slavery was abolished, many former slaves in Arab and 
Swahili households remained in the same homes in which they had been enslaved, if only now 
paid small, cash wages. By the 1930s, though, migrant men began to increasingly take the place 
of formerly enslaved women, and also found work in European and South-Asian homes.44 Labor 
relations were most paternalist in Swahili and Arab households, paying wages as low as 6/- to 8/- 
per month, though also with in-kind payments of clothes, housing, and food. However, South 
Asian employers generally followed the structures of the city’s larger industries, paying higher 
wages, but with less paternalist obligation. One home paid 13/- per month with food and housing, 
another 16/- or 17/- with food, but not housing, while another paid 20/-, though without providing 
housing or food.45 
The labor relations on Mombasa’s peri-urban market gardens also only partially fit into 
general patterns of increasing proletarianization and the overt monetization the food system. In 
these fields, migratory Africans, mostly Kikuyu and Meru, worked for South Asian employers and 
grew produce sold in Mombasa. Wages for these agricultural workers varied from 10/- to 21/- per 
month, though inconsistently they may have also been compensated through food and housing. 
Some workers were provided food from the farm, but these created awkward relationships with 
																																																						
43 The separate testimony of Captain Belfrage, Chairman of the African Warfage Co., Abdulah Cherajdi, President 
of the Unemployment Coast Citizens Association, and the combined testimony of Saidi bin Awath and Mbarak bin 
Ali, employees of the East African Literage Company, to the Mombasa Labour Commission of Inquiry, 1939. 
(AG/8/119), KNA-Nairobi. 
44 Strobel, Muslim Women, 127-131. 
45 The separate testimony of Ali bin Namman, Headman, Dr. M.A. Rana, and Makhan Singh, General Secretary of 
the Labour Trade Union of East Africa, to the Mombasa Labour Commission of Inquiry, 1939. (AG/8/119), KNA-
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employers who only reluctantly allowed their workers to eat what could have been sold. Kabatha 
wa Washomba, who worked on one such market garden outside Mombasa, used his wages to buy 
and split a bag of maize meal with four friends, as well as some meat, but then would also 
occasionally add to this with some “Indian vegetables like binda and bogigari and spices” that he 
picked from his employers’ field for his own consumption. However, Washomba added that “they 
do not belong to us they belong to the owner. … I take a little vegetables but the owner shouts at 
me a lot.” Pushed that he may have been stealing them, Washomba replied that “I take it in the 
presence of the owner, I do not steal it,” but yet his employer would always express displeasure 
when he did.46 Washomba’s testimony suggests that workers on this market garden were pushing 
the owner to be more of a patron than he desired to be, by demanding that they were owed food 
too as payment for their labor. That he reluctantly permitted his workers to take food from the 
fields may have been because he was aware of the Master and Servants Ordinance and, if he 
reported his workers for theft, he would have had to also explain that he was not otherwise 
providing them with food.  
Additionally, throughout Mombasa, many employers during the 1930s practiced a 
rhetorical, if not in reality material, paternalism. For example, the railway, the largest of state 
employers in the city, technically paid per diems for food, but at rates so low that these payments 
did not provide workers with the resources they needed to adequately feed themselves. Manual 
laborers at the railway made a total salary of 23/- per month, but it was divided as 3/- for housing, 
1/- for firewood, and 4/- for food. Barely above the 20/- per month that Father Lawless saw as 
inadequate for providing a healthy diet, and far below the amounts for which Africans and Arabs 
were advocating, the inclusion of “per diems” were more a rationalization of low wages than a real 
																																																						
46 Testimony of Kabatha wa Washomba, agricultural worker, to the Mombasa Labour Commission of Inquiry, 1939. 
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commitment to providing workers with access to diversely nutritious diets. Merely stating that 4/- 
was reserved for food did not mean it was actually enough to allow workers to eat more than maize 
meal. The designation of per diems, therefore, only served to cover over the reality that these 
workers had their food no more guaranteed than those who received a single, gross wage. Manual 
laborers at the railway, and others in similar situations, were in fact fully proletarianized within 
Mombasa’s urban food system. Their food was acquired through cash, not paternalist relations.47 
Before the 1930s, workers on the Kenyan coast led difficult comestible lives. They 
primarily subsisted on a diet of maize meal, salt, and, if they were lucky, small amounts of meat, 
vegetables, and maybe some beans. However, for the most part, they ate boiled maize meal. Their 
situation was not one many in East Africa would have envied. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the 
food lives of workers during the 1930s had declined even from that low standard. The evidence 
we have tells us more about the higher-wage earning workers that made between 40/- and 60/- per 
month, but who were nonetheless only able to make their budgets work by going deep into debt to 
duka grocers. The record is unclear about the extent to which workers making less, who were the 
majority and earning between approximately 6/- and 24/- per month, were able to access credit 
from duka owners. The archive has no evidence of it, and we might assume that merchants may 
not have wanted to risk lending to workers who made so little month-to-month, especially if they 
were casual workers with no guaranteed income. If they were unable to access credit, which seems 
likely, they would have not been able to afford food in the quantity or variety they needed, let 
alone desired. The racialized political economy of Mombasa, and the wages that it paid to Africans, 
meant that their experience of wage labor came with the imposition of structural starvation and 




addition to such duka-debt relations, Africans and other urban residents also improvised and 
strategized other ways to round off the sharpest edges of colonial capitalism, and devised ways to 
survive in the city. 
Gender and Urban Food Systems in 1930s Mombasa 
Out of this unequal political economy, workers and small-scale proprietors created a new 
urban food system in Mombasa different in scale and composition from anything that had existed 
in the pre-colonial city. In particular, one of the most striking features of the experience wage-
labor migration to cities like Mombasa in East Africa was that men, while they were away from 
home, cooked. This was in stark contrast to rural areas in which women, almost exclusively, 
performed kitchen labor, with some help from young children.48 However, not all migrant men in 
Mombasa cooked and, those who did, did not cook all the food they consumed. The composition 
of Mombasa’s food system, and the social structures that held it together, were shaped by 
demographics, how peoples’ income determined what types of households they could create and 
the food they could afford, and the spatial geography of where people worked in relation to their 
homes. 
 Though arrival in urban areas meant living a much more overtly commercialized life, many 
migrants in Mombasa still managed to acquire their food through membership in a kin group, 
though the gendered demography of the city and the racialized wages that Africans received 
created markedly different urban kinship structures. The resiliency of kinship in Mombasa can be 
partially explained by political economy, as with rent expensive and wages low, only the relatively 
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1920s and 1930s. See B. Orr and J.L. Gilks, Studies of Nutrition: The Physique and Health of Two African Tribes 
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privileged in the African population could afford a home or apartment on their own, meaning that 
the atomized autonomy of modern city life was not part of most migrant experiences. Instead, the 
majority had to live with others and share rents in order to make their budgets work. However, 
these arrangements were not strictly economistic in a commercial sense, as they were also 
constructed to be social units that organized the domestic labor of the household. 
In some of these homes, people lived rent-free for periods as dependents of a person who 
had access to housing. Muriuki Kathungu remembered that when he first arrived in Mombasa he 
was without work, but was nonetheless taken into someone’s home. By 1939, he was employed as 
a roadbuilder and had free housing, but missed living with other people. Even though he was in 
government housing that prohibited roommates, Kathungu offered to others what he received upon 
his arrival in a new city, and took on boarders who would only pay when they had work. For those 
he called his “guests,” Kathungu explained that “If they get casual daily work they pay, otherwise 
they do not.”49 That notions of dependency and obligation remained paramount in the urban setting 
was made clear by Sabakaki Ali Giwisa, who was from Buganda where such a culture was strong 
in the political and social structure, when he observed that “In Mombasa a man who needs friends 
needs money, but I have no money,” and he continued that “I cannot collect these people for I have 
nothing to give them.”50 Part of the reason to have followers, or at least friends who were co-
dependents, was that it allowed for the distribution of domestic labor within the household, 
including inside the kitchen. Kabatha wa Washomba, who worked on a South Asian market garden 
and lived in the peri-urban area near Mombasa, recalled that, among his friends, “We cook [our 
																																																						
49 Testimony of Muriuki Kathungu, road builder, to the Mombasa Labour Commission of Inquiry, 1939 (AG/8/119), 
KNA-Nairobi. 
50 Testimony of Sabakaki Ali Giwisa, employee of the Municipal Canteen, to the Mombasa Labour Commission of 
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food] in turn, one day I, and other day another boy.”51 Washomba described his relation as one of 
equal distribution, but evidence from later decades shows that domestic cooking labor in such all-
male households was often mediated through hierarchical relations of reciprocal obligation, except 
that in the city generation replaced gender, with junior men cooking for their elders in exchange 
for free or reduced-cost food and rent. Though Kathungu was silent on the issue of domestic labor, 
if later decades are any indication, it seems probable that his dependents who did not have cash for 
their rent paid for their shelter by working in the kitchen.52 
 For migrants in Mombasa, entering into dependent relations became a way they could 
escape the most intense levels of depravation they faced in the town’s racialized political economy, 
avoiding both starvation and homelessness. During the great famine of the late-nineteenth century, 
people on the margins throughout rural East Africa entered into asymmetrical dependencies with 
powerful “big men” in order to access food, and similarly, in the manufactured, incremental famine 
of colonial wage labor, urban patriarchs who had secured steady work could use their accumulation 
of wages to build authority and prestige by taking in those who were without.53 This took on added 
significance in households without women because it allowed these urban “big men” to avoid 
cooking, and thus maintain their separation from the domestic labor of the kitchen that migration 
threatened. Some male workers at the Mombasa Public Works made quite clear that remaining 
																																																						
51 Testimont of Kabatha wa Washomba, agricultural worker, to the Mombasa Labour Commission of Inquiry, 1939 
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52 Kathungu to the Commission. 
53 For the social and political consequences of rinderpest (cattle disease) and famine in late-nineteenth century East 
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outside the kitchen was crucial to their masculinity, as, in reference to their ration, they had 
“refused to cook it because they say that that is the woman’s job to cook and not theirs.”54 
Historians have also shown that some men with consistent income during the colonial 
period employed women as concubines, who offered access to prepared food among other 
comforts. However, like with single-night prostitution, these more long-term arrangements were 
likely rare and available only to a small number of people, as high-wage earning Africans were 
few.55 Taking in a concubine was also significantly more expensive than having a male dependent, 
since women were also paid wages in addition to receiving food and shelter. For “big men” taking 
on male dependents, rent had to be paid regardless, and the cost of food, if prepared strategically, 
does not have to double, triple and so on with each additional person in the home. However, in the 
stagnant wage environment of 1930s Mombasa, surplus cash to be paid to concubines was scarce. 
The unemployed male migrant was the less expensive follower if one wanted to build prestige on 
the cheap.56 
 While such comestible relations continued to be at least partially structured by reciprocal 
obligation within urban households, as people traversed the city’s geography to go from home to 
work, they became increasingly entangled in Mombasa’s commercial economy. Far from their 
kitchens, and realistically without enough time to cook a meal even if they were close, workers 
had to either bring food with them, or purchase a prepared meal if they wanted something to eat 
during their shift. Within this context, a diverse group of urban proprietors began to recognize 
these workers as a new consumer class, though one with extremely limited incomes. With 
																																																						
54 Testimony of Robbins of the Public Works Department, Mombasa, to the Mombasa Labour Commission of 
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55 Willis, Mombasa, 168, 186.  
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thousands of people every day looking to buy prepared meals, snacks and beverages, urban 
residents capitalized on this opportunity to secure their own incomes by providing these migrants 
with the comestible “comforts of home.”57  
This work of selling prepared food and drink was done mostly by those excluded from the 
wage-labor economy. As many have noted, wage-labor in British Africa was implicitly rendered 
as male, emerging both out of the British patriarchal conflation of maleness and waged work, and 
African rural social structures in which women’s agricultural and household labor was too valuable 
to sacrifice, and so it was men who were seen as available to be sent to cities and plantations.58 
However, during these early decades of colonialism, some women did migrate to and live in 
Mombasa and other cities throughout Africa, and needed money to survive within a 
commercialized economy to support not only themselves, but often also children and husbands 
who lived with them, and to even send what remittances they could to their rural homes.59 
Moreover, the thousands of women who permanently lived in Mombasa also increasingly needed 
cash income. While middle- and upper-class Muslim women following purdah generally avoided 
working in public, historians have noted how formerly enslaved women after abolition, as well as 
Mijikenda women from surrounding rural areas, began to sell prepared food in Mombasa to 
generate income in the city.60 
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While women were often explicitly excluded from nearly all except domestic wage labor, 
many men also found it increasingly difficult by the 1930s to find work. By 1933, as migration to 
the city increased and the Great Depression suppressed the economy, one-third of Mombasa’s 
population was unemployed.61 Even earlier than the 1930s, African men showed a willingness 
when looking for work be flexible in what they considered masculine labor. Strobel has observed 
that during the early decades of twentieth century men came to predominate as domestics in the 
homes of Europeans, Arabs and Indians, necessitating the creation of a new colonially-paternalist 
term, the “houseboy.” Our evidence of the gendered composition of the street-food industry during 
the 1930s is thin, and what we have actually points to women primarily doing this work, but, by 
the 1950s when archival records thicken on this topic, it is clear that men made up a significant 
portion of the people selling food and drink in the city.62 Consequently, even though direct 
evidence is limited, the masculinization of cooking and serving food in Mombasa’s streets, and 
the rapid growth of the industry, likely began during the 1930s when men were struggling to find 
work as wage laborers, and thus would have been incentivized to turn towards the “informal” 
economies that had previously been a sector controlled mostly by women. Just as the men who 
worked for wages as domestics had to “redesign their self-image to include housework,” including 
inside the kitchen, so too other men had to accommodate themselves to the reality that, to survive, 
they needed to cook and serve food and drinks to both men and women in Mombasa.63 
The thesis that the industry rapidly expanded during the Depression is additionally 
supported by the reality that the municipal government also began in the same period to draft laws 
to regulate it. In 1929, the Mombasa Municipal Board started to pass licensing laws for non-
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62 See Chapter Three. 
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European eateries. While European restaurants were licensed nearly as soon as the British took 
control of Mombasa, urban authorities had been content to ignore how the rest of the city acquired 
prepared food. With the new bylaws debated and passed from 1929, the Municipal Board set the 
initial framework for how officials for the remainder of the century would try to create a “modern” 
restaurant and eatery infrastructure in the city. Consequently, though largely lacking the 
administrative capacity to enforce these regulations during the 1930s, these laws nonetheless 
established health requirements and building codes that have shaped the material struggle of 
survival for food and beverage vendors in Mombasa up to the present day.  
In the bylaws, colonial officials reimagined a new, modern restaurant culture in which the 
dirt floors of Mombasa’s eateries would be transformed into those made “of cement or wood or of 
some hard, impervious material.” The walls would similarly be solid and resistant to moisture or 
other substances, being composed of “glazed tiles, cement or other hard materials.” In addition to 
these solid floors and walls, the new Mombasa restaurant also needed to be ventilated and have 
access to clean water and a latrine. These were meant not only to physically alter the architecture 
of the city’s eateries, but to also enact social change within them. They were designed to prevent 
the metaphorical collapsing of home and business into a single physical and social entity. The 
bylaws allowed that people could legally have restaurants in their homes, but they needed to have 
a food storage, dining room, and latrine that were separate from those of residential use. The 
distinction between home and work needed to be strictly delineated, in the law, and in the 
architectural construction of physical space.64 
The drafts of these by-laws reveal not only this colonial vision of the comestible city, but 
also provide evidence into the actual composition of the food and beverage industry for a period 
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during which we have only scant documentation of these institutions. The attention paid to 
outlawing restaurants built on top of dirt floors and without walls made of “hard materials,” as 
well as modifying those that existed inside peoples’ homes, tells us that such comestible businesses 
likely already existed, thus requiring laws to legislatively transform them. Language also provides 
clues. In 1901, mkahawani was the primary word in Swahili used for restaurant, but by 1939 the 
noun for “hotel” in Swahili, hoteli, had had its definition expanded to also mean restaurant.65 These 
changes in language, as well as the legislation strictly policing the line between household and 
restaurant, suggest that vendors’ homes were places where men went to find both the comfort of 
food and shelter. Migrants, living far from home, found their meals and place of rest in the same 
institution.  
Such combined hotel-restaurant businesses also made good economic sense for those who 
ran them. If already paying rent for a home with a kitchen, and with limited access to capital, why 
expend double the rent for a separate restaurant when one could be created within their residence? 
Moreover, by operating out of their homes, vendors could also grow their revenue by renting bed 
space to men in need of a cheap place to sleep. Workers who either did not have friends with whom 
they could share rent, or could not find an urban patriarch to take them on as a dependent, looked 
to these hoteli to fulfill both the comforts of food and shelter. As Luise White has shown, 
prostitutes sold these “comforts of home,” in addition to sex, when men could occasionally afford 
them, but, as this dissertation argues, the far more common and daily ways in which men on low 
incomes acquired these comforts were in these hoteli and other eateries.66 
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However, whether living in a hoteli or another kind of household, when most people went 
to work for the day they needed to bring already-prepared food with them for lunch, or find a place 
they could purchase it. On their breaks, people could stop at a hoteli in someone’s house if one 
was located nearby, but they could also find a full meal at a roadside vendor, a kibanda in Swahili, 
or from a hawker selling prepared tea, coffee and snacks. These were especially important in 
industrial areas where in-home restaurants would not have been common given the paucity of 
residential housing, and the mobility of vibanda (pl. of kibanda) and hawkers meant they could 
easily move to where there was demand. At these vibanda, meals were cheap and, consequently, 
basic. Sidney Mintz has noted that meals created in a context of scarcity, whether environmental 
or in this case manufactured by a racialized political economy, often were composed largely of a 
single starch that was meant to be filling, and were complemented by a small relish that acted as a 
flavoring agent to make the staple more palatable.67 Such were certainly the conditions in 
Mombasa. As we learned in the above section, workers desired more diverse and satisfying meals 
than their wages provided, and often went deep in debt to have them, but, to keep food cheap, in 
the vibanda diversity of flavor was sacrificed for economy of price. 
Meals at roadside eateries consisted of a large starch serving such as rice or maize porridge, 
and were accompanied by a small relish of meat or vegetables. Nonetheless, even with a plate 
consisting primarily of starches, the majority of workers could only occasionally afford to eat at a 
kibanda with their diminished spending power.68 Individual meal prices ranged from 24-30 cents, 
which means most people could not eat all their food at these vendors on a daily basis. This tells 
us that most of the food that working-class people in Mombasa were eating was prepared at home. 
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Additionally, since most people worked from the early morning until the early evening, we can 
conclude that most food eaten outside the house would have been at lunchtime. However, despite 
its simplicity and the inconsistency of access to it, when people were able to purchase a prepared 
meal in a Mombasa eatery, it provided quick, easy and filling food. Large portions of maize meal 
were neither as nutritionally healthy or as diversely interesting as what people ate in rural 
communities, but, after a morning of hard labor, such filling food was likely quite satiating and 
desirable.69 By adding a supplementary option to cooking at home or bringing already-prepared 
food to work, street-food vendors by the 1930s were becoming a prominent part of Mombasa’s 
landscape. 
However, this was also an industry that had emerged nearly completely outside the 
regulatory structures of Mombasa’s administration. As municipal authorities created new licensing 
laws to administer the city’s restaurants, their initial motivations during the 1930s were more 
aesthetic and bureaucratic than economistic. They wanted to gain control over the future trajectory 
of Mombasa’s eateries. At first, the municipal board proposed a fee structure for the various 
licensing categories, but this approach was quickly rejected in favor of simply having free 
registration for all food businesses. These by-laws were less about taxes, and more about having 
power over the shape and composition of the city. It was social engineering, the creation of a new 
comestible Mombasa, rather than short-term economic extraction, that characterized official intent 
at this historical juncture. The Mombasa Minister of Health observed: “These By-laws are intended 
as a measure of control in a matter of health, not as a means of raising revenue, and it is 
considerable that while registration is essential for control the licence fee is unjustifiable.”70  
																																																						
69 For rural diets during this period, with the Kikuyu as the example, see J.B. Orr and J.L. Gilks, Studies of 
Nutrition: The Physique and Health of Two African Tribes (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1931), and, 
for the colonial period more generally, as well as the Kamba, Luo and Luhya as well, see Chapter One.  
70 Minster of Health, Mombasa, to the Town Clerk, Mombasa. 27 June, 1931. (UY/5/74) KNA-Coast. 
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Nonetheless, while the government did not require a fee for a license during the 1930s, 
these laws effectively presented an unwanted construction and/or rent bill to anyone who attempted 
to abide by them. A central advantage that the work of the street-food industry provided to 
undercapitalized proprietors in Mombasa were the low start-up and operating costs: cooking 
supplies, a push-cart, perhaps a table and chairs for customers, daily ingredients and fuel. A 
somewhat larger vendor might also pay wages to a few employees, but theoretically this expense 
was made up by increased revenue. There were costs, certainly, but they were not insurmountable. 
However, the restaurant by-laws threatened to create difficult hurtles to entering the industry by 
increasing the start-up capital required if one was to cook and serve in a restaurant with hard, 
“impervious” floors and tiled walls, and especially if people needed to remodel their homes to 
create a dining and cooking space discretely separate from their living quarters. The “healthy,” 
modern vision of Mombasa’s public-eating culture that officials imagined during the 1930s was 
one designed to be run and dominated by those who could afford high rents or the remodeling 
costs necessary to convert their businesses to fit municipal specifications. 
These laws, however, quickly faced the hard reality of Mombasa’s actual material 
conditions. The existence of these street-food vendors was essential to the daily reproduction of 
the labor force in the city, and Mombasa could not operate without them, unless the state and 
private employers were willing to raise wages. Low start-up and operating costs opened the 
industry to more people, but they also were crucial for keeping prices low enough that the city’s 
working class could afford to patronize these eateries. Workers’ wages prohibited them from 
eating in licensed restaurants that built their rent and other overhead expenses into the price of 
their food and drink. Absent a reconfiguration of Mombasa’ social structure, street-food vendors 
were necessary, however much they offended the aesthetic sensibilities of municipal and health 
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officials. By 1936, it had become clear that these new bylaws were extremely impractical. The by-
laws, one official observed, 
have not and are still not being strictly enforced on the poor class of natives, Arabs and 
Indians, as it is clear any attempt at strictly enforcing them would be not only a hardship 
on the applicants, but also on the section of the public served by those applicants.71 
 
These laws went largely unenforced, but their occasional application raised anxieties 
enough to affect Mombasa’s comestible culture during the 1930s, if only not in the way the drafters 
of them had hoped. The home restaurant that had drawn the ire of officials not only continued to 
operate, but may have actually increased in number during this period. Officials noted, “there are 
in existence a large number of so-called Restaurants, etc. working behind closed doors as it is 
impossible for them to obtain licences owing to the stringency of the By-laws.”72 Driving 
comestible merchants “to work behind doors,” these laws may have simply encouraged some 
vendors to leave the streets and to prepare and serve their customers at home, away from the 
surveillance, however minor, of health authorities. Some board members saw the impracticality of 
such strict building codes, and conceded that perhaps they needed to shape their laws to fit 
Mombasa’s urban landscape rather than the other way around. They argued that it was better to 
allow vendors to exist as they were, and license these vendors in order to “get some control over 
them rather than drive them to work behind doors.”73  
 The archives provide no evidence that subsequent effort was taken to enforce these laws 
any more intensely during the 1930s or for much of the 1940s. Street-food vendors had to adapt to 
																																																						
71 Report of the Sub-Committee appointed under Board Minute 938 to reconsider the Mombasa Municipality 
(Inspection, Storage and Sale of Food) Bylaws, 1929, and the Mombasa Municipality (Restaurant) Bylaws, 1931. 5 
August, 1936 (UY/5/74), KNA-Coast. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Report of the Sub-Committee, (Inspection, Storage and Sale of Food).  
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haphazard enforcement, but overall this period is notable more for the creation of laws to control 
the industry, rather than any sustained effort to do so. 
Conclusion: Racism and Urban Struggle in Colonial Mombasa 
The social history of working-class food in Mombasa opens a view into how the large 
global structures of capitalism and the racism of empire were made manifest in the daily lives of 
Africans living in a colonial city. Racial inequality was experienced in many ways in Kenya and 
across the African continent during the colonial period, but among its most visceral and physical 
forms were the hunger and malnutrition that it forced upon African workers in urban areas. As 
with the “food deserts” that political economies of racial segregation have created in communities 
of color in the cities of the United States today, so the urban, African poor in colonial Kenya had 
to endure the nutritional consequences of unequal access to healthy and diversified diets. In 
Mombasa, the Great Depression further exacerbated what was already an unequal social structure, 
causing a decline in the real wages of urban Africans. However, it would be a mistake to attribute 
these changes simply to the abstraction of a global economic downturn. The poverty wages 
Africans were paid were not the product of impersonal market forces, but rather the specific 
choices of individual employers based on racist assumptions about what Africans, as a group, 
should be paid. The Depression was a challenge, but also an opportunity for the state and private 
companies in Mombasa. While it deflated global markets, the Depression also put a final end to 
labor scarcity on the Kenyan coast, allowing employers, without fear of losing their labor force, to 
keep wages suppressed. In 1939, the Mombasa Municipal Engineer effectively admitted that there 
was collusion between various state employers to keep wages down when explaining why he 
lowered monthly salaries during the 1930s from 18/- to 16-. He observed that “In 1930 and 1932 
the Railway and Public Works Department found fault with the Municipality boys [the employees 
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of the Municipal Engineer] that they were being paid higher than their boys, and that is why we 
came down to those figures, the same figures as the Public Works Department and the Railway.”74 
They could have paid their workers more, provided two more precious shillings a month to help 
improve their employees’ diets, but they did not want to set a precedent of 18/-, a standard still 
well below what was required, as a higher rate of pay in the city. 
 African migrant workers thus found themselves in a desperate situation in 1930s Mombasa, 
but this chapter has also shown the ways in which these workers and other residents in the city 
improvised new forms of urban living to cope with the reality of unemployment, under-
employment or, even if one had a position, living off inadequate wages. However, in the coming 
decades, these strategies of urban survival would become identified by the British as roadblocks 
on the path to urban modernity. All-male households, a burgeoning body of development policy 
began to argue, posed a threat to social order and needed to be replaced by the hetero-patriarchal 
nuclear family and, instead of these workers eating at unlicensed vendors, they required food either 
cooked by wives or purchased in state-approved restaurants or canteens. Development would come 
to promise higher wages, better housing and more amenities for some, but we will also see that for 













Image 2: Street Food in Mombasa, 1908 
   
A rare image of street-food vendors in colonial Mombasa taken in 1908, selling what appear to be 
fried fish, a form of vending that would prove enduring, and is still common throughout the city 
today. For more on fried fish selling, see Chapter Three. MSS. Afr.s. 1607/1. African and 
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DEVOURING DEVELOPMENT: WORKING-CLASS FOOD AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN MOMBASA IN LATE-COLONIAL KENYA 
 
The form and substance of Mombasa’s urban modernity was made during the period lasting 
from the 1930s to the early 1960s. Historians of empire and decolonization in Africa will recognize 
this as the period that John Lonsdale and D.A. Low have called the “second colonial occupation,” 
and that Frederick Cooper has identified as the time when what we now recognize as 
“development” emerged as a form of imperial governance.1 Unlike much of the research into the 
history of development in colonial Africa, though, this chapter is part of a growing field of 
historiography seeking to move beyond studying shifts in imperial thinking and policy, and to 
instead consider how daily life changed for Africans during a period in which colonial authorities 
engaged in a massive project of social engineering.2 However, to understand the everyday in the 
port city of Mombasa, the broader context of how imperial forms of rule and global political 
economies changed during these years must remain central to the analysis. The approach taken, 
therefore, is neither from the “above” or “below,” but one that untangles how structural 
transformations in British ideology and policy had real impacts on the ways in which working-
																																																						
* My use of “making” in the title and throughout is drawn from E.P. Thompson’s classic elucidation of class 
formation and his emphasis on the processual, rather than static, nature of historical structures. See The Making of 
the English Working Class (New York: Vintage, 1963), laid out theoretically in his preface, 9-16. 
1 John Lonsdale and D.A. Low, “Towards the New Order,” in History of East Africa, Part III, eds. Lonsdale and 
Low (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 1-64. Since the 1980s, Frederick Cooper has dedicated a good portion of his 
scholarship to the study of development and its consequences in late-colonial and decolonizing Africa, which he first 
examined in the context of Mombasa. For Mombasa, see his On the African Waterfront: Urban Disorder and the 
Transformation of Work in Colonial Mombasa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). For Cooper on 
development and decolonization, see Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British 
Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and, for French-controlled Africa specifically, Citizenship 
between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2014). 
2 In the urban context, see the examples of Lisa A. Lindsay, Working with Gender: Wage Labor and Social Change 
in Southwestern Nigeria (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003) and Caleb Edwin Owen, “Lands of Leisure: 
Recreation, Space, and the Struggle for Urban Kenya, 1900-2000,” (PhD Dissertation, Michigan State University, 
2016). The dissertation in progress of Robert Rouphail, also at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 
considers the social and cultural history of how cyclones shaped development in colonial Mauritius.  
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class Africans acquired their food in Mombasa, while also remaining squarely focused on how 
urban residents operated within, outside and remade the very structures that were imposed upon 
them.3 Therefore, this chapter is about how a new kind of city emerged from this period of 
development, but one that was quite different from the ways the British had imagined it might be, 
and in a form whose traces continue to crucially shape the everyday experiences of the people who 
live in Mombasa today. 
The ideologies and policies that crystalized during these decades into a new form of 
colonial governance were rooted in a period of ongoing imperial crisis. As Cooper has argued, 
before the 1930s, British officials knew little about the social lives of the Africans working in 
colonial cities or on plantations. However, as disorder spread throughout the empire during the 
1940s, and with Mombasa as one of the focal points of this global struggle by colonized workers 
seeking better living standards, the British government responded to this initiative by 
implementing far-reaching plans aimed at labor stabilization. In Mombasa in particular, a series of 
strikes during the 1930s focused the lens of imperial concern on this small port town that had an 
outsized impact on imperial commerce. These strikes forced officials to realize to their horror that 
Mombasa’s casual workers they had hitherto viewed as being unorganized, as autonomous units 
of labor, were in fact quite capable of collective action and, within the narrow networks of colonial 
export economies, of work stoppages that could grind imperial commerce to a halt.4 In Mombasa, 
the British responded by trying to make knowable what they perceived as an inchoate urban mass 
																																																						
3 This is in contrast to the position of Sean Hanretta whose critique of the “colonial rubric” in Africanist 
historiography sidesteps the crucial issue of power. While I share his view that we need to center African practices 
of self- and communal-fashioning, we should also not lose sight of the reality that the formation of these cultural and 
social structures occurred in the context of the extreme political and economic asymmetries of colonial society. Sean 
Hanretta, Islam and Social Change in French West Africa: The History of an Emancipatory Community (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
4 This transformation has been studied in the context of Mombasa and the wider British and French empires by 
Frederick Cooper in his On the African Waterfront, Decolonization and African Society and Citizenship between 
Empire and Nation. 
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of casual African laborers, “detribalized,” little understood, yet also capable of causing great 
disruptions in the imperial economy. The colonial state, along with the city’s employers, decided 
that a better paid and stable worker, while more expensive, would also become more rational, more 
upright, more invested in the workplace and, most importantly, more predictable. They wanted to 
forge a “respectable” working class, separated from the rest of the urban masses, and represented 
by rational trade unions that would facilitate smooth communications and negotiations, and thus, 
theoretically, reduce work stoppages.5 
Central to such ideas about how to develop Mombasa was the need to remake working-
class diets and the social structures and institutions through which their food was provisioned, 
prepared and served. By the 1930s, the inadequacy of the diet imposed on Africans while working 
as wage laborers came to be identified as a major structural flaw in the British Empire. If African 
workers, a growing consensus concluded, were fed a more nutritious and satisfying diet, they 
would work more efficiently, miss fewer shifts from illness and be more content, which by 
implication meant the empire would be more economically productive and have greater labor 
stability. The food of the “modern worker” needed to change and, assumed to be male, he therefore 
required increased wages to be able to afford enough food for both him and his family who were 
now going to come to live with him in the city. The modern family of colonial urban development 
was one in which the all-male households of the past where men cooked, socialized and, in the 
minds of the state, conspired to be disruptive would be replaced by the purported stability of 
conjugality, with wage-earning husbands and wives who prepared their food.6 
																																																						
5 Cooper, On the African Waterfront, 247-278. 
6 For colonial concerns over all-male households, socializing and “disturbances” in Kenya, see Luise White, 
“Separating the Men from the Boys: Constructions of Gender, Sexuality, and Terrorism in Central Kenya, 1939-
1959,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 23, no. 1 (1990):1-25. For more on the colonial 
construction of the “modern” African family, see section two below, and Image 3.  
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In addition to this new ideology of empire, the realities of migratory family life in Mombasa 
were changing too. From the 1940s forward, tens of thousands of African women did migrate to 
the coastal city, and many of them joined their husbands. During this period, as the experience of 
migration came to be increasingly redefined as one in which conjugal families were possible, the 
gendered nature of urban food provision and preparation was remade as well. Even though 
migration and urbanization during the first decades of the twentieth century had radically changed 
men’s relationship to cooking, their desire to perform rural patriarchies nonetheless remained part 
of how they wanted to imagine themselves and organize labor within their families. However, to 
draw on an analogy, when a rubber band is stretched out and then returns to its old form, it 
resembles how it looked before, but not exactly. Similarly, gendered structures in Mombasa’s 
migratory communities were elastic, not cyclical. They did not return to be just as they were before. 
The gendered nature of how food was provisioned and prepared in the growing number of urban 
African, conjugal families did resemble their rural counterparts, and aligned in some ways with 
the colonial vision of the modern family, but neither of these gendered renderings of food systems 
and their divisions of labor squared precisely with how urban residents constructed families, 
friendships and other more monetized relationships through which they acquired their daily food.7 
 Indeed, this chapter also examines how, during the same period, food consumed outside of 
the household was becoming central to these newly emerging, working-class food systems. Street 
food had been part of city life in Mombasa during the 1930s and before, but interrelated structural 
changes in the city’s political economy and demography saw the rapid expansion of the industry 
																																																						
7 This draws on David Schoenbrun’s more general call for Africanists to consider how African modernity was 
created and interpreted through the “durable” though also changing structures of pre-colonial Africa that continued 
to inform social action during the colonial and post-colonial periods. David Schoenbrun, “Conjuring the Modern in 
Africa: Durability and Rupture in Histories of Public Healing between the Great Lakes of Africa,” American 
Historical Review 111, no. 5 (2006): 1403-1439. 
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during the final decades of colonialism. The mass unemployment that had been new to Mombasa 
during the Depression had, during the 1940s and 1950s, became endemic. The unemployed, or in 
some cases underemployed or underpaid, created a lasting urban class of people in the city unable 
to rely exclusively or at all on wages to sustain their lives in the city, and so turned to small-scale 
trading activities, a bundle of practices now commonly referred to as the “informal economy.” 
Within this context, the decades stretching from the 1930s to the 1950s were the formative years 
during which “informality” became central to economic life in Mombasa. However, the very 
notion of informality itself has become controversial in African-studies literature, in part because 
its existence is dependent on the notion that its antonym, “formality,” actually exists as a separate 
entity.8 The economic practices that were deemed informal already existed before their categorical 
crystallization during the 1950s. However, as these economic activities rapidly expanded and the 
colonial government came to want to control them under the ideology of urban development, they 
were increasing rendered as illicit and “unlicensed,” the opposite of the approved, the licensed, the 
“formal.” The formal/informal divide, as categories of economic analysis, simply repeat the 
colonial distinction of licensed and unlicensed, rather than engaging in the more crucial task of 
specifically studying the often inseparable economies of wages and small-scale trading, whether 
licensed or not, that structured people’s lives in the city. 
 Consequently, instead of seeing the formal and informal as economic categories, this 
dissertation views them as political ones that increasingly from the 1950s came to determine a 
trader’s exposure to an increasingly authoritarian state seeking to excise informality from the social 
body. Urban development, as much as it was about nutrition, wages, housing and other amenities, 
was also, fundamentally, about the making of the formal, licensed city. For state authorities in 
																																																						
8 Gareth Meyers, African Cities: Alternative Visions of Urban Theory and Practice (New York: Zed Books, 2011), 
70-103. 
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developing Mombasa, modernity and formality (licensed) were co-terminus. The formal/informal 
binary, therefore, is not particularly useful as a tool for understanding how political economies in 
urban Africa have actually worked historically, but it does provide an insight into a basic 
assumption that has informed how elites, during the colonial period and after, have tried to remake 
the continent’s cities and in the process shaped the field of struggle in which vendors and hawkers 
have operated. However, though political categories, they have also had profound material 
consequences.  
Before the late 1940s in Mombasa, the licensed/unlicensed distinction was not important 
in a city in which urban officials were content to allow Africans to create their own institutions as 
long as they still showed up for work. However, once the state became committed to recreating 
the city as it was imagined by development theorists, the extent to which peoples’ homes, 
businesses or other activities were rendered as either formal or informal, and therefore licit or 
illicit, determined whether they would, on a daily basis, face the threat of arrests, fines, 
prosecutions and potentially the demolition of their structures. Researching these aspects of the 
history of development is a departure from many of the foundational studies in the field. Cooper’s 
work on Mombasa and the wider British and French empires set the research agenda for 
understanding how the rise of development and new imperial theories of labor changed the context 
for wage-labor struggles in decolonizing Africa, but what remains less clear are the effects of these 
processes on those who operated outside these formalized sectors, for those who were marked as 
informal, including the people selling prepared food and drink in Mombasa.9 We see clearly in 
																																																						
9 Cooper, Decolonization and African Society and On the African Waterfront. Lindsay’s otherwise pathbreaking 
study into gender and the family during the period of colonial development in Nigeria remains focused on the people 
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urban expulsions in colonial and decolonizing Dar es Salaam heads in a direction similar to this chapter, but his 
interests remain primarily on colonial policy, rather than social history. See his African Underclass: Urbanisation, 
Crime, and Colonial Order in Dar es Salaam (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005). Closer to my approach is 
the recent work of Richard Pithouse on shack-settlement communities in Durban, though with differences of 
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Cooper’s research how this was a period in which the state worked to create a segmented, and 
relatively privileged, urban working class, but this chapter asks, what did development mean for 
those excluded from such plans? Cooper acknowledges this limitation in his approach, and hints 
that officials, both colonial and post-colonial, were aware of the narrowness of their programs of 
social engineering, with benefits reserved primarily for railway and dock workers and other select 
state and private employees, and thus they worried about and felt “a profound distrust of the vast 
portion of African society that lay outside the small but potentially controllable ‘modern’ 
workplace and ‘modern’ city.”10 Such concerns have not been limited to anxious bureaucrats in 
Kenya, as many liberal and radical critics more generally concerned with development have shared 
such a “profound distrust” of people whom urban officials in Victorian Britain called the 
“residuum” and Marxist theorists the “lumpenproletariat.”11 While Mombasa’s hawkers and 
vendors may not fit the exact sociological position of the people who have been termed the 
lumpenproletariat or residuum, they share with them the fate of being deemed an illegible and 
disposable social category, as a group that stands in the way of “progress.”12 Liberals and radicals 
alike have feared the inchoateness of the illegible urban poor, the people who do not fit into their 
visions for the future. By the end of the 1940s, colonial officials looked out and saw such a vast, 
unknown landscape of hawkers and vendors who largely cooked and sold food and drink how and 
where they wanted, from their homes or squatting on private and public property. They were not 
																																																						
periodization in the South-African context. See Pithouse’s “A Politics of the Poor: Shack Dwellers’ Struggles in 
Durban,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 42, no. 1 (2008): 63-94 and “Thought Amid Waste,” Journal of 
Asian and African Studies 47, no. 5 (2012): 482-497. 
10 These anxieties extended to rural Africa, which colonial, and some post-colonial, officials also saw as existing 
outside the kind of modernity—economic, social, political and cultural—that they wanted to create. Cooper, On the 
African Waterfront, 275. 
11 Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London: A Study of the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) and, for a radical critique of this tendency within Marxism, see Pithouse, 
“A Politics of the Poor,” and “Thought Amid Waste.” 
12 I am drawing here from the insights of Pithouse in his research into shack dwellers and their confrontations with 
the state in South Africa. See Pithouse, “A Politics of the Poor” and “Thought amid Waste.” 
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a working class, not even waged casual workers, but uncontrolled proprietors struggling to skim 
incomes off the urban economy. 
Development in colonial Mombasa was intrinsically dualistic, focused on constructing a 
new world, but while needing to simultaneously destroy the old. The all-male household was to be 
replaced by a conjugality composed of husbands, wives and children with a wage-earning man and 
a woman cooking the food of the family, eating nutritious meals that would power the imperial 
economy through the labor of men. Outside of the home, the masses of illegible street-food vendors 
were to be replaced by a controlled and monitored licensed trade, ideally housed in state-built 
structures. The floating population of unemployed migrants without work to support families could 
be removed and returned to the reserves, while those traders who did not fit into this new order, 
the informal, the unlicensed, would form a residuum that would be disposed of through arrests, 
prosecutions and demolitions.13 The making of respectable African working and trading classes 
also necessitated the unmaking of their antitheses, all-male households and illicit hawkers and 
vendors. In Mombasa, the social, economic and political world that emerged by the end of the 
1950s was one radically transformed from that of the 1930s. This new reality had been profoundly 
affected, though certainly not determined, by colonial development. 
Workers’ struggles and the empire of development that emerged in response not only 
transformed the social landscape and political economy of Mombasa, but also the source base from 
which historians can study the city’s history. As with the Willan Commission following the 1939 
General Strike that provided a textual basis for Chapter Two, so the continuation of strikes and 
colonial reports provides a documentary foundation for the social history of development during 
the 1940s and 1950s. Improvements in African spending power and cost of living were uneven at 
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best during the decades, and for many their economic condition deteriorated.14 As a consequence, 
strikes of some variety happened nearly every year, and major general strikes occurred in 1947 
and 1955. In this context, the state was struck by “a sudden desire to understand” African social 
life, and as a result a series of sociological studies were produced and provide unprecedented 
descriptions of daily life in colonial Africa, including key surveys from 1945, 1947 and 1957. As 
these authors were concerned with nutrition specifically and household budgets generally, they are 
especially useful for the historian of working-class, urban food systems in Mombasa. Moreover, 
as the Municipal Board and then Council took the lead in trying to formalize street-food, these 
businesses and their place in the city shift from scant mention prior to the 1940s to a subject of 
central concern to city authorities. Therefore, analysis and descriptions in previous chapters that 
often required informed inferences tied to limited bodies of evidence, from the 1940s can take on 
a more textured, granular and data-driven approach. As much as the elite authors of these studies 
and municipal minutes controlled the production of these documents, poor and working-class 
Mombasa residents, through their answers in interviews and actions that officials reported, have 
much to say in them as well. 
The Structural Transformation of East Africa: Food, Imperial Crisis and War 
 The depravation of the Great Depression marked a new nutritional nadir in the lives of 
Mombasa’s impoverished majority. For those employed, their below-subsistence wages 
structurally deprived them of both the quantities and varieties of foods they needed and desired 
and the unemployed faced an even greater struggle to acquire the food they required in the colonial 
city. Classical Marxism sees such circumstances as the incubators of a revolutionary class 
consciousness, as the internal contradictions of capitalism continue to destroy the middle strata of 
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society, throwing ever more people into the exploited masses who will eventually rise to overthrow 
the system.15 However, as history and subsequent scholars have shown, such a programmatic view 
of history overlooks the ways in which the abstractions of capital and the state have not been, in 
practice, abstractions at all, but social and cultural systems created by actual individuals whose 
agency can redirect the course of history away from its seemingly inevitable course. Capitalists 
and their inconsistent allies in the state have at key points recognized the contradictions in a 
capitalism set on a course to consume itself, and moderated exploitation and made concessions to 
workers that have allowed gross inequalities to remain, but at levels more attuned with the 
maintenance of social stability.16 
 During the 1930s, officials in Kenya and the wider British Empire increasingly came to see 
an imperial economic and social system that was unsustainable, one whose internal contradictions 
needed to be addressed lest it implode upon itself. Strikes protesting material depravation broke 
out not only in Mombasa during the 1930s, but across the British Empire, especially in the British 
West Indies and in the mining communities of Southern Africa. In response to what appeared to 
be a global uprising, the British strategy was equally global. Though officials used different 
language, their conclusion clearly was that exploitation had been extended too far, and that mass 
depravation needed to be replaced by at least basic subsistence. Central to these newly emerging 
designs to “develop” the British Empire was the need to improve the diets and thus nutrition of 
colonial populations.17 The health of the empire, it seemed, hinged on the health of its subjects. 
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 However, as scholars are increasingly recognizing, colonial labor theory was not simply a 
body of ideas created “out there” in the imperial holdings, but were often adapted from practices 
that had been developed through relations between the state, capital and labor in Britain.18 The 
linking of labor stability and productivity to the nutritional health of workers, as opposed to simply 
being sure they ate the proper quantity of food to survive, was an idea that originated in the 
metropole rather than the empire. While employers and the state were mostly content to allow the 
British working classes to subsist on bare essentials during the nineteenth century, with a large 
proportion of their calories coming from cheaply imported sugar, ideas about the relationship 
between labor and nutrition had changed by the beginning of the twentieth century.19 During the 
early 1920s, with coal-mining strikes in the north and the general economic depression of the 
industry, the diets of the miners who extracted the energy that ran the British domestic economy 
became an issue of national concern. Parliament noted that miners’ wages had sunk to 20 percent 
of their prewar levels, while the cost of living had risen to 180 percent, which prompted William 
Adamson of the House of Commons to decry “that there is actual starvation existing in the mining 
districts of this country,” and Member of Parliament J.J. Walsh added that “the vast mass of the 
mining population to-day are in a state of semi-starvation, they and their children.”20 
 In response, Britain’s Medical Research Council sent a team of nutritionists to study the 
diets of the country’s miners in Durham, Derbyshire, Northumberland and Stirlingshire. In their 
findings, we can see an emerging connection made between the social and natural sciences of labor 
theory, nutrition and economic efficiency. Drawing on a language of objectification, the team’s 
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report reduced workers through analogy to machines whose functional requirements needed more 
attention from a paternal state and society that depended upon them remaining operational. The 
report observed that workers resembled “a machine to the extent that, if work has to be done, fuel, 
as a source of energy, must be supplied.” However, humans, though machine-like, were unique 
from machines in that they needed not only fuel, but regenerative energy inputs for maintenance 
and, if they were young, to grow their physical bodies, as “the [human] organism must derive the 
necessary material for both growth and repair.” Pushing the analogy further, the authors continued 
to sort the differences and similarities of the “maintenance” and “operation” of machines and 
human workers, noting that “The energy-giving value of food-stuffs is determined in the same way 
as the energy value of coal is determined by the engineer—by burning a known amount under 
definite conditions and determining the amount of heat, in heat units of Calories, which is given 
off in the process.” However, the team was not only concerned with the energy outputs of the foods 
workers ate, as they were part of the “new nutrition” movement of the early twentieth century, and 
so their goal was not only to alleviate hunger through providing simple carbohydrates, but to 
advocate for a dietetic transformation in which people consumed balanced and diversified diets 
that included the presence of key minerals and vitamins crucial to bodily health.21 
 Britain also conducted nutritional studies in Kenya during the 1920s, but they were shaped 
by a political economy and ideological context different than that of the postwar metropole. Both 
were informed by labor concerns, but the miners of 1920s Britain were a more permanently settled 
working class, and so were studied as workers in already existent industrial situations that 
produced certain nutritional outcomes. However, in Kenya during the 1920s, British administrators 
were concerned more with the labor supply, rather than a working class per se, and so their 
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nutritional studies were aimed towards policies that would have more rural Africans “turn out” 
and work as wage laborers for European settler, corporate and government enterprises. Despite the 
reality that an African working class spread across cities and plantations was already in formation 
during the 1920s, the British still viewed Africans as rural traditionalists engaged largely in either 
pastoralist or agricultural activities. Therefore, when J.B. Orr and J.L. Gilks set out to study the 
nutrition of “two African tribes,” the Kikuyu and the Maasai, their interest was not in that of urban 
or plantation workers, but of Africans in their traditional “tribal” units in bounded rural areas.22 
For the two authors of a study that would gain such prominence in colonial circles that it was 
referred to simply as the “Orr and Gilks Report,” the nutrition of the thousands of Africans 
increasingly filling Kenya’s urban areas such as Mombasa and living off paltry wages were not 
the concern, but rather their focus was on the perceived deficiencies of rural diets that damaged 
African health, and in so doing prevented more of them from turning out as workers, and entering 
labor-migration networks that would lead them to European employers.23 
 That this notable 1920s colonial nutrition study premised on labor concerns was narrowly 
focused on rural Africa and the “supply” of African workers should not be a surprise. Despite 
growing populations of Africans across the continent being dependent on wage-labor to acquire 
their food, whether in cities, mines or on plantations, employers before the 1930s, as Frederick 
Cooper points out, asked “little more than how many workers could be obtained for a low wage.” 
More specific to Mombasa, even at the port, arguably the most important center of African 
working-class life in East Africa, employers “did not so much as know their workers’ name.”24 
However, the growing imperial crisis over the emergence of workers’ movements across the 
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empire precipitated a fundamental transformation in how British officials and other employers 
viewed Africans and their place in the colonial system.25  
As a result, by the mid-1930s, the geography of imperial nutritional concern came to 
include urban Africa and other areas where workers were dependent upon wages. In a 1937 
memorandum sent in preparation for a vast nutritional study of East Africa, the authors 
demonstrated the extent to which the metropolitan attention to the interrelation between “new 
nutrition” and labor theory had penetrated the objectives of the empire, writing that “information 
is needed to enable the dietaries commonly provided for those receiving rations during … 
employment in large industrial undertakings, to be accurately balanced,” and that great attention 
should be paid to how food and nutrition affected “the performance of work.” However, surveyors 
were to also make differentiations between various types of labor, and the diets that each required 
in order “to obtain information of practical value in deciding on the quantity of food necessary for 
individuals carrying out light as distinct from heavy work,” as “it is necessary to separate the bare 
costs of maintenance of the body … from the cost of performance of muscular work in the more 
usual sense of the word.”26 
 In a preliminary report produced the same year in Tanganyika, the shift in official attitudes 
towards the “new nutrition” perspective was clear, reflecting the changing emphasis in nutritional 
studies from solving “hunger” to encouraging diversified diets.  Decrying the imposed posho diet, 
the study chided “Employers who expect a labourer to work and maintain health on a ration of a 
pound and a half of maize meal and four ounces of beans,” and that they showed “no more 
appreciation of nutrition than was evident in Lind’s day,” being James Lind, the eighteenth-century 
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nutritionist. However, as with the scientists studying miners and their families in 1920s Britain, 
this concern for African dietaries was not based solely on humanitarian principles, but was 
connected to economic, which in turn also meant political, stability. The preliminary report 
continued that the “improved physique and therefore capacity for work and greater output” that 
would come from better nutrition was “one of the most important things to make those concerned 
appreciate.” Good nutrition, it seemed, was a cure for a multitude of colonial ailments connected 
to African workers and the economy, as it would provide “more contented labour on plantations 
and in the mining industry and contended labour brings the best type and an adequate supply of 
workers.” Once on the plantation or working in the mine, with an appropriate diet, workers would 
stay healthy and productive, which would “reduce the enormous wastage of such labour as now 
occurs in days taken off on account of sickness.” With this increased production, the colony would 
produce more exports “with the resultant improvement in the economic and financial position of 
the territory.”27 
 This change in imperial thinking, the notion that better nutrition meant more efficient, 
productive and stable societies, was globalized during the late 1930s with the publication and then 
circulation of Nutrition in the Colonial Empire: Report of the Colonial Advisory Council. By 
November of 1939, the Colonial Office was informed that 5,000 copies of volume one and 3,500 
of volume two had been sold, primarily to Crown Agents, with an additional 5,000 and 3,500, 
respectively, available for purchase.28 Six copies were sent to Kenya.29 The report built upon and 
crystalized the growing consensus that malnutrition was not only a “problem” of rural Africa, but 
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that the nutritional health Africans employed in cities needed to be of central concern to the empire. 
Colonial Secretary William Ormsby-Gore, in his assessment of the report and its findings, 
concluded that nutritional policies should be aimed at “both rural and urban peoples.”30 Moreover, 
the Colonial Office’s briefing on the report concluded that, as regards nutrition, there were “special 
problems in the towns” and that more generally “the rates of wages at present paid are often 
insufficient to provide adequate food for a normal family.” Articulating the ascendency of “new 
nutrition,” the report found that “Diets are frequently insufficient in quantity and still more often 
insufficient in quality,” as “they are bulky,” and “the bulk is too often made up of foods that do 
not supply all the needs of a balanced diet.”31 
 By the end of the 1930s, the ideological context of empire had transformed from an earlier 
view in which the material condition of urban Africans was important neither to the state nor public 
or private employers to one in which the British Empire was politically and financially incentivized 
to improve not only the diets of urban working classes, but also their housing, wages and access 
to leisure activities. However, while the ideology of empire had changed, the reality that the 
exigencies of history fundamentally shape the nature of social change had not. In 1939, to save the 
Empire, the British were prepared to radically change the dietaries of the African working classes, 
but, with the advent of the Second World War, imperial authorities retreated back to their racial 
division of resource distribution, and instead instituted policies that, somehow, imposed even more 
comestible depravation on Kenya’s urban Africans than during the Depression of the 1930s. 
 World War II, in short, precipitated shortages in Kenya’s food supplies that greatly 
increased its cost in cities, if such food was even available. Food shortages are never apolitical and 
those that occurred in Kenya’s pre-colonial past were certainly shaped by social inequalities that 
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determined who was allowed access to scarce resources. However, the shortages themselves were 
quite explicitly the result of ecological crises in which food was literally scarce.32 During World 
War II, in contrast, Kenya produced more food than it ever had, by orders of magnitude.33 This 
was a food shortage created by political economy, a political economy of war and imperial racism, 
not an ecological crisis. Starting in 1941, East Africa became the primary supplier of grain to the 
Allied war effort in the Middle East, which as a consequence funneled mass surpluses of maize, 
the primary staple of the African working class, as well as the less commonly consumed wheat, 
out of the country. The war effort meant that the Empire demanded “all East African territories to 
produce the utmost” and “that all that could be produced was required.”34 
 However, this structural change in East Africa’s location within global food supply chains 
was not simply a redirecting of already existent domestic supplies towards exports, but was as 
much about increasing grain production within Kenya to meet the demands of the Middle Eastern 
theatre. For urban Kenyans, though, the political economy of restructuring the food supply towards 
mass-export production meant that food needed to become more expensive for them. The colonial 
state, under increasing sway from white agriculturalists during the 1940s, remade Kenya’s 
agricultural economy in a way that radically decreased the risk white farmers took in capitalizing 
their estates for increased production by guaranteeing minimum prices on maize. As a result, all 
maize during the war, whether produced by white or African farmers, was to be sold through state 
marketing boards that provided white farmers this minimum price, but which had the double 
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purpose of also cutting off African maize growers from urban markets so as to maintain the high, 
controlled price of settler maize. Not only did this mean higher prices for maize in cities, but it 
also suppressed the potential profits of black farmers, de-incentivizing their production, as the 
marketing boards paid them little more than half of what it did to European farmers. This 
differential between what the state paid settler and African farmers has led some historians to 
conclude that African agriculture was subsidizing white production. However, whatever the 
relation between white and African farmers, concludes John Lonsdale, “Beyond any dispute is the 
fact that the real losers from maize control were African urban workers,” as their expenditures on 
food rose to meet to the new, controlled price, with their wages lagging significantly behind.35 
Therefore, this rapid transition in which Kenyan food systems were reoriented more fully 
towards export production further compromised the already precarious situation of Africans living 
in cities. Moreover, this rural, agricultural restructuring also transformed Kenyan urban spaces by 
precipitating massive increases in the migration of Africans to Kenya’s cities. The boom in 
agriculture meant that both Europeans and an emerging class of African capitalists wanted an 
increasingly commercialized rural economy of land and labor. Starting in the 1930s and then 
accelerating during the wartime commodity markets of the 1940s, better capitalized African 
agriculturalists began to expand their acreage and squeeze small holders off their land.36 This was 
then paired during the 1940s and into the 1950s with settlers who expelled thousands of African 
squatters from the White Highlands to clear new land for their own cash-crop cultivation, with a 
few remaining as wage laborers, but with many more sent adrift without a home in the “native 
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reserve” to which they could return. These two processes, African class formation and settler 
expulsions of squatters, were created by the same trend towards rural commercialization, and both 
contributed to growing classes of Africans with either small, sub-economic holdings or who were 
entirely without land. Many in this rural underclass looked to plantation labor as a source of 
income, but others turned to cities where the war was generating more jobs, though certainly not 
enough to keep pace with this vast process of proletarianization that was separating more and more 
Africans from the land. With ever more of the rural poor turning to urban migration as both a 
strategy for survival and one that held out the hope of social mobility, Kenya’s cities, as Lonsdale 
observes, “were transformed.” Estimates vary widely, but Mombasa’s African population during 
the war grew by at least 10,000, to approximately 55,000. As the economic trends of the 1940s 
continued into the 1950s, so too did urban growth, with the African population of the city nearly 
doubling to 90,000 by 1957.37 
During the 1940s, these migrants arrived in Mombasa and joined tens of thousands of other 
workers and hawkers struggling to access urban food in an economy of resource distribution that 
reflected older colonial racial assumptions about communal and social organization, but also, 
argues Reynolds Richter, new notions of class and urban citizenship.38 In Mombasa, the emerging 
desire of the state for a stabilized working class collided with the exigencies of wartime rationing. 
When colonial scientists during the 1930s were writing about the crisis of urban nutrition, they 
implicitly carved the outlines of the subject to whom colonial benevolence would be bestowed: 
the waged, African male worker. While mostly an operating assumption in discourse during the 
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1940s, Richter’s research demonstrates how wartime rationing allowed these ideas to crystallize 
into the more concrete forms through the ways in which food was distributed during the war. While 
other scholars have pointed to how ideas of ethnicity and race were exacerbated and created anew 
by a wartimes rationing system in which different foodstuffs were allotted to “Africans,” “Asians,” 
“Arabs” and “Europeans,” Ritcher shows how a colonial vision of class and urban citizenship also 
created inequalities of distribution within urban African communities. While all residents of 
Mombasa were technically allotted access to their racially-determined rationed foodstuffs, most 
Africans only had access to first-come, first-serve duka shops where food-queues started hours 
before they opened and supplies were quickly sold out, meaning most had to purchase at least 
some, if not all, of their food on the black market at even higher prices. However, for those Africans 
who worked for wages in industries and state agencies deemed vital to the war effort, they were 
provided food directly from their employers, avoiding the queues, which made them among the 
few Africans with a guaranteed supply of food in a city wracked by shortages. As the state was 
increasingly working to narrow who could be an urban citizen, Richter shows how food became a 
central way that authorities defined who belonged.39 
 Therefore, from the late 1920s to the 1940s, nutrition and food came to be central elements 
in how Britain sought to bring order, stability and legibility to an empire wracked with conflict, 
and to craft the kinds of subjects it found desirable. During the late 1930s, this meant a more 
equitable distribution of food throughout rural and urban African society, but, with global war, all 
Africans were made to bear the burden of sacrificing their nutrition to war effort, mitigated only 
somewhat if ones labor was deemed crucial to winning the conflict. By the 1940s, the social body 
that the policies created during the 1930s and then adapted to the exigencies of war were meant to 
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create was clear enough. Rural areas would be controlled by a small cadre of white and black 
capitalist farmers who would employ an African working class who would work on ever larger 
plantations as land titles were secured and then consolidated into this ownership class, while cities 
would function through a similarly small group managers and owners who would employ an 
upright and stable class of African workers, living in the city with their families.  
Food was central to this vision. For the state, this stabile working class could only exist if 
workers were nutritionally better fed, which would make them more efficient and content. Though 
writing about Nairobi, the vision of E.R. St. A. Davies, writing in 1939, captured the position of 
officials throughout Kenya and the British Empire when he argued that policy in the colonial city 
should “encourage the better type of native worker and provide accommodation for him and his 
family in the town. Fewer natives, better fed, properly housed, constituting with their families a 
permanent and controlled native population, should be our aim.”40 This would bring localized 
stability in places of employment, which would extend to the cities in which these workers lived, 
and through a collection of imperial cities so reconstituted, the empire itself would gain an 
equilibrium that would allow it to continue into the future. However, the flaw in this imperial logic 
also reflects the gap in the scholarly literature that has illuminated this shift in imperial thinking 
we now recognize as the emergence of the empire of development. In reality, outside these grand 
visions of social engineering, the great majority of Africans who actually lived in these cities could 
not fit into this version of colonial society, especially in places like Mombasa. Moreover, even 
those who did superficially fit the subjectivity of what British officials envisioned, their families 
and social lives diverged significantly from the ideal type theorized in the colonial literature. What 
follows in the two sections below is a social history of urban development that builds on past 
																																																						
40 Report of Committee of Inquiry into Labour Unrest at Mombasa (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1945), 50, (331.11 
REP), Library of the Kenya National Archives (hereafter, Library-KNA). 
	 121 
scholarship that elucidated these transformations in imperial thinking, but told us less about how 
Africans actually lived. Rather than focusing primarily on what the colonial idea of Africa society 
was, we will see instead, through the lens of Mombasa’s working-class food systems, how these 
policies were implemented and then remade by Africans in their daily struggles in a colonial city. 
Food and Family in 1940s Mombasa 
 The gendered demographics of migration to Mombasa created a relatively homogenous, 
mostly-male African population in the city during the first decades of the twentieth century. 
However, by the Second World War and during the years that followed, thousands more women 
from the interior regions of East Africa began to make their homes in this largest city of the Kenyan 
coast. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, the mostly male African migrants during the early decades 
of the twentieth century remade rural structures of food provision and preparation by forming 
homosocial households in which generation replaced gender, with younger men cooking for their 
elders in exchange for reduced cost or free access to food and shelter. However, as more and more 
women came to urban areas, rural ideas about gender and food came to increasingly structure 
kitchen labor in Mombasa. The first three decades of rapid urbanization had transformed the 
gendered nature of Kenya’s food systems, but these “durable” structures had not been destroyed.41 
They were instead elastic, and many migrant Africans adapted them to the changing realities of 
the capitalist city. 
 This shift in how migratory food labor became re-gendered again in 1940s Mombasa was 
not uniformly experienced by all Africans, but was instead crucially shaped by class 
differentiation, as well as the idiosyncratic preferences of individuals. Under the model proposed 
by colonial development, African conjugal structures of food provision and preparation would be 
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remade to more closely align to gendered ideals in the urban West. Foodstuffs would be acquired 
through the labor of a male, waged worker, either as employer-provided rations or purchased with 
cash, and then wives would prepare the food for the family.42 While normative for the British, such 
a construction of the family was actually a departure from rural African patriarchies in which 
women not only cooked the food, but provided it too, producing it through their agricultural labor. 
In Mombasa, those most economically-positioned to perform this new gendered vision of the 
family life of “the modern worker” were those with salaries in government and industrial employ, 
as they were generally the relatively best paid in Mombasa, and their wages were on the rise. 
Central to the state’s justification for raising wages and provisioning housing and other benefits 
was the belief that these changes would facilitate such normative family formation, allowing men 
to live with wives and children in the city. However, the evidence as to whether people actually 
aspired to do so is uneven.  
Some certainly did. One such man (unnamed), who had migrated from the Nyeri in Central 
Province and who was “employed in the public service,” had initially lived by himself in a rented 
room in the Majengo neighborhood of Mombasa, but upon being provided “modern quarters” as 
part of his job he brought his wife and children to the city. In this home, a new sort of conjugality 
became possible, as his wife took over cooking and prepared food for the family. They projected 
an image of working-class modernity not only in gendered relations, but also through their 
consumption habits. Unlike many, they were able to conspicuously consume fresh milk on a daily 
basis and consistently ate meat, which was still a somewhat rare luxury only two years removed 
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from World War II. However, the cost of performing this gendered and consumptive respectability 
also seemed to stretch the man’s wages beyond what they could sustain, as he explained that “he 
borrowed money every month, apparently paying one friend off against the other each month.” 
Other men in Mombasa seemed to not find such domestic arrangements worth the cost, as with a 
different Kikuyu man who worked as an artisan for Kenya and Uganda Railways and Habour 
(KURH) and, despite being provided with free housing by his employer, his wife still lived in their 
rural home in Nyeri. While he sometimes ate with friends, he also cooked his own meals at home 
over a charcoal burner that included ugali accompanied by combinations of potatoes, greens, and 
onions, while he too was also able to afford the luxuries of ghee, milk and meat. The British ideal 
of the settled, stable African working class in many ways misunderstood why many, though not 
all, migrants went to Mombasa. Often, migration to Mombasa was meant as a way to save capital 
to invest in rural homes, a goal made more possible if dependents were able to be sustained by 
food grown on the shamba (farm) rather than purchased through urban wages. Consequently, while 
the state may have desired these African men to be part of a stable and permanent working class 
and to form the normative families of the “modern worker,” some migrants had other priorities 
that did not involve the creation of such urban households.43 
 However, whether or not migrant African men wanted to form such permanent and urban 
“male breadwinner” families, the political economy of the city seems to have made this nearly 
impossible for the large majority of them. While the waged workers of the state and Mombasa’s 
major employers could in some analyses be seen as part of a “labor aristocracy” or, in the terms of 
more recent scholarship, those endowed with “urban citizenship,” their position of privilege in the 
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colonial city was truly a relative one. As Frederick Cooper notes, the labor aristocracy, for all the 
theorization of their status as an economically and politically elevated class, were “often not so 
well off after all.”44 Indeed, during the 1940s in Mombasa, “waged workers” themselves were 
deeply stratified by pay gradations, and most were living in poverty. For example, at the KUHR, 
a major employer in Mombasa, Africans working as “artisans” were reportedly earning 70 to 150/- 
per month, a high salary by colonial standards, but these workers only represented around 12 
percent of Africans colony-wide who worked for the KUHR, while “unskilled laborers,” who 
constituted 80 percent of the workforce, made only 15/- per month plus rations or 4/- in lieu, a 
wage that unequivocally consigned them to poverty.45 The 1945 “Phillips Report” concluded that 
the salary of a lower-wage worker from KUHR could not reasonably support one, let alone 
multiple, dependents. That this committee would come to such a conclusion can be taken as fairly 
persuasive evidence of the depths of the poverty that these workers faced, as its members had a 
quite limited notion of what constituted a minimum living standard for African workers in 
Mombasa. Theirs was a vision of urban livelihoods in which workers would be just above dire 
poverty, noting that, when calculating wages, they “should not, of course, be justified in putting a 
premium on extravagance, even for the sake of eliminating malnutrition,” and that they should be 
on their “guard lest the main emphasis … be shifted from what [the African worker] needs to what 
he wants.” Instead, they noted, their understanding of a “minimum standard” was one that attended 
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to basic requirements, but would “not [be] calculated to dispense with the need for effort or to 
remove the incentive to higher attainment.” From this premise of near basic subsistence and bodily 
health, the committee nonetheless still felt that “the married man” at the bottom of the salary scale 
during that period, “even if he has no children, is a long way below” the “poverty datum line.”46 
 Consequently, the poorer classes of Mombasa, the majority being African but also 
including some Arabs, Swahilis and South Asians, had to create urban family structures of food 
provision and preparation that would allow them to survive in the city’s unequal political economy. 
During the 1940s, waged employment was still almost entirely male, and likely even more than in 
the early decades of the century since migrant men had largely by this point taken over domestic 
labor, with the exception of childcare, from women.47 In 1947, it was estimated that of 21,950 
Africans registered as being employed in Mombasa, only 250 were women. However, the same 
study also reported that women accounted for one-third of the adult African population in the city 
and that, while men were more likely to be temporary migrants, women commonly were more 
permanent residents.48 Moreover, while not conclusive, the evidence suggests that many of these 
women lived with male partners, with the best data we have reports that two-thirds of the African 
men employed at the KURH in Mombasa lived with their wives.49 Consequently, approximately 
14,000 women lived in Mombasa during the 1940s with little access to wage labor from which to 
earn income, and many of them lived with men whose own salaries were not adequate to support 
dependents. 
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 As a result, African women were almost certainly partially responsible for provisioning 
food for their urban households, and as a result most families in the city likely did not fit the 
modernist gendered ideal of the male salary providing all of the household income. Excluded from 
wage labor, African women increasingly turned towards small-scale, commercial trade to 
supplement male wages. Though without being specific to gender, two separate reports from the 
1940s made note of such hawking activities in Mombasa, describing in 1945 the “conditions in 
Majengo,” a working-class neighborhood, and its “multitude of petty traders, dealing in a great 
variety of commodities,” with “its particularities of commercial practice,” and in 1947 labor survey 
about how “there are also some Africans rendering services to other Africans, some as traders, as 
boot repairers,” and “as carpenters.”50 However, N.M. Deverell, a social worker and co-author of 
the same 1947 survey, observed in her part of the study that both men and women were engaged 
in such trading activities. Moreover, in families where “The main source of income is the monthly 
wage,” often this base amount was being “supplemented by various means.” For women, these 
“various means” included selling prepared food, foodstuffs, black market commodities, and 
working as hairdressers.51 While we cannot know for sure how many African women were among 
these “traders” in Mombasa, given their lack of access wage labor and how, even if they did live 
with someone who had a salary, it would most often not have been adequate to support them both, 
we can logically conclude that many, and even thousands, of African women engaged in such 
income-generating activities in Mombasa. These women, though now using the cash they earned 
from these businesses instead of their agricultural labor, acquired foodstuffs that then they cooked 
for their families. 
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 However, women’s household labor related to food in Mombasa was not always 
completely divorced from the natural world. For these women and their families, or anyone living 
near poverty, their urban lives were becoming more precarious not only because of rising food 
prices and general scarcity of ingredients, but also because of the changing natural environment of 
the city. During the first decades of the twentieth century, Mombasa’s built environment 
overlapped and intermingled with the natural one, still filled with fields, brush and small forests. 
As a result, poor migrant workers were able to gather firewood with which to cook their food 
around the island without too much trouble. However, as more buildings were constructed, 
covering and clearing open areas, and as the many more thousands of migrants who came to the 
island picked over the remaining wood, an abundance became a scarcity.  As a result, what had in 
rural areas and for the first decades in Mombasa not been an expense, or a minor one, because it 
could mostly be gathered, had quickly by the 1940s become a major part of urban budgets. While 
some wood was still available for those willing to search for it, gathering in the main became an 
increasingly less viable way to acquire cooking fuel for the single male laborer, as the hours it 
would take to find enough far exceeded the value it would bring. As stated in 1945, “Fuel for 
cooking is one of the essentials of life for Africans in Mombasa; and few of them, on this small 
and thickly populated island, are able to collect their own.”52 However, as more and more women 
came to live in Mombasa with their husbands, their labor was directed towards the gathering of 
wood. A task that had been the responsibility of children in rural areas, a simple job that could be 
done right before cooking began, now came to take up a significant portion of women’s time in 
Mombasa, and the financial stakes were high. During the 1940s, even just a single person who 
cooked for themselves may have spent as much as 7/- to 8/- per month on firewood, which was a 
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major expense, given that many peoples’ wages were barely more than 30/- for the month. These 
women collected drift wood or cut it from the small number of remaining mangrove swamps 
around the island, such as near Mbaraki. Alternatively, they could also engage in the far more 
time-consuming task of gathering firewood off the island, as when one report observed seeing a 
“worker’s wife” who had “spent a large part of the day on the mainland and returned with a bundle 
of bushwood.”53 However, with limited supplies of gatherable wood, many people simply 
purchased it, which also seems to primarily have been the responsibility of women living in 
conjugal relationships. To save money, they could buy it in bulk from the main trading depot at 
Ndia Kuu, which some women were reported to do once a month, or on a more daily basis from 
smaller, mostly Arab, retailers throughout the island who sold firewood in bundles of three 
pieces.54 
Women in Mombasa, therefore, had even greater responsibilities in the provisioning and 
preparation of their families’ food than they had in rural areas. Their income from trading 
contributed, and likely in some cases entirely provided, the food they cooked for their households, 
while they also now had to gather or purchase the firewood, a task that had been assigned to 
children on the shamba. African families in Mombasa were not only constructed differently than 
the state hoped they would be, they were also not simply reproductions of rural structures in the 
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city. Urban families were, instead, the new creations of people drawing on past practices, but 
adapting them to the political economy and changing environments of the colonial city.   
However, while thousands of Africans were creating such conjugal households in 
Mombasa during the 1940s, such normative “husband-wife” family formations were only one of 
the ways in which people in Mombasa created relationships from which they could find 
nourishment, from food or otherwise. Though specific statistics are lacking, the evidence suggests 
that likely half, if not more, of the African men in Mombasa did not live without a wife or female 
partner.55 Moreover, though no numbers exist to quantify the total proportionally, anecdotal 
evidence also shows that some women were living in the city without a husband.56 For these 
people, living outside the conjugal family, their household food was cooked and consumed through 
a complex variety of domestic social relationships. 
In some instances, these relationships were still between men and women, but those who 
were not married, and may have only lived together part of the time. For example, some wage-
earning men had non-client relationships with prostitutes, acting as touts and bodyguards and in 
exchange they were “kept” by these women.57 Luise White stresses that, in Nairobi, such 
relationships were closer to “boyfriend-girlfriend” sexual partnerships, rather than that of an 
asymmetry between a pimp and a prostitute. She observes that women rarely shared their earnings 
with these men, but instead, as her informant Asha Wanjiru told her, “if you wanted you could 
give him some [money], but if you didn’t you would only have to buy him food, cook it, and eat 
with him.”58 Other relationships also provide evidence that men were often dependent on women 
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to not only prepare but to provide their food outside of formal structures of marriage. One man 
living in Mombasa, divorced from his wife, had a new girlfriend who was employed as an ayah, 
made 5/- more per month than he did, and was provided food at her place of work. While the man 
seems to have taken many of his meals at vibanda eateries or by buying fried fish for take-away, 
his girlfriend also served as social-safety net for him, as Deverell observed that “I do not think that 
he had much difficulty over food as he said that if he was short his ‘wife’ would help him.”59 
Other men living without wives in the city were also able to avoid performing kitchen labor 
by creating new domestic structures. For example, a married Kamba man and sweeper for a port 
company, whose wife was back in Ukambani, lived in a space he shared with a casual laborer at 
the port and an “old Mkamba woman.” The men shared a room and the woman slept on a couch 
on the passageway outside.  The three of them arranged that if the two men supplied the food, then 
the older woman would cook the meals that she would be able to eat as well.60 In another 
household, this one off the island in the rapidly growing, peri-urban Changamwe neighborhood, a 
group of migrant men who shared a home drew on generation rather than gender to structure 
kitchen labor. One member of the household was a Kikuyu man who was married, but had not 
been able to pay all the brideprice for his wife, and she remained in Embu district with one of their 
sons. However, their other son, who was 10 years old, had come to live with the father in Mombasa, 
and he performed the kitchen labor in the migratory household.61  
While for upcountry laborers, such remaking of gendered and generational norms was 
necessitated by the long distance they were from their homes, but for other Mombasa residents, 
even those who were migrants, geography opened the possibility for maintaining the close link 
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between food preparation, gender and kinship. For example, many coastal Mijikenda Africans also 
migrated to work in Mombasa, but, as both colonial officials and scholars recognize, they were 
able to maintain close links to their nearby rural homesteads. For example, one man, a Digo, the 
Mijikenda ethnic group from the rural areas surrounding Mombasa, lived in the city with his 
brothers’ family where he also took most of his meals. The brothers, living together in a share 
condition of poverty, supported each other, as it was noted of the man that “if he is short of cash 
he expects his brother to feed him and he does the same for his brother.” Additionally, on the 
weekends, he would return to his wife who lived on their farm in Changamwe (then still a fairly 
rural place), and so could have his meals prepared through the rural, gendered structures of kinship. 
Another Digo man, a causal laborer at the port who had lived in Mombasa since 1936, was able to 
rent a room from his aunt who owned a home in Majengo. While responsible for some of his own 
meals, as part of the household, his aunt prepared food eaten communally at midday, which would 
have been accessible for him with the port’s two-hour lunch breaks. However, this relationship 
was not one entirely of dependency, as the man paid his aunt about 10/- a month for the food.62 
For both these Digo families, life in the city stretched and remade aspects of their food lives, but 
kinship remained a key access point for much of the food they ate, and gender continued to 
structure much of the labor that prepared it. As a result, the Mijikenda in colonial Mombasa were 
“part-time proletarians,” and indeed part of this meant they needed to only partially, and on a part-
time basis, restructure their food systems to accommodate to the changing realities of the capitalist 
city.63 
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However, many men in the city, thousands of them most likely, did not live with wives, 
girlfriends, aunts or children, and the food they ate at home was cooked either by themselves or 
their male friends and roommates. In considering how men reacted to these new responsibilities, 
any conclusions must be tentative, as affective preference is hard to prove historically without 
direct testimony. Nonetheless, the fact that no evidence exists during the 1940s or the surrounding 
decades of households with women in which men cooked does strongly suggest that men only 
prepared food when compelled by such homosocial situations. Whether they enjoyed the act of 
cooking is something we cannot ascertain, but it seems clear they would have preferred that women 
or their male juniors did it for them. While a household in which they did not prepare food may 
have remained their ideal, a defining feature of migration and urban life for thousands of men 
during the twentieth century in Mombasa remained that, indeed, they did cook. While James C. 
McCann dismisses the significance of such realities in his survey of African food history when 
noting that in Africa “bachelors do cook—but not creatively and rarely well,” it is the view of this 
dissertation that we should pay closer attention to what was a radical transformation of African 
gender structures.64 
As addressed in Chapter Two, African men during the 1930s created homosocial 
households in which cooking responsibilities were shared among men of a similar age, and others 
in which better paid workers became patrons of the poorer and unemployed, providing them with 
food and shelter for free or at a lower cost in exchange for their labor in the kitchen. During the 
1940s, the evidence we have of specific households does not indicate the continuing presence of 
these patron-based household structures in Mombasa. If we take this as indicative, the conclusion 
could be that the soaring cost of living during the war impoverished nearly all African workers, 
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higher paid or not as raises hardly matched inflation, and thus diminished access to surplus 
resources to doll out as patronage. Additionally, as more men began to live with their wives, these 
more normative relationships may have been preferred to those of the migratory household. 
However, the evidence for the 1940s requires such conclusions to remain speculative. What 
is clear, though, is that men situated in similar, rather than asymmetrical, financial relationships 
did continue to build households in which they shared space, friendship and food. For example, 
one Kamba man, unmarried and who had work at the port since the 1920s, shared his home and 
food with multiple male roommates where it was observed that “3 lbs. mixed meal was being 
prepared to be eaten by 5 men with one very small fried fish for relish.”65 Elsewhere, in a room in 
Mombasa’s Old Town near the dhow port, a man from Taita, a mostly rural area between Mombasa 
and Nairobi, shared a room with a friend. While his wife had previously lived with him in 
Mombasa, she had returned to their shamba near Voi with their three-year-old child. An employee 
of a transport firm, he seemed to eat most of his meals at home, as he and his roommate shared the 
household expenses, and were “noticed having tea and bread for breakfast, ugali and stewed liver 
at midday and Ugali and stew in the evening.”66 However, while for many men, these relationships 
allowed them to lower their costs through shared expenses, have time off from cooking and 
provided the amity of friendship in a town far from their families, others did not make such 
connections, and lived on their own and, when eating at home, cooking their own food.67 
While much of the analysis thus far has focused on how working-class Africans acquired 
food, who cooked it, and who gathered together to eat it, the experiences of many of the city’s 
poorer classes were also fundamentally defined by not eating, not having access to the resources 
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to acquire enough food. For some, this was a literally painful, if somewhat strategic, choice. A 17-
year-old painter working for a transport company, who was a first generation son of migrants from 
Tanganyika, but also lived on his own and was responsible for all his expenses since his mother 
had moved south to Ramisi near the border, was saving for the bride-price so he could marry his 
fiancée and therefore symbolically enter adulthood. His need to save money while living on a 
painter’s salary, even with it being 50/- a month, was difficult, as he at times had to draw on credit 
just to provision his basic goods. In his efforts to save, therefore, he skipped meals to make his 
budget work, often skipping dinner.68 The tendency of men living on their own to skip meals to 
save money, most likely either for bridge price or to buy rural land, seems to have been fairly 
common, as Deverell observed in 1947 that “Single men, unless they form a group of tribesmen 
for the purpose of sharing their food tend to stint on their food … to save money.”69 She also 
hypothesized that some of the men she saw smoking while walking to work in the morning may 
have been doing so, in part, to suppress their appetite. While this was only speculation, one Kamba 
man did tell her that “if I eat a large quantity of ugali in the evening I do not even require a cup of 
tea in the morning.”70 
However, when people were able to eat, the food they consumed inside their homes in 
Mombasa was cooked by wives, other female relatives, children, male friends or themselves. The 
structures of these social relationships were both familiar and new for the migrants creating and 
living within them. Generation, as in rural areas and during the early decades of migrant 
community formation in Mombasa, remained an important force in determining who was assigned 
the work of the kitchen, but, as more women came to the city, gender came to again be central to 
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how the labor of food was distributed in urban families. By the 1940s, women were increasingly 
once again cooking the food that men ate. Gendered ideas about kitchen labor proved extremely 
elastic in Kenya. For decades, with few women in Mombasa, migratory men cooked their own 
food, but durable ideas that structured rural patriarchies proved to be stronger than a few decades 
of urban practice, and men wanted the women in their households to cook their food, as observed 
of African workers in 1947: “Married men would expect their wives to prepare at least one good 
meal per day.”71 As we have seen, though, many men did not live with women, and had to continue 
to perform a migratory masculinity in which cooking was part of their daily life. 
Nonetheless, not all, and for some not even most, of the food that they consumed was eaten 
inside their homes. Street-food businesses continued to grow in 1940s Mombasa, a process that 
was inexorably tied to the city’s political economy. As during the 1930s, most working-class 
Africans in Mombasa were living in poverty, structurally placed into that position by their below-
subsistence wages. While at their jobs, these workers needed cheap and accessible prepared meals, 
as returning home to cook food during a shift break was difficult and most licensed restaurants in 
the city were often not near worksites and, regardless, were priced well out of what nearly all 
Africans could afford. At the same time, unemployment was significant in the city. Of the 27,500 
African men in Mombasa in 1947 (de facto the only Africans eligible for wage employment during 
the 1940s), only 21,500 of them were registered as employed, leaving 6,000, at least theoretically, 
without work. Of courses, a certain number of casual laborers would not have been counted, though 
those employed the day the census was taken were, and such estimates for a variety of technical 
reasons are never fully reliable, but nonetheless it seems reasonable to say that thousands of 
African men in a total male population of only 27,500 were unemployed. Moreover, an additional 
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14,000 African women were effectively barred from waged work and so, together, potentially as 
many as 20,000 of the city’s total adult African population of only 41,500 could not earn a living 
from wage labor. As I argued above, married women turned towards the informal economy to 
supplement their husbands’ below-subsistence wages and to help provision food for their 
households, but so too did thousands of others who did not have access to wage labor, including 
single women, whether widowed or unmarried, as well as the thousands of unemployed men.72 
With the more than 20,000 men working in Mombasa on most days needing a meal while on shift, 
as well as countless other men and women needing a quick, easy and cheap meals, many of those 
excluded from wage labor turned to preparing and selling them food, coffee and tea as a way to 
earn income in the city. 
By the 1940s, the ubiquity of these comestible businesses on Mombasa’s landscape, as well 
as their integration into the lives of the African working class, was clear. The Phillips Report in 
1945 noted that taking meals at such eateries appeared “to be a not uncommon practice among 
Africans in Mombasa,” and Deverell wrote that “Cooked foods of various sorts are sold at eating 
houses and innumerable wayside stalls.”73 Moreover, the motivation of Africans to eat in these 
smaller-scale restaurants was driven as much by taste as economic need. The preference for 
prepared food seems to have stemmed in part from the basicness of the rations many of them 
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received from employers and the difficulty of finding supplemental foodstuffs during the war and 
the years that followed. An abundance of evidence exists that Africans during the 1940s bristled 
against being paid food rations in kind rather than the cash equivalent. While some resistance to 
this may have come from single men who wanted to reduce their spending on food so as to save 
money, many other workers were turned off by the dull, repetitive nature of a rationing regime, 
which provided foodstuffs with only a loose relation to what they would have eaten at home. This 
depravation of taste that a diet of rations entailed was only thrown into further relief by the 
numerous working-class eateries throughout the city from which they could find more desirable 
meals. Multiple officials studying labor unrest in Mombasa during the 1940s were made aware of 
these preferences, and observed that “the ‘posho’ standard which the African complains about so 
frequently” was composed of a basicness that “leaves no room for that variety which is 
increasingly desired by town-dwelling Africans,” and that “the monthly issue of 60 lb. of posho 
[maize meal] is an anachronism.” Deverell herself conceded, of the food provisioned to workers 
by employers, that “it is not a diet I could care to recommend.”74 Rather than be resigned to 
monotony, many workers looked to the “numerous small eating houses where food can be obtained 
and of more variety than could possibly be provided by the Railway Administration.”75 
These sellers of tea, coffee, fried snacks and larger meals became incorporated into the 
daily routines of the city’s workers. While some people skipped breakfast to economize and others 
ate bread with tea at home, many others stopped at a roadside stand or a duka shop on their way to 
work and purchased a hot beverage with either a mahamri, a spiced doughnut, kaimati, fried dough 
covered in sweet syrup, mofa, a maize-based pastry, or chapatti, pan-fried flat bread of South 
Asian derivation but that had been indigenized into East African cuisine. During these morning 
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walks, the homosocial kin and friendship relations that structured migratory households also 
occasionally extended out to the streets. One morning while walking to work in a group, “Some 
Africans [were] noticed asking their friends to spare them a piece of their mofa [etc.] and so 
manage to breakfast for free.” During lunch hours, if men did not return home for food, they would 
have their meal at a roadside eatery, and while it seems many ate dinner in their households, some 
people would purchase fried fish from a hawker after work before preparing some ugali and then 
using the fish as the relish. Other workers, on their way to a night shift at the port, would stop by 
a vendor and purchase mishkaki, grilled meat.76 
 The organization of this street-food industry was reflective of deeper, historical East 
African social relations, while it was also indicative of the how the increasing commercialization 
and urbanization of Mombasa was changing the city’s structure. During the 1940s, Arabs had a 
prominent place in the business of selling prepared food and drink, particularly in the tea, coffee 
and fried-snack trades. Arab women dominated the preparation side of the commonly consumed 
fried morning sweets and chapatti, a food item eaten at all times of the day.77 Cooking out of their 
homes, some women cooked at a larger scale of production, preparing these foods specifically for 
commercial resale, while others would simply cook bigger portions of food they were already 
preparing for their families, and then sell the surplus.78 The washiri Arab women who prepared 
these foods entered the industry through a gendered division of labor and urban commerce. Their 
experiences in the food trade were shaped by the seclusion of women being a part of the 
performance of Islamic respectability on the Swahili coast. While Muslim women of the lower 
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classes commonly entered public space and performed labor, the ustaarabu ideal, the set of ideas 
undergirding Islamic urbanity on the coast, valorized households in which women were provided 
for and remained inside the home [go to Strobel for more on this]. However, this hegemonic desire 
to perform ustaarabu, with its nostalgic reference to the patrician merchant and slave-owning 
classes that had formally dominated coastal politics, could often not be reconciled with the reality 
of the capitalist political economy that increasingly structured Mombasa’s social relations. As 
families need more income than men’s wage labor alone could provide, these Arab women created 
a middle ground between the exigencies of capitalist modernity and coastal respectability, 
engaging in the commercial economy, but doing so in their homes. They prepared the fried snacks 
of the working classes, but then did not sell their products themselves in public, instead having 
them sold in local maduka shops or by hawkers on the street, especially in the working-class 
neighborhoods of Makupa and Mwembe Tayari on the island. The maduka were owned by South 
Asian and Arab men, and the hawkers were women and children, most likely African and doing 
this work to generate income for their own households or helping to supplement the wages of a 
male husband or father. Arab women were the producers in this industry, for the most part, but 
their gender quite literally cost them money, specifically the 12-percent that their sellers 
commissioned.79 Whether complicating the ideal types of urban Islamic respectability or the 
colonial state’s vision of the “modern family,” Arab and African women alike rarely lived entirely 
on the wages of the men in their lives. 
The businesses, then, that prepared and sold fried snacks to Mombasa’s working classes 
were composed of both men and women, but with fairly gendered roles, as Arab women prepared 




children did so too on the city streets. However, during the 1940s, the roadside, prepared-coffee 
industry was the work almost exclusively of men. Cups of coffee in Mombasa sold for a very low 
price, two cents, compared to other comestible items such as a chai, tea with milk and sugar that 
went for 15 cents, and so were very much available to the city’s poorer classes. Despite these low 
unit prices, coffee hawking was actually a fairly profitable business, but it had to be done through 
economies of scale. As a consequence, the mostly Arab men who worked the sector during the 
1940s worked long days, walking through the streets, clinking their cups in their pockets to alert 
potential customers, and trying to sell enough to generate a profit. One such coffee hawker 
generally sold two delnas of coffee per day, which amounted to eight cups of dried, ground beans. 
If consistently reaching that amount, he would make 70/- a month, more than double what many 
laborers earned.80 While tea was widely available, the evidence we have for the 1940s only 
references it being sold in maduka, alongside the fried snacks offered for breakfast.81 However, 
given the ubiquity of hawkers selling tea during the 1950s, such businesses probably existed during 
the previous decade, but simply in smaller numbers.82 
For those selling larger meals, the evidence we have for the 1940s suggests that women, 
and probably African women, predominated in these industries. Deverell, whose study was 
primary on Africans and would usually specifically identify people of other groups, observed that 
“Uji [porridge] and mbaazi (cooked beans sometimes mixed with whole maize) are prepared by 
women and hawked for sale” in the city.83 In addition, while such activities were attributed mostly 
to women, the number of men selling prepared food during the 1950s pushes this study to conclude 
that some African men, particularly given the unemployment situation, were likely also doing this 
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work during the 1940s, but, with our limited sources and the predominance of women in the 
industry, were simply not being mentioned in colonial reports.84 
During the first five decades of colonialism, Mombasa’s poorer classes built a street-food 
culture that certainly emerged, in part, from pre-colonial antecedents, but on a scale and variety 
not seen in the coastal city’s history. The industry was created through adaptions to Mombasa’s 
unequal political economy, but also by the ingenuity of hawkers and vendors seeking to make a 
living in a city that offered them few alternatives, as well as the taste preferences of urban 
consumers who wanted more than the posho rations of wage labor. However, by the end of the 
1940s, this expanding industry had grown to an extent that it began to catch the attention of a 
colonial state that was at the same time increasingly interested in gaining control over and 
remaking the economic, social and aesthetic composition of the city. In Mombasa, a new form of 
government, “urban development,” would soon radically transform the relationship between these 
street-food proprietors and the state. 
Street-Food and Urban Development in Late-Colonial Mombasa 
Development is a system of paternalism, a mode of power that has a long history on the 
Swahili coast.85 The nefariousness of paternalism lies in its ability to round off the sharp edges of 
what are most often, at their base, violent systems of domination. Paternalism reached its apogee 
of exploitation on the slave plantations of the Americas, but it has also infused asymmetrical power 
relations around the world and throughout history, providing ideological cover for social inequity. 
Like other forms of paternalism, this new one in post-war East Africa had its softer edges. The 
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new developmental empire, theorized during the 1930s and 1940s, could finally be implemented 
more forcefully during the 1950s with world war and its aftermath slowly receding. As the British 
faced an empire of continuing instability from labor protests, the premise of development seemed 
as urgent during the early 1950s as it had during the mass strikes of the 1930s. In this new, 
developmentalist empire, overt coercion needed to be replaced with accommodation. Africans 
needed to be made to feel invested in living in a world run by Britain. The colonial city and its 
social structures needed to be remade. African men should be able to afford to have their families 
with them in the cities. They needed to live in modern homes. They needed spaces of leisure.86 
And, critical for our purposes, they needed proper places to eat.87 
The inclusion of working-class eateries as part of Mombasa’s urban development plans 
came in 1947. After the Municipal Board debated for months about whether and to what extent 
the state should take on the responsibility of building municipally-run food canteens, the “Ten 
Year Development Plan” of the same year crystalized it as a priority.88 The records are thin on 
details, but by late 1947 the municipality started to receive rents for the use of kitchens in canteens 
that had formally only served alcohol in Mwembe Tayari, Changamwe, Kisauni, and Majengo, all 
areas with large populations of African workers.89 The repurposing of these alcohol canteens to 
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also serve food was part of the larger development plan for Mombasa that aimed to bring the city 
into a modernity recognizable to the colonial state. For the British, the “modernization” of colonial 
cities was about reconfiguring temporal and spatial geographies. Development would bring 
Mombasa in line with the upward trajectory of world, historical progress. The author of the ten-
year plan, Municipal African Affairs Officer P.H. Brown, put forward that “In no instance is 
anything projected which is alien to urban development in England at present or which, in most 
instances, is not considered as basic progress and development.”90  
As the municipal government slowly began to build the types of eateries it thought more 
suitable to a stable, urban working class, it also sharpened its attention on the people who were 
already providing food to the city’s working poor. Little more than a month after the release of the 
development plan, the Town Clerk and the General Purposes Committee proposed a 15-point set 
of recommendations for trading in Mombasa, some of which aimed to radically restructure the 
city’s comestible cultures. Among them, it was suggested that “all street trading be abolished” and 
“That the vending of all foodstuffs excluding uncut fruits and beverages be prohibited.”91 
Alongside these suggestions, it was proposed alternatively to raise the license fees on street traders. 
During the 1930s, the state saw licenses exclusively as a form of control and not as a way to 
generate revenue, but, with the postwar state expanding, licensing fees became more important to 
municipal budgets and, additionally, allowed the state more control over the nature of capital 
accumulation and class formation in the colonial city. In the debate, Captain Hamely of the board 
specifically outlined that these fees would allow them to undercut the economic advantage that 
street-food vending provided to hawkers and others vendors, noting that “it had been felt that the 
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license fee should be increased, because the hawker had no overhead charges to meet in the manner 
as the shopkeeper, thus producing unfair competition.”92 What poorer members of society saw as 
a rare advantage that allowed them to earn higher profits, Captain Hamely and the vision of urban 
development that he supported saw as a form of “unfair” accumulation outside the controlled 
logics of bureaucratic capitalism. 
However, the “colonial state” that was initiating such development plans in Mombasa was 
not a unitary force, but a complex and ever changing assemblage of competing interests that would 
converge and conflict depending on the nature and implications of the issue under debate. The 
Board was dominated by Europeans, who were allotted seats and hired for administrative posts in 
numbers greatly disproportionate to their population in the city.93 Throughout the 1950s, European 
officials in Mombasa were generally, with some exceptions, in agreement about their desire to 
radically reorder working-class food systems. However, many of the Arab and South Asian and, 
especially later when they had more representation, African officials questioned the totalizing 
vision of their European colleagues, and pushed for more moderation and negotiation when dealing 
with street-food vendors. These Arab, South Asian and African officials were part of Mombasa’s 
urban elite and shared some of the ideological views of their European counterparts, but they also 
in dealing with the issue of street food often demonstrated that they had a perspective more attuned 
to the dynamics of the city and what sorts of institutions and relationships were required to keep it 
functioning.  
For example, Councilman Jetha, part of the South Asian community, rejected the 1947 
proposal to raise licensing fees that Captain Hamely had supported. In a vote split almost entirely 
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down racial lines, Jetha convinced other South Asian, Arab and the one African on the Board to 
vote with him, and they stalled the proposed fee hikes inside the General Purposes Committee.94 
Councilman Jetha then spent much of the next year, 1948, trying to exempt maize and cereal 
roasters from becoming entangled in the increasingly strict sanitation laws of the city, and argued 
to the Board that it “should not only see to the cleanliness of the town but also to the welfare of its 
inhabitants.” He saw in these increased fees the dual tragedy that they would put maize roasters 
“out of business” and “not only deprive that person of his livelihood but deprive a section of the 
community of a commodity it wished to purchase.” Understanding the continuing necessity of the 
competitive advantage that low overheads provided to such hawkers and venders and the workers 
who benefited from their cheaper prices, Jetha contended that these fees did not take account of 
the reality that “the labouring classes cannot afford to go into restaurants,” and that these small-
scale businesses allowed them to access “roasted maize at a price within their means.”95 The same 
year, when the Board was working to formalize zoning laws that would bar hawkers and vendors 
from central areas of Mombasa, and add additional licensing costs, Jetha was joined in his defense 
of hawkers by Councilman Janmohamed who argued that “the creation of prohibited areas and the 
proposed fee to be charged for a general hawkers licence would cause great hardship,” and that 
“many hawkers would be unable to pay the fee and would find the lucrative area of town barred 
to them.”96  
Despite these urgings for restraint from Jetha, Janmohamed and those who voted with 
them, these councilors ultimately lost the debate over the future of Mombasa, and instead the city 
government over the coming years, led departmentally by the Town Clerk and the Medical Officer 
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of Health, began to institute a system of surveillance, arrests, displacement and demolitions as its 
new administrative policy towards illicit vendors and hawkers. This change in urban policy, 
representing a clear attack on the businesses of the poor, was not unique to Mombasa, as governing 
authorities were also engaged in a similar restructuring in Nairobi, a period of the city’s history 
that Claire Robertson calls the “First Hawkers War.”97  
Mombasa officials began their “war” against street food with an effort to remove vendors 
during the early 1950s near Kilindini port on Mombasa island, the center of working life for 
thousands of the city’s laboring classes.98 At a recently established street-food market near the 
docks, women food vendors served prepared meals to the workers, and had been “welcomed” by 
their customers when they arrived in 1951. During the initial push by authorities to oust these 
women, port workers were able to successfully defend them. They pushed the Labor Office at the 
port, and succeeded in having a shed built for the women. With these vendors secure, the workers 
were happy that “they were then being provided with cheap and good food.” However, on a second 
pass, the Labor Officer ignored the preferences of the workers, and displaced two thirds of the 
women who vended food by the port, reducing their numbers from 150 to 50. The effects of this 
were negative both for the vendors and the workers who had purchased their food. These “100 
deserving and old women” were “put out of business,” and were deprived of access to the port, 
one of the most lucrative prepared-food markets in the city. For the workers, meal breaks became 
less satisfying, more inconvenient and expensive. In terms of taste, the reduction in the number of 
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vendors “resulted in a deterioration of the standard of food,” and as a result “many labourers are 
forced to have their meals elsewhere where they have to pay more.”99 
The next year, municipal authorities turned their attention to coffee and tea hawkers, an 
industry itself under rapid transformation from the increased urban migration of rural Africans 
during the 1950s. Primarily run by Arabs during the first half of the twentieth century, more and 
more Africans began to work as tea and coffee hawkers during the final years of colonialism.100 
However, policy towards these hawkers shifted significantly beginning in January of 1953, and 
may have not been unrelated to the increased African presence within the industry, when the 
Medical Officer of Health wrote to Mombasa’s Liwali and complained that, since he arrived, “I 
have considered coffee [and] tea … hawkers to be a serious menace to the health of the town.” 
Expression a palpable sense of revulsion, the Medical Officer of Health rejected the long-followed 
practices through which coffee was hawked in the city, the click-clicking of cups in the vendor’s 
pocket, and recoiled at the bodily contact between the seller and the products consumed by their 
customers. He observed that “cups are either kept in the pocket of the hawker, or rattled about in 
his hand. In either case they have been exposed to a serious degree of contamination, as their 
clothes are usually filthy, and it would greatly surprise me if the hawkers wash their hands during 
the day.” He also worried that these hawkers were spoiling the city’s physical environment, as 
when a client finished a cup of coffee “the dregs are discarded onto the street or pavement.” He 
also saw the industry’s system of cup washing to be completely inadequate and, though without 
any evidence as he conceded “I cannot prove it,” he nonetheless accused that these beverage 
vendors were “responsible for much of the tuberculosis, typhoid, dysenteries and other infectious 
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diseases in the town.” Proposing a new, tightly-monitored prepared beverage industry, he stated 
that the only conditions under which he would approve further licenses for selling beverages were 
for those that were bottled or, if they were prepared by the hawker, they needed to be served in a 
disposable cup and the proprietor needed more extensive washing and waste-disposal facilities.101 
In response, Mombasa’s Liwali, himself a part of the Municipal Board and a prominent 
voice in the Arab and Swahili communities from which many of these hawkers came, defended 
coffee and tea hawking and its place within the city’s history and society. However, the Liwali 
also, to a certain extent, conceded to the logic of his governing colleague, the Medical Officer of 
Health. He wrote that “coffee hawkers have been doing this sort of work for over 50 years now 
and their method of operating have been the same ever since.” Though it seems certain that coffee 
hawking had a history quite a bit longer than fifty years, the point was that these vendors were 
intrinsic to the city itself, as “coffee is an essential food to Arabs and it has become the essential 
diet to African labourers as well and all these people cannot live without it.” He informed the 
Medical Officer of Health that the proposals for reforming the industry were not practical since 
hawkers could not afford to rapidly remake their businesses and, using arguments similar to those 
of Jetha, contended that if these rules were enforced the vendors would “have no other alternative 
except to stop at once from selling the coffee and will mean depriving these people of their only 
means of livelihood and also depriving this essential diet to these African labourers and poor 
Arabs.” Nonetheless, the Liwali also upheld the sanitation logic that these businesses needed to 
change, and he did not reject the Medical Officer of Health’s reforms, but asked that they be 
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delayed.102 Soon thereafter, the council agreed, recommending to wait to enact the policies until 
the following year, in 1954.103 
However, whatever concession the Liwali was able to negotiate, municipal authorities and 
other elites with similar aesthetic sensibilities continued to move to clear prepared beverage and 
food hawkers from Mombasa’s landscape. During October of 1953, less than a year after the 
agreement to delay enforcement, Rosina House, located on Salim Road (now Digo Road) in the 
town center, wrote to the municipality to complain about coffee hawkers that were operating near 
their building “during the early morning hours.” As a result of their complaints, the hawker 
“nuisance was checked up by the Askaris [police].” Days later, though, the coffee sellers had 
returned and were operating each morning, and Rosina House asked the government “to send some 
askaris between 6:30 and 8 a.m. every morning and have this nuisance checked out entirely.” The 
police returned, and cleared the hawkers out again.104 The class dimensions of such actions, with 
elite residents taking advantage of the new policies of urban development to mobilized state 
coercion in order to excise the economic activities of the poor from their neighborhoods, also 
inflected the experiences of people selling prepared food. The next year, in 1954, a group of 
licensed restaurant owners hired an attorney to complain to Mombasa’s Town Clerk about 
unlicensed Africans and Arabs who were “vending cooked food round about Mwembe Tayari, and 
particularly in the proximity of their hotels [restaurants].”105 While those from Rosina House were 
more concerned about the general presence of hawkers and what it meant for the aesthetics of their 
neighborhood, these restauranteurs were clearly more directly worried that street-food vendors 
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with their low overhead and therefore cheap prices would draw away their customers. Using the 
legitimacy their building and trade licenses granted them in Mombasa’s political structure, they 
directed the state to clear out these competitors. The next day, the Town Clerk informed their 
attorney that the “matter has now been investigated and prosecutions have been taken against the 
unlicensed Street Traders for contravention of the Mombasa Municipal By-laws,” and reported 
that “these persons have now ceased this unauthorised trading.”106 
However, since the point of these forced removals from the perspective of the state was 
that they be part of a larger development project meant to promote order, stability and colonial 
control, authorities realized they could not just clear out these street-food vendors and provide no 
alternatives to the workers who needed the food and beverages these hawkers sold. Moreover, with 
thousands of residents relying on these comestible professions for their income, the state also 
understood that it needed to create alternative economic opportunities to the traders who had been 
displaced. Through these clear-outs, the state had manufactured a problem for which poor 
Mombasa traders had already found a solution. That is, hawkers themselves had answered the 
question of how to feed underpaid workers and provide income to the city’s vast population of the 
unemployed, but now the colonial state was trying to engineer its own system over which it would 
have control. The government’s response to a question the majority of the city was not asking them 
to answer was to create a network of food canteens around the city that would be located near key 
worksites in which some of the hawkers who lost their livelihoods would be able to work legally. 
Rather than illegible and unplanned urban development, these new institutions would 
compartmentalize these vendors into delineated spaces where they would be made visible to the 
state through licensing and inspections. They would, in short, become “modern.” 
																																																						
106 Town Clerk, Mombasa to A.Z. Mahmud, Esq., 21 August 1954 (UY/28/98), KNA-Coast. 
	 151 
The creation of a network of licensed, working-class eateries in Mombasa had first been 
considered during the early 1950s, but at that point the emphasis was on private employers building 
their own canteens for their employees, and staffing them with the hawkers being displaced by the 
first rounds of clear-outs. However, the city’s industrial concerns had little interest in expanding 
their obligation to feed workers beyond providing them a ration.107 Municipal authorities sent a 
circular to larger employers at the port suggesting they build food canteen, but the responses were 
tepid, as “the Committee was informed that some companies had replied declining to allow women 
[hawkers] within their compounds and others stated that they had referred the matter to their 
principles in the United Kingdom.”108 Some employers did eventually build canteens for their 
workers, but these were few.109 Nonetheless, the city government continued to squeeze food and 
beverage hawkers and expel them from their areas of operation, and so pressure continued to build 
on the state to find a way for workers to have access to affordable food and to allow those who 
needed income to provide it. 
By 1957, when the Medical Officer of Health initiated another mass operation against 
people selling prepared food in Mombasa, government inaction to alleviate the suffering caused 
by the ways in which this displaced the otherwise unemployed and decreased the access of the 
poor to affordable prepared food in the city was becoming increasing untenable. This was perhaps 
in large part because of changing political structures in the Kenya Colony. Mombasa officials were 
likely more aware of the difficulties this caused for Africans in the city because, by the later 1950s, 
more Africans were in the municipal government and who were themselves tied to newly forming 
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urban constituencies. With this limited political liberalization of the colonial state’s more than five 
decades of racially authoritarian rule, a select-few Africans entered into elected and appointed 
positions during the 1950s, especially towards the end of the decade. On the issue of street-food, 
these newly-installed African officials generally occupied a middle ground, operating within the 
developmentalist logic that unlicensed hawking was anathema to modern Mombasa and its future, 
but while being on the whole far more amenable than most of their European colleagues to 
compromises and negotiations that would enable the industry, in effect, to continue. 
By 1957, while operations against vendors continued apace, little had been accomplished 
towards building the food canteens that were ostensibly to feed workers who now increasingly 
lacked access to food and income to hawkers who had been displaced. Funding had been, by this 
point, allocated to build these canteens, but it was stuck deep in the municipal bureaucracy. Ronald 
Ngala, an African and Coastal Member of the colony-wide Legislative Council, sent a letter to the 
Mombasa Town Clerk to argue the case of the food hawkers from his constituency. While his 
motive may have been in part driven by genuine, self-realized concern, Ngala was also clearly 
responding to Mombasa residents who had come to him demanding affordable food be available 
to the city’s poorer classes. He told the Town Clerk that “Many Africans have been to me to 
emphasise the need for having some African food at Mwembe Tayari,” a working-class 
neighborhood, and then continued that “I have visited Mwembe Tayari and seen that none of the 
local restaurants there sells any African food, e.g., beans, sima [ugali], maize, porridge, e.t.c.” 
However, even if it was available, these “local restaurants are too costly for the type of African 
wishing to have his meals at Mwembe Tayari.” Conceding to the official line that hawkers should 
not be part of the city’s long-term plans, Ngala nonetheless proposed that “some temporary 
	 153 
arrangements should be made to allow those Africans selling food at Mwembe Tayari to continue 
doing so awaiting the new arrangements,” those being food-vendor stalls in the local market.110 
While the Town Clerk, A.V. Ratcliff, seemed to have little confidence that Ngala’s 
proposal would pass through the municipal council, F.P.B. Derrick, Mombasa’s District 
Commissioner, more clearly understood the vital role that street-food played in the city, a position 
that had been made clear to him by mobilized African residents who had complained to his office. 
While agreeing with the sanitary logic of the Medical Officer of Health, Derrick nonetheless felt 
the need for social stability should at least in the short term be prioritized. In a circular sent to the 
Chairman of the municipal board, the Medical Officer of Health, the African Affairs Officer and 
the District Officer in Majengo, the District Commissioner wrote that “I do not know if you are 
aware of the very considerable feeling there is among Africans in the town regarding the 
prohibition which has recently been imposed … on food vendors selling food in the streets and in 
open spaces.” He continued that, while acknowledging the importance of sanitation, he also 
encouraged authorities to “go slowly in this matter as otherwise there may well be repercussions” 
because “a very large proportion of the manual labourers employed in this town traditionally obtain 
their food from itinerant food vendors and do not go to Arab or African owned ‘hotels’ where the 
food is much more expensive.” While one canteen had been approved for construction in the High 
Level industrial area, Derrick argued that many more would be needed in order to adequately 
provide food to the city’s working classes, and that in the meantime temporary areas needed to be 
established in which street-food vendors could “carry on their trade.” Making clear the link 
between his position and the political action of Africans in Mombasa, he concluded his letter by 
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acknowledging that “I have brought this matter to your attention because I have received 
representations from a number of Africans.”111 
In addition to such concerns at the district and national level, some municipal officials, and 
seemingly only ones who were African, were questioning the logic of a total prohibition of street-
food in the city. This included the members of the Mombasa African Affairs Council, David Ikumi, 
George G. Madumadu and Lance Jones. While touring Mombasa’s industrial area in 1957, they 
observed and spoke with vendors working in this part of the city. Along with multiple tea vendors, 
they saw “over 30 unlicensed food vendors of various descriptions and cleanliness” who catered 
to workers in the area. These vendors, existing in a political environment in which they faced the 
constant threat of prosecution, continued nonetheless to operate. Like other officials, African or 
otherwise, the three councilors were tentative to explicitly approve of these businesses, but they 
did concede to their necessity within Mombasa’s political economy. For people needing income, 
“this trade is profitable” and for those workers who required their meals while on the job, these 
vendors provided a “great service to the customers.” Their position was not simply drawn from 
sympathy for the traders, but came from their understanding of street-food being generative of 
Mombasa’s modern future. In contrast to most other municipal officials, this African delegation 
saw itinerant street-food vending as integral to and a part of the city’s capitalist expansion. Their 
mobility was critical to a city in which “buildings will continue to be erected in and around 
Mombasa” and such food was required to feed the consequent “influx of labor [that] is increasing 
daily.”112 
Whatever the internal debates of the government were about the future of street food 
vendors in Mombasa, the city’s workers kept working, still needed food, and these small-scale 
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proprietors continued to serve it to them, making small profits and their urban lives economically 
viable. Moreover, some had actually achieved official recognition, and with it security. At the 
Port’s street-food market, one of the first areas the state had targeted during the early 1950s, those 
that had survived the early raids were granted licensed status in a city that otherwise prohibited 
their type of business. Dock authorities, with significant political and economic sway in the colony, 
had seemingly made clear that their employees who labored at the most important transportation 
choke point in the Kenyan economy, and really that of East Africa as well, needed access to food 
while at work. As a result, during lunchtime, dock workers would exit the port and walk to the 
north of the Labour Compound “where up to 48 licensed food vendors—licensed by the port—
cook varying types of meals on the spot for African workers.” At these small eateries, food prices 
remained steady and affordable throughout the 1950s, and customers could find large portions of 
food and thus “the place is obviously popular with the men.”113 However, despite these efforts to 
limit food hawking to these 48 licensed vendors, the attraction of the one of the largest 
concentrations of working-class customers in Mombasa drew in unlicensed vendors as well, a fact 
made evident in 1958 when state authorities moved through Mombasa with another round of raids 
and arrests of food vendors that were focused, “in particular, at the Dockyard area.”114 
After the operation, F.J. Khamisi, one of four elected African representatives on the 
municipal council, expressed dismay at what he felt as a breaking of a recent tacit agreement to 
halt arrests until enough food canteens had been built to feed the city’s working classes and find 
employment for hawkers. Responding to complaints from his constituents, Khamisi questioned 
why these raids had happened since as the council was aware “we have … established only a few 
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of these canteens,” and, more generally that “It should be realised that these food vendors are 
serving a very useful purpose in providing at a very reasonable price, food which is much needed 
by the workers,” and that the hawkers “are at the same time earning a decent living out of the 
meagre profits derived from this business.” Similar to other officials, Khamisi too conceded to the 
logic of the government that trading outside the controlled confines of municipal licensing had no 
future in modern Mombasa, but he also modestly proposed that the council minimize the arrests 
and localize them “to areas that are presently served by the existence of the present Food Vendors 
Canteens.”115 
However, Khamisi was ignored and the operation against street-food vendors continued. 
The next month, August 1958, he wrote the council again, expressing that “he viewed with dismay 
and disgust the arrest and prosecution of African women food vendors,” and he asked “for the 
suspension of such measures.” When the letter was finally addressed more than two weeks later, 
the council again rejected his overtures, and responded by patronizing one of only four elected 
Africans on a council of more than twenty in a city in which Africans represented the large majority 
of the population. Councilors accused Khamisi of not understanding that this was an issue of racial 
justice for Africans. They argued that “the control of food standards was in the interests of 
everybody,” and that “disease knew no colour bar.” Racial justice, according to this colonial logic, 
was the restructuring of Mombasa to fit the modernist aesthetics and public-health priorities of the 
state, irrespective of whether this devastated the livelihoods of already poor African hawkers and 
compromised the ability of other low-income workers to find adequate food throughout their 
workday. The Committee concluded its assessment of Khamisi’s suggestions by rendering him as 




progressive leader of his people.”116 Following this attempt by Khamisi, there was little pushback 
within the council against these arrests, prosecutions and demolitions. 
Part of the state’s reluctance to halt its raids on street-food vendors came from facing the 
reality that their alternative, the municipal canteen that was to replace informality, could not be 
realized until they had excised these eateries from the city. By the end of the 1950s, the state had 
started to create a new comestible geography in Mombasa, installing government-built food 
canteens in Mwembe Tayari, Majengo, Makupa and the High-Level industrial area.117 However, 
the flaw in the state’s logic of comestible urban planning came from a misunderstanding, or 
purposeful ignorance, of why unlicensed vendors were so popular in the first place, both for 
proprietors and customers. The low overhead and operating costs that came from being unlicensed 
and not paying rents provided hawkers with minimal capital start-up and operating costs, which 
then also allowed them to keep their food prices cheap. Some of the new canteens did have waiting 
lists of vendors wanting a stall, which indicates that at least some people valued the security from 
demolitions, arrests and displacement that a licensed business theoretically supplied, but as a 
consequence they also had to incorporate the monthly fees into their pricing structures.118 As a 
result, these canteen food vendors struggled to compete with those who were unlicensed. For 
example, at the High-Level canteen, meant to serve industrial workers, business was bad. In 1958, 
the women who ran the eateries in the canteen complained that “their business was being seriously 
interfered with by the operations of illicit food vendors and that they could double their output if 
the demand were there.” In a debate over whether to expand the size of this canteen, the African 
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Affairs Officer concluded “that the construction of additional stalls would only be justified on the 
basis of the complete suppression of the illegal trade.”119 
In addition to building these food canteens, the state also wanted to restructure the prepared 
beverage trade that had so horrified the Medical Officer of Health back in 1953.120 While municipal 
authorities saw a city in which African women were “food vendors” and African and Arab men 
were “tea hawkers,” the actual social composition of who was serving food, tea and coffee to the 
city’s workers was more complex, evading such simplistic categorization. For the tea industry, 
municipal licensing operated through two categories, one for people with “tea houses” and the 
other for mobile “tea hawkers.” During the 1940s, as we saw, the maduka selling tea also offered 
a variety of fried snacks, and so the selling of tea was never strictly separate from that of offering 
prepared food. However, during the 1950s, the state explicitly banned and enforced a prohibition 
against tea operators selling food items.121 In practice, while some Mombasa workers were similar 
to the English working class in treating the highly-caloric cup of sugary and milky tea as a meal, 
this was a choice of poverty rather than preference, and many preferred to also eat some fried 
dough snacks, bread and other varieties of cooked food with their tea when they could afford it.122 
Moreover, the fried food that many tea hawkers sold was some of the cheapest in Mombasa, while 
still being filling with a high caloric content, and so was a less expensive substitute for heartier 
meals sold by food vendors. To appeal themselves to this class of workers, proprietors wanted to 
offer not only tea but a variety of small snack items for those who wanted to save money on their 
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daily meals. A bigger selection meant a larger customer base, and thus potentially higher profits. 
Weighing the costs of arrests and prosecution or losing the profits from selling these foods, the 
record suggests that many continued to offer the fried snacks of the Swahili coast. 
Moreover, the “tea” industry itself was changing during the 1950s, shifting from breakfast 
and snacks focus towards a hybrid model in which lines were blurred between the purported 
division between “female” food vendors and “male” tea hawkers and houses. Tea hawking, unlike 
street food, was legal in 1950s Mombasa, but in tightly delineated terms. Tea hawkers strategically 
continued to apply for licenses, agreeing to sell only tea, but then created the businesses they 
deemed most profitable irrespective of what municipal authorities demanded. Such a license 
provided, even if one was operating beyond its terms, a certain level of political legitimation that 
may have helped some to avoid the raids that were sweeping through the city during the 1950s. 
While some hawkers and tea shop owners only pushed beyond their license to sell the usual fried 
snacks and bread, others were operating what amounted to restaurants, some on quite a large scale. 
In January of 1959, three different Arab shops were running illicit teahouse-restaurants that were 
attached to the exterior of their buildings, and the council, again concerned about capital 
accumulation occurring outside municipal control, lamented that “There are ample [licensed 
restaurants] in the area who suffer through this setup.”123 
However, most tea hawkers cum street-food vendors operated on a smaller scale, but still 
managed to provide a variety of food options to their customers. Joseph K. Njengu, a “tea hawker,” 
sold what would have been recognizable offerings at a street-food vendor’s stand, “cooked maize 
and beans and meat,” while Ahmed bin Said, licensed only to hawk tea, nonetheless turned his cart 
“into a restaurant” during the early morning and evening hours. Elsewhere, tea hawker Abed bin 
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Faraj had “a large awning with tables and chairs” where he “cooked bread [sic.] and beans contrary 
to Licensing By-laws,” while Rajab Abdalla was also “selling bread and beans from his tea cart.” 
Other tea hawkers were caught and penalized, but continued to trade as they saw fit. Kombo 
Mwanganyi was not reissued a license “in 1957 because he was always dirty and selling food. His 
license was restored again in 1958. He is again dirty and selling foodstuffs.”124 Murethi Tutri, who 
had applied for a license, was told to wait until after the hearing on his application, but he ignored 
the authorities and continued to hawk. Compounding the frustration of the council, “bread was 
found cut and uncut in a box on his table next to his cart.”125 As with the women who sold food 
on Mombasa’s streets, these male tea hawkers and tea-house owners risked prosecution and 
demolition, as when the council recommended that “all Tea Hawkers found selling commodities 
other than those authorised by their licenses” be prosecuted. In particular, they should target “those 
Tea Hawkers who had erected shelters around their carts,” and “That the Town Planning 
committee be recommended to authorise the demolition of [such] shelters.” 126 
At the close of the 1950s, the ideal of Mombasa’s working classes eating only inside 
approved, licensed facilities remained mostly a modernist dream, as the eateries of vendors and 
hawkers were still the foundation of how the city’s workers acquired food when outside their 
homes. By 1961, municipal authorities conceded they had failed to prevent the sale of bread and 
other snacks by tea vendors, and relented to allow them to sell mahamri and sliced bread. However, 
this was insufficient for some vendors, and they continued to push the boundaries. Almost a full 
decade after demolitions and prosecutions had begun, restaurant owners were still “complaining 
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of unfair competition by Tea Hawkers who were acting as ‘petty-Hotel Keepers’ [restaurateurs] 
and selling food not covered by their licenses.”127 
Conclusion 
 For all the resources put behind development, the Mombasa that emerged at the end of 
colonial rule had perhaps been radically transformed, but these changes came as much from the 
poor struggling to make their lives in the city work as it did from top-down structural engineering. 
Even if people had wanted to live in the households of the “modern worker” where men earned 
wages and women only performed kitchen labor and other domestic work, the political economy 
of the city made such family formations hard to sustain. However, development and pressures from 
labor movements did result in some material improvement for those within the confines of the 
waged world. On the income of wage laborers during the 1950s, the nature of the data, 
complications in correlation to inflation, and great wage differentials between employment sectors 
makes both precise and general conclusions difficult, but overall real wages did increase slightly 
by the end of the of the decade.128 Nonetheless, the base-line of the 1940s was a condition of 
impoverishment, and so minor growth in real wages did not likely provide many households the 
option of performing a gendered domesticity in which husbands earned wages and wives worked 
only the household. More convincing is the conclusion that married men continued to work for 
wages, as such jobs were still mostly reserved for them, and many of their wives labored in 
Mombasa’s streets as small-scale traders selling, among other items, prepared food and drink.  
Additionally, many migrants continued to live outside conjugal families and cooked their 
own food or purchased it, as observed in a 1958 study of Kongewea, a growing peri-urban suburb 
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north of Mombasa, that “most single men” in the community “do their own cooking or eat in the 
local ‘hotel.’”129 The same study identified a monthly salary of 300/- per month as ideal for forging 
modern, African workers who could afford to purchase their own homes, and felt that “It is to this 
group that future plans must be directed in order to create a stable class of urban Africans who 
have an investment, however small, in the community and who therefore will have an invested 
interest in the stability and future of its Local Government.”130 However, since that amount was 
more than double what most in the city actually made, and that those who did represented only 11 
percent of the adult-male, African population, and less than eight percent of all African adults, 
most family structures would have required that “women’s work” generate cash. The gendered 
division of labor meant that these women worked as street traders because it was their only option, 
but they were also joined by many unemployed men, or those seeking alternatives to wage labor, 
and, as we have seen, many of them turned to selling prepared food and drink.131 In 1960, 
researcher A.G. Dagleish observed in surveying the labor landscape of Kenya as a whole that 
“Mention must be made of the problem presented by the large number of Africans who are 
seemingly unemployed, but who are frequently in self-employment, often of a kind which is 
perilously close to legality.”132 
During the 1940s and 1950s, these and the other transformations addressed in this chapter 
had remade Mombasa to the extent that, by the end of colonialism, proportionally, more women 
cooked more of the food that men ate in Mombasa than had been the case during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century. However, many men continued to prepare their own food, and 
purchased it from both female and male cooks on the streets. The gendering of these urban food 
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systems emerged through the competing and overlapping forces of efforts to reproduce rural 
patriarchies, developmental notions of the modern family, and the need for Mombasa’s poor to 
earn enough income to survive in the city. Neither model, rural or developmentalist, emerged just 
as envisioned, but they were combined with the city’s political economy to create new urban 
families and bonds of comestible kinship in an idiosyncratic variety that escapes simple 
categorization. 
At the close of the 1950s, Kenya would soon be independent. Becoming an independent 
republic in 1963, more than 60 years of racial authoritarianism under colonialism came to an end. 
However, in terms of family formation and the gendering of the provision and preparation of food, 
the political economy that drove such social structures during the 1950s was little changed during 
the 1960s. More women came to the city, and when they lived with husbands it was deemed the 
wife’s responsibility to cook. Men continued to prepare food, but only when on their own or for 
profit. Independence, therefore, was not a major marker in the periodization of food, gender and 
the family in Mombasa, but it was for a change in the politics of street food. During the late-
colonial period in Mombasa, even after a few African representatives had been added to the 
government, hawkers and vendors were only able to infiltrate the mechanisms of state to a limited 
extent given that, especially on the municipal council that administered licensing and sanitation 
laws, Europeans held large majorities, despite being an extreme numerical minority in the city.133 
However, the newly-elected African councilors who took their seats on the post-colonial municipal 
council were suddenly tied to African constituencies in ways that Europeans had never been. In 
this new political context in which government officials were incentivized to listen to their 
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constituencies, or at least those people within them who raised their voices, vendors and hawkers 
found an opening into the elite spaces of governance on a scale unimaginable during the colonial 
period and, as well shall see, were able to influence policy. Nonetheless, the consequences of the 
institutionalization of the ideologies of urban development and planning, as well as the tactics of 
arrests, prosecutions, removals and demolitions as the method for administering those deemed 
“informal” in the city, were lasting. The way these governing assumptions manifested themselves 
and the political purposes and interests they served would change, but, unquestionably, they 
continued to build insecurity into the lives of the people who made their living selling food and 

















Image 3: The “Modern Family,” c. 1950s 
    
An imperfect image for the purposes of this dissertation, as this is a rural family, but it does capture the ideal 
type the British sought to valorize and reproduce in cities as well. This photo was taken during the 1950s in 
the midst of a massive commercialization and “modernization” of the African countryside, and its 
representation of domestic structures and dietary choice was meant to invoke the modernity of Leonard Githui 
and his family, who are unnamed. The caption that accompanies it notes that Githui was “an enlightened 
Kikuyu farmer,” who was joined by “his family at table. Meat and vegetables and an orange a piece make a 







Image 4: Cooking in rural Kenya, c. 1950s 
 
British Official Photograph. INF/10/164 Part I. Photo of an unnamed woman in an unnamed part of rural 
Kenya, c. 1950s, and indicative of the gendered division of kitchen labor in rural areas, a system being 





Image 5: Ugali 
 
 














Source: Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa,” 257. For further context to these numbers, in 1925 it was 
reported that there were 7,555 kazi ya mwezi, or “monthly workers,” e.g., not casual laborers, in Mombasa, 
which helps us deterimine in rough estimate how many upcountry Africans were a percentage of the 
“Africans” figure in the above graph. Most kazi ya mwezi were upcountry migrants, and so during the 
1920s these workers may have represented at least 50 percent of the “Africans” figure. For the growing 
population of “Africans” reported in years 1931, 1935,1939 and 1945, that we have little evidence of a 
rapid uptick in the Swahili population with, on the contrarary, much anectodal evidence of growing number 
of migrants, suggests that the “upcountry” as well as likely Mijikenda percentage of the “African” 
population was increasing along with the overall rise in the population of that statistical group. Frederick 
Cooper, On the African Waterfront: Urban Disorder and the Transformation of Work in Colonial 
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Source: Karim Janmohamed, “A History of Mombasa, c. 1895-1939: Some Aspects of Economic and 
Social Life in an East African Port Town during Colonial Rule,” PhD Dissertation (Northwestern 





Source: Mombasa Social Survey Part I, 219, and Kenya Population Census, 1962: Tables, Volume II, 









































WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF 









Note: These are entry-level wages, and do not account for incremental raises for long-term employees. 







































Average Monthly Wages in Mombasa, 1938-58































































Weekly Expenditure on Food by Item, 1939-58
Tea (3.5 oz.) Salt (3.5 oz.) Vegetables (28 oz.)
Sugar (14 oz.) Sim-Sim Oil (15.75 oz.) Beans (14 oz.)













The data in the preceding three graphs indicate, overall, an increase in waged, working class African spending 
power on food during the period from the late 1930s to the end of the 1950s. For example, from 1939-58, the 
cost of the diet in Table [blank] increased by 237 percent, but wages for railway workers, to select one group 
of wage earners, also grew by 440 percent during that same period, nearly doubling their real wages for 
purchasing food. However, important qualifications are also necessary. While wages rose singificantly faster 
in proportion to many items of the above sample diet, this was less true in regards to the price of maize/mixed 
meal, which was in fact the most significant element in African food budgets, as the price of maize/mixed 
meal inceased by 338 percent from 1939 to 1958. Combined with the reality that the base-line economic 
status of workers during the late 1930s was one of dire poverty, and that most poor Africans in the city 
primarily ate maize-based posho, the improvements in real wages and how they translated to what Africans 
could actually afford to eat may not have been, in the end, particularly impactful. Source: Mombasa Social 















































                            
         
Salaries at the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours, the largest single employer of Africans in 
Mombasa in 1945, demonstrate how wages were central to the making of a racialized class structure in the 
city, with the average African salary being only 7.3 percent of what Europeans made and 25 percent of the 
income of South Asian and Arab employees. Source: Data for calcuating average incomes from Estimates 
of the Revenue and Expenditure of the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours, Including Main and 
Branch Lines, Lake Marine Services, Motor Car Services, Coast Port Services (Nairobi: Government 
Printer, 1945), 4-6. For such workers as a porportion of those in Mombasa in 1945, see Janmohamed, “A 











































Average Monthly Salaries for the Kenya and Uganda 






Of the 22,702 Africans who worked for the KURH, 80 percent were “unskilled laborers,” meaning that the   
majority of Africans working for the railways and harbors made far less than the 62.5/-monthly average 
listed in figure [blank], as these manual laborers made only 23/- per month in Mombasa (as of 1945, 3,857 
Africans were employed by KURH in Mombasa). The wage structures of colonial Kenya were creating a 
racialized class structure, but were also dividing Africans into differentiated classes, with a small minority 
making closer to living wages while the majority remained impoverished. Source: Report of the General 
Manager on Railways and Harbours: For the Year Ended 31st December, 1946 (Nairobi: Government 























SKILLED/SEMI-SKILLED AND UNSKILLED 
WORKERS AS A PERCENTAGE OF 








Again, these African wages can be compared to the average of 885.5/- for Europeans and 250/- for South 

















































Mombasa Island and the North Mainland, 1945. Note the increasing density in the Central Business District (CBD), 
south-east of “Old Mombasa (Mvita).” Nyali, on the mainland, remained mostly plantations at this point, but would 
become an elite neighborhood for tourists and residents during the second half of the twentieth century. Source: 














In addition to the increased density on the island and in Nyali, notice the homes in Kisauni and Likoni, both 
areas where migrants were increasingly living. Source: Atlas of Kenya: A Comprehensive Series of New 
and Authentic Maps Prepared from the National Survey and other Governmental Sources with Gazetteer 




“TO BE MAKING FOOD VENDORS A REGULAR AND PERMANENT FEATURE IN THE 
TOWN”: STREET FOOD AND THE PARAMETERS OF THE POSSIBLE IN 
DECOLONIZING MOMBASA, 1963-1971 
 
 By the time Kenya became independent in December of 1963, street-food vendors in the 
coastal city of Mombasa had endured nearly 15 years of a concerted and concentrated effort to 
erase their businesses from the city’s landscape. During this period, the central question vendors 
faced in their struggles was whether their modes of urban income generation would survive the 
dramatic restructuring of city through colonial theories of modernization and development. 
Starting during the late-1940s, urban officials worked to remake the city as modern, with a 
stabilized and permanent urban working class. With attention focused on quelling labor unrest and 
producing greater imperial stability, colonial officials sought to remake the social lives of urban 
Africans with the intention of creating a stable and predictable labor force. Modern African 
workers were to live in comfortable housing with their families, engage their leisure time in 
wholesome, productive recreation, and, of great consequence to the city’s street-food vendors, if 
these urban residents were to consume food outside these new households, it would be in licensed 
and tightly monitored public eateries. However, to create this new comestible culture, the old 
one—run by illicitly operating and only dimly monitored purveyors of tea, coffee and prepared 
food—needed to be destroyed.1 
 Despite the intensity of the harassments, prosecutions, and demolitions that came with 
modernization and development during the late-colonial period, street-food vendors retained and 
even expanded their foothold in the city. A 1964 estimate placed the number of “illegal” food 
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vendors at 124 on Mombasa island and 64 in the mainland suburbs around the city.2 This actually 
probably greatly underestimated the number of people selling food illicitly, since tea shops and 
hawkers were not counted, and they often sold prepared food contrary to the terms of their licenses. 
Not only had these vendors survived late-colonial development, they had also maintained their 
hold on the most desirous comestible geography of the city. Sellers of prepared food, like any other 
proprietor, need to be geographically well-situated within a city’s network of consumers to 
maximize their returns. Street-food vendors’ operations were based on economies of scale, on the 
small scale, selling high volumes of cheap sugary tea, the starchy-staple ugali with vegetable and 
meat-based relishes to accompany it, and various fried snacks. Retaining control of highly-
trafficked areas was fundamental to their businesses, and though they had to confront a violent 
colonial bureaucracy, many had succeeded in doing just that.  
Scanning the landscape of early independence Mombasa, illicit vendors and hawkers sold 
prepared food in a variety of such high-volume locations. They set up around Mombasa’s busy 
public markets, such as Makupa and MacKinnon, as well as in public parks like Coronation 
Gardens in the center of town. They also remained visible in the industrial-commercial parts of the 
city, providing lunch to the city’s waged working classes, especially in the High Level Godown 
neighborhood, the loading, unloading and storage zone for many of East Africa’s commodities. 
While the colonial state had tried to appropriate these comestible geographies from vendors and 
hawkers by building competing municipal food canteens, vendors continued to operate in close 
proximity and were able to undercut these state institutions by offering lower prices.3 
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In this way, the day-to-day reality of “anti-colonial” struggle for street-food vendors had 
only partially been an issue of flags and elected officials, and more so one fought over how the 
trading landscape of Mombasa was to be constituted. As control of the Kenyan state transferred 
from British to African hands, the extent to which the struggles and interests of these vendors were 
to be represented in the new government remained unclear. However, an initial answer emerged 
little more than a month after Kenya gained independence, as the General Purposes Committee of 
the newly post-colonial Municipal Council of Mombasa considered a report on “unauthorised food 
vendors” in the city. If any of Mombasa’s street-food proprietors were in the council’s chambers 
on that day, February 10, 1964, the comments by health official A.H.B. Rydon would have been 
uneasily familiar. In his report, Rydon urged the council to see “that these unauthorised vendors 
presented a hazard to the health of the citizens of Mombasa.” Detailing specific concerns, Rydon, 
the Ag. Medical Officer of Health, argued that vendors could spread “diseases such as food 
poisoning, diarrhoea and dysentery and typhoid … by the unhygienic preparation and handling of 
food.” He urged cooperation between government departments, and considered that force may be 
necessary to curb the industry. He hoped that support would be forthcoming for “any measures 
which would be taken by the officers of the Council in conjunction with the Police in prosecuting 
these illegal vendors and removing them from the streets and open spaces of Mombasa.”4 
 For tea hawkers and shop owners, food vendors and home-restaurant operators, such an 
approach to the city’s comestible industry, and the vision of independent Mombasa that it 
articulated, bore a strong resemblance to the practices of the old, colonial government. However, 
as a burgeoning thread of Africanist historiography pushes us to consider, drawing a straight line 
between a colonial past and a neo-colonial future sidesteps the crucial task of interrogating how 
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inherited structures were reworked in new contexts and deployed in ways that concepts such as 
“continuity” or “colonial legacies” fail to adequately explain.5 While the states, economies and 
policing systems of independent Africa did mirror those of the colonial period in significant ways, 
decolonization also entailed a reshuffling of the networks and cultural languages through which 
power and authority were exercised. This did not always, or even often, result in the kind of 
liberation that Africans imagined as European colonies fell, but it did significantly redirect and 
modify the platforms and languages through which they struggled. 
As the February health report indicated, colonially-produced ideas about food, urban space 
and sanitation would remain part of how vendors interacted with the independent state, but as 
Africans and other Kenyans began to increasingly occupy more, though certainly not all, of the 
government offices that had been held by Europeans, and as the language of republican citizenship 
infused governing discourse, the nature of communication and claim-making did change in 
meaningful ways. Debates over licensing and the occupation of public and private land would 
continue, but, within the political culture of an independent republic rather than a colony, the 
language of conflict and accommodation became reconfigured, opening new possibilities for how 
street-food vendors might fit into Mombasa’s landscape. These proprietors, no longer subjects of 
the British Crown, were now wananchi (citizens) and were thus owed the matunda ya uhuru (fruits 
of freedom/independence). These generic discourses took the form of contingent practice when 
vendors translated them to have meaning within their specific struggles to maintain their 
businesses and survive in a city whose policies had been designed to destroy their livelihoods. 
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Reworking their strategies, street-food vendors in post-colonial Mombasa came to stake their 
claims through a bricolage of discourses. They shamed independent urban authorities with a 
language of honor and obligation, and in which mostly urged them to live up to their duty to 
provide the wananchi with their endowed haki (right) to earn a living and thus allow them to 
provide food and education to their children. These vendors, pace David Schoenbrun and Frederick 
Cooper, drew upon globally circulating ideas such as citizenship and rights, and their claims were 
shaped by how capitalism and statist bureaucracy had remade Kenyan society, but they were also 
inflected through the specific materiality of their experiences and articulated within the “bundles 
of durable language” from pre-colonial Africa that continued to infuse ideologies and power 
structures in colonial and independent Africa.6 
These post-colonial strategies and changing networks of power were not without tangible 
consequences. As the February 10 meeting in 1964 of the General Purposes Committee drew to a 
close, the councilors indicated to health officials that their program of urban sanitation in relation 
to street-food vendors may not, in fact, be so easily pushed through the council. Rather than 
recommending it for approval and adoption, the committee instead tabled it and formed a sub-
committee to consider its implications. In effect, this temporarily withdrew the council’s support 
for prosecuting vendors. Distressed, Rydon, along with the Town Clerk, lodged a formal objection 
with the council, asserting that “the Sub-Committee was made contrary to their advice since the 
delay in prosecuting unauthorised food vendors was not in the interests of public health.”7 A door 
had been opened, and through it existed the possibly of a different comestible Mombasa in 
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independent Kenya. Illicit vendors would struggle in the coming years to keep that open door from 
slamming back shut again. 
 
During the early years of independence, the “Africanization” and “Kenyanization” of the 
government’s administration and the nation’s economy became central pillars of Kenya’s 
decolonization program. Africans, long marginalized, were to take a more representative place in 
positions of government and have wider influence in the economy. However, while Africanization 
did to a certain extent occur, President Jomo Kenyatta, who eschewed more radical notions of 
decolonization, conceded that many positions throughout government would continue to be 
occupied by Europeans until indigenous Kenyans were “ready” to take their place. The effects of 
this were felt nationally, at the level of local governance, and in particular in Mombasa’s offices 
of the Medical Officer of Health.8 Consequently, while the city’s municipal councilors were now 
Kenyans, Europeans remained in positions of power in urban government through the auspices of 
a new, racialized creation of decolonization: the former colonial official turned “expatriate” white 
expert. This new constellation of power—white experts shaping policy but with Kenyan nationals 
now holding key decision-making authority—created tensions almost immediately over the issue 
of how to administer Mombasa’s street-food vendors. 
 By the mid-1960s, the unemployment problem in Mombasa was reaching a crisis point, 
and municipal officials were feeling pressure to allow their constituents to do what they could to 
generate income. Salaried wage jobs were few, and people increasingly turned to vending and 
hawking as a way to make a living, with the food industry a popular choice. Though we do not 
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have consistent longitudinal data on the number of people working as street-food vendors, in 
Rydon’s 1964 report he pointed with anxiety “to the ever-increasing numbers of unauthorised food 
vendors who are at present plying their illegal trade in Mombasa.” Though the council was fairly 
quiet about its actions during the first months of independence, Rydon’s anxieties reveal the 
different tactics the independent government was employing when he wrote that “Everyone is 
aware of the acute unemployment situation in Mombasa,” but he then pleaded “that permitting 
unlicensed vendors of cooked food to carry on their unlawful trade is not a solution to the 
problem.” Rydon accused the councilors of turning “a blind eye,” but they were at this juncture in 
actuality seeking a middle ground of accommodation between the inherent violence of 
developmental modernization and the reality that they had more immediate obligations to their 
constituency of citizens than had colonial officials to their subjects.9 
 However, while new, less-precarious spaces for vending were slowly opening, municipal 
officials also continued in other ways to operate within the licensing logic they inherited from the 
colonial state. The major thrust of the council’s early-independence policy towards the selling of 
prepared food was to continue and expand the colonial program of building municipal food 
canteens to, over time, replace illicit street-food venders. In an April meeting in 1964, two months 
after Rydon’s report, municipal officials began to build their own comestible map of the city, and, 
like vendors, to consider where demand was highest for prepared food. The General Purposes 
Committee proposed building canteens near the Mombasa port, a major center of employment in 
the city, near the train station, where tea vendors had sold food nearby in Jubilee Square, next to 
housing estates, and by the Labor Department’s compound.10 
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 While reproducing and further entrenching the colonial program of food canteens, the 
municipal council worked to create a distinctly new approach to the illicit vendors who continued 
to work outside these state eateries. During the initial months after independence, the council had 
deprioritized the enforcement of bylaws against street-food vendors, but they also, more 
structurally, began rethinking what it meant to be licensed. One form of vending in the city was to 
sell fried fish, which had long been consumed on the Kenyan coast. This market rapidly grew with 
the large migration during the colonial period of Luo workers to Mombasa from the Lake Victoria 
region, where fish had constituted a large part of their diet. While most food vendors primarily 
provided lunch food, fried-fish sellers were more of a take-out dinner service. Workers would get 
off their shift, or hawkers would finish their day of selling, they would purchase a fried fish, and 
then bring it home where they would cook some ugali or another starch to accompany it. At a 
November 1964 meeting of the General Purposes Committee, Councilor S.M.S. Makuto, one of 
the main advocates for street-food vendors, brought up these fried fish sellers, many of whom 
operated in Majengo, one of the largest African neighborhoods on the island. He argued that “this 
Council should not attach any conditions to the licenses for the sale of fried fish.” The issue was 
not the general legality of frying fish for sale, as preparing and selling fried-fish was a legal 
profession, and these traders were considered distinct from “unlicensed food vendors.” However, 
fried-fish sellers were required to have running water and access to drainage, despite the uneven 
infrastructure of the city. The council tabled Makuto’s proposition and created a sub-committee to 
inspect the premises in which these vendors operated.11 Ten days later, the sub-committee reported 
that “as people did very little business it was unreasonable and unnecessary to require them to have 
washing facilities.” At the meeting, the Medical Officer of Health, C.D. Rosenwald, protested and 
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engaged in a “lengthy discussion” with the councilors. However, limited in that moment in real 
power and the social capital to exert enough pressure, Rosenwald conceded to removing the 
requirement of having running water in favor of a more broad understanding of what constituted 
“washing facilities,” which could include “a large drum with a tap” or a “washing basin.”12 
 Fried-fish sellers had already been a legally-recognized profession, but the first two months 
of independence for them meant an easing of some of the difficult-to-meet requirements for their 
trade. The subtle changes to the licensing parameters of these fried-fish sellers were relatively 
uncontroversial, but the approach the council took with “unauthorised food vendors,” those 
operating outside municipal canteens, had more radical implications for the composition of urban 
space in the city. Building on the concession to deprioritize the prosecution of food vendors, the 
council went further when it decided to grant temporary licenses to roadside and in-home food 
vendors, which marked the first time these professions had been legally recognized in Mombasa. 
The councilors’ vision was still one in which roadside and in-home food vendors were not part of 
the city’s future, but, in the present, they would be temporarily licensed until the new canteens 
were built, and into which it was expected they would eventually move. This allowed councilors 
to compromise with their constituencies, to not deny them the haki to make a living, but while still 
operating within the licensing logic of the council, and preserving the idea that canteens were what 
the city’s comestible culture was to be. 
This change in policy began informally and idiosyncratically. The evidence is sparse, but 
suggestive that specific groups of vendors were pressuring their councilors to provide them better 
security in their trade. During the first months of independence, the council issued letters to a 
limited number of vendors who operated near the High-Level Godown neighborhood, granting 
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them permission to sell prepared food. Such actions technically violated the city’s by-laws, since 
food vending, except in municipal canteens, was illegal, but enough influence had been applied to 
convince these councilors to circumvent the city’s codes. However, these backchannel actions 
were neither fully-communicated nor agreed upon, and vendors continued to be arrested and 
harassed by police. By March 1965, the council realized it needed to formally legalize street-food 
vending if tangible changes were to occur. After detailing the continued harassment that vendors 
faced, the councilors ended their committee meeting by instructing the Medical Officer of Health 
to generate a report “on the possibilities of issuing a limited number of temporary licences to the 
foodvendors who would [eventually] be accommodated in the new canteens.”13 
However, the council did not act with a unitary voice, and the constituencies that councilors 
relied upon were not built only from the interests of unlicensed vendors. The following month a 
coalition led by J.Z.M. Mgaya, at the request of licensed vendors operating inside the market, 
asked for the removal of “all unlicensed traders and foodvendors” operating on the mainland in 
areas around “Chamgamwe Foodvendors Canteen and Market.” At that same meeting, Councilor 
M. Babu also suggested that tea licensing quotas, which to that point only affected Mombasa 
island, also be instituted and fixed at 20 on the mainland where African suburbs such as 
Changamwe, as well as Kisauni and Likoni, were rapidly growing.14 Moreover, on Mombasa 
island, despite the council considering temporary licenses, vendors still faced the daily possibility 
of harassment and demolition. The next month, April 1964, the council issued eviction notices to 
food vendors and other traders operating in the heavily-populated Mwembe Tayari neighborhood, 
and their representatives in the Coast Province National Traders Association, the replacement for 
the colonial Mombasa African Traders Association, claimed that their trading space were being 
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claimed by the state so that it could “be taken over by the Kenya Bus Service.”15 Despite this 
pushback, the council was trending in favor of the city’s illicit, or potentially soon to be licit, street-
food vendors. Two months later, Councilor A.J.K. Mulandi disputed the idea that vendors around 
Changamwe should be removed, feeling “that until the Council had erected a temporary market at 
Changamwe the unauthorized traders and foodvendors should not be removed from the road 
reserves near the Municipal Changamwe Housing Estate.” Reversing its previous position, the 
General Purposes Committee agreed, and recommended “that no action be taken to remove the 
unauthorized traders and foodvendors from the Road reserves near the Changamwe Foodvendors 
Canteen and Market until the Council had erected a temporary market.”16  
Sitting in the council chambers during this decision and waiting their turn to speak, the 
Medical Office of Health, C.D. Rosenwald, and the Chief Medical Inspector, were likely not 
pleased by this development. Taking the floor, they spoke more generally of what they perceived 
as the consequences of actions such as the council’s amendment that required the Medical Officer 
of Health to provide temporary licenses “to all food vendors who were reasonably clean.” They 
saw this not as temporary stop-gap, but as the first step that would dismantle their authority in the 
city. The health officials argued that, if the council legalized street food as currently constituted, 
they would not only lose control of vending, but also their ability to impose strict standards on 
already licensed “restaurants and other premises dealing in food.” Realizing the instability of their 
strict position, the health officials pushed for a compromise by conceding that issuing temporary 
licenses only to the number of vendors that would then be accommodated in the canteens had the 
possibility of at least containing legally-legitimated roadside food vending. Otherwise, they 
worried that providing “unlimited licenses would greatly increase the risk [to public health] and 
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give no hope of a solution to the problem in the foreseeable future.” They requested that the 
council’s minute requiring them to license all food vendors be rescinded and asked for specific 
details on what the sanitation requirements would be for these temporarily licenses, if the were to 
be issued.17 
These health officials had been correct to be worried about how their claims would be 
received by the council. After consideration, the committee denied all their requests. The minute 
requiring unlimited licensing of street-food vendors was confirmed, and the Medical Officer of 
Health was to “be instructed to issue licenses to all food vendors who were reasonably clean and 
prosecute those who were not,” and, perhaps speaking to councilors who were skeptical, urged 
“that members of the Council should give all support to the Health Department in carrying out the 
instructions contained” in their above order.18 
Word spread quickly throughout Mombasa that free, temporary licensed were going to be 
issued by the council, and street-food vendors in the city began to strategize how best to use this 
new licensing category. Rosenwald noted soon after that his office was receiving applications from 
people already “approved for tea and mahamri hawkers licenses” who have “said that they would 
prefer to take out food vendor licenses, widen their scope of trade, and save license fees.” However, 
Rosenwald had it backwards. These tea and mahamri vendors likely had already widened the scope 
of their trade to serve beans, roast meat and maize, as well as other prepared food, but now saw 
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12 April, 1965 (UY/12/339), KNA-Nairobi, and “Licenses for Refusals, G.P. Committee, Addendum to the Agenda. 
7 June, 1965. See Chapter Three, “Devouring Development,” for more on the use of tea licenses by food vendors 
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exasperated as he watched the system of control and surveillance that the colonial state had built 
quickly falling apart within a year of independence. He wrote the council, arguing that not only 
would health authorities be unable to impose strict sanitation conditions on restaurants, but also, 
just as concerning, that increasingly there remained “no conceivable reason why any hawker 
selling any item of food should be expected to pay a license fee.” Not simply threatening revenues, 
Rosenwald saw food vendors, who were already prominent in the city and “expected to appear in 
increasing numbers,” as “the greatest present threat to health in Mombasa.” Bringing out the 
tensions of Kenya’s limited Africanization, Rosenwald complained that he and his European 
colleagues, as well as the local employees who worked for them, could not continue much longer, 
noting that “Several of the Inspectors expressed the view that it was futile to try to do their jobs 
properly in the impossible circumstances being forced upon them by the Council.” This attitude 
was “fast overtaking expatriate officers” and, trying to press on the nation-building sympathies of 
these independent officials, he pushed them to consider that such a viewpoint may quickly be 
“appearing in local officers, on whom Mombasa is to depend for many years to come.”20 
However, for Rosenwald, health and sanitation were only part of his disdain for roadside 
street-food vendors. His distaste for them was also aesthetic and tied a need to produce a 
consumable image of Mombasa to global markets. By the mid-1960s, the Kenyan government was 
working to refine its development priorities, and tourism had been identified as a key source of 
foreign-direct investment and foreign exchange. Mombasa’s coastline and the resort hotels and 
ancillary industries that lined it constituted one of the central pillars of Kenya’s post-colonial 
tourism strategy. The “idea of Kenya” that was supposed to be produced for tourism consumption 
was a mix of primeval naturalism in safaris and on beaches, rural African “traditions,” and urban 
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modernity in its developed cities.21 Food vendors did not fit into the global-norms of urban 
architecture that imperialism had created and, for Rosenwald, they represented how African cities 
were producing an unrecognizable modernity. He stressed that if the vendors were “not provided 
proper canteens,” and even if they were licensed only after they removed their structures, these 
traders “will inevitably build further unsightly unauthorised buildings.” Vendors’ structures were 
“neither traditional nor picturesque,” but instead were “only unsightly and insanitary” and “have 
brought adverse comment from tourists, and particularly from visiting health personnel and civil 
servants from the rest of Kenya.” Concluding, Rosenwald drew a clear line between the health 
department and the Municipal Council, and wanted to remove health officials from any liability, 
stating that if licenses were to be provided, the council should not seek “approval or encouragement 
from the Health Department.” He and his officers “felt that the Council should bear the full 
responsibility for the consequences, and not be in a position to say that the licences were approved 
by the Health Department.”22 
As the council mulled Rosenwald’s letter, vendors continued to apply for the free 
temporarily licenses. By the time the General Purposes Committee reconvened on June 21, over 
300 tea vendors had submitted applications. As the councilors debated, it became clear that the 
opening that temporary food-vendors’ licenses had created might remain, but that it would be 
narrowed. Retreating from the idea of unlimited licenses, the committee members agreed to the 
previously proposed concession from the Rosenwald and the Health Inspector, and agreed only to 
license as many vendors as could fit into the new canteens once they opened.23 When the 
recommendation of the committee went in front of the general council about two weeks later, 
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sentiment was solidifying around this more limited view of temporary, licensed vending. One 
councilor, A. Ali, according to the Daily Nation, “jumped to his feet” during the meeting and 
declared, “I wish to support [the Minister of Health],” and he was seconded by the Mayor Msanifu 
Kombo who told his colleagues that “I hope all councilors will do likewise.” After a vote, the 
council unanimously passed the Rosenwald’s recommendations. The Daily Nation, at the 
conclusion of its article on the meeting, editorialized that “An unlimited number of food hawkers 
would inevitably result in the lowering of standards in all sorts of other food handling 
establishments.”24  
The moment of unlimited licenses had come and gone, and the narrowed version of 
temporary licensing was reconfirmed and further entrenched a month later when the Ministry of 
Local Government in Nairobi became aware of the activities of the Municipal Council of 
Mombasa. Officials in Nairobi wrote that they were “extremely perturbed” to have heard that the 
Mombasa council was “proposing to issue licences in contravention of their own by-laws and that 
such action was considered irresponsible and very disappointing when it came from the second 
most important municipality in the country.” Solidifying the position of Rosenwald and his staff 
with the support of the national government, the Ministry of Local Government concluded that  it 
was “pleased to note” that the municipal council “had now decided to take the advice of the 
Medical Officer of Health on the subject of licencing foodvendors.”25 
While a discourse premised on sanitation, nation-building, and modernization informed 
Rosenwald’s arguments, and seemed to have convinced many councilors and Nairobi-based 
officials, street-food vendors pushed back with a language informed by anti-colonialism and a 
notion of democratic decolonization. Nicholas Ntinda, of the CPTA, brought the food vendors case 
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to the nationally-published Daily Nation newspaper, and there asserted that “his members were 
‘very annoyed’ at the Ministry’s remarks” that “condemn the licensing of food vendors.” The 
council’s laws, he argued, were “colonialist-made.” The predecessor organization during 
colonialism, MATA, had framed their arguments around the lack of representation that Africans 
had had in the municipal council, and that its exclusionary laws reflected the racist composition of 
urban authority. While Kenya was now independent, Ntinda pointed to how the such laws of the 
colonial system were continuing to inform vendors’ realities. Instead of reproducing such colonial 
iniquities, he argued, the council should help street-food vendors to also benefit from the new 
constellation of power and governance in independent Kenya by creating “new democratic by-
laws prepared by our elected councillors.”26 
However, while the colonial-era MATA had represented and bundled together the interests 
of both licit and illicit vendors, the politics of decolonization and the reconfiguration of urban 
licensing was continuing to pull vendors apart. On September 22, 1965, the General Purposes 
Committee considered a second petition written by Councilor Mgaya, who represented the vendors 
working the Changamwe Municipal Canteen, and voiced their concerns over the food vendors 
operating near these official eateries. For vendors who made the decision to work out of municipal 
canteens, the choice was not an economic one, as their businesses struggled to compete with illicit 
vendors who could offer lower prices, but rather one of security and stability, as for them the 
consistency of not facing constant harassment, arrests and demolitions superseded the priority of 
potentially higher profits outside municipal canteens. However, after independence, they still 
struggled “to pay their rents owing to severe competition from the unauthorized foodvendors,” 
except now the deprioritization of prosecuting illicit vendors and the creation of temporary licenses 
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had, as health officials worried, made less clear any advantage to staying inside the canteens. As 
these municipal vendors saw those outside gaining greater security while they continued to pay 
rents, tensions between the licensed and unlicensed became tauter. In their petition, they argued 
that “it was unfair on the part of the council to permit unauthorised food vendors to operate,” and 
that “they were of the opinion that the unlicensed traders and foodvendors should be removed 
immediately from the entrance of the Changamwe Housing Estates.” They stopped short of 
denying them the haki to make a living, suggesting “they be asked to occupy vacant spaces away 
from the Estate,” but ultimately aligned themselves with this state’s vision that roadside vending 
would not a permanent feature of the town. They concluded that these relocated vendors should 
be warned that “when the temporary market which the Council intended building in the near future 
was erected all such unlicensed people would be removed.” The committee, perhaps swayed by 
the ways that these vendors had mobilized the council’s own logic, recommended their petition 
for adoption by the council.27 
The direction that urban governance of street food took in early independence Mombasa 
was indeed not a straight line between the “colonial legacies” of late-colonial development, but 
instead drew on these past practices and then recast them through a multi-valent set of conflicts 
and struggles between and amongst councilors, vendors and health officials.28 Shifting sets of 
pressures could also quickly reorient alliances. During a meeting in January, 1966, less than six 
months after Councilor Ali had yelled out that he “wished to support” the Medical Officer of 
Health, he reversed himself and took the side of illicit. The records do not indicate how or by 
whom he was pressured into this reversal, but he stated in the council that because “of the limited 
number of licensed foodvendors in the town and owing to the prosecutions of a number of 
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unlicensed foodvendors by the police,” that he felt the 60 licenses at which the temporary quota 
had been set was far too low, and that it needed to be raised to 130. During the same meeting, I.K. 
Ndirangu tried to push the issue even further, arguing that only raising the quota to 130 would not 
solve the problem for hawkers, and that instead it should be abolished all together. He urged the 
council to see that “the people were becoming clean” and that any number above the 130 should 
be licensed as long as “they were clean and complied with the council’s requirements.” After a 
warning from the Medical Officer of Health, Ndirangu’s suggestion was not adopted, but the quota 
was recommended to be increased from 60 to 130, and less than a month later this change was 
adopted by the council. At the same meeting, N.S. Rihal, the newly installed Medical Officer of 
Health was ordered to inspect throughout the city to find vendors who were clean, but not licensed 
because the existing quota.29 
At the news of the licensing quota being expanded spread, vendors began applying again 
in large numbers. By March, the council had 182 applications for such licenses pending, and these 
were “on the increase day by day.” Rihal, of Mombasa’s South Asian community, had replaced 
his European predecessor as the Medical Officer of Health, but was no less interested in moving 
beyond the colonial-licensing logic. Bristling at the idea that he report back to the council on clean 
vendors who might be licensed, Rihal retorted in a February 4 meeting that “I am afraid I do not 
agree with the logic” licensing more foodvendors, since, “in my opinion, ALL … are dirty and 
potentially dangerous when they lack the elementary essentials of hygiene,” and he further pointed 
out that “Allowing foodvendors to operate at all is contrary to Council’s requirements set out in 
its Bylaws and certainly against the principles of the Public Health Act.”30 
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However, in response to push-back from some municipal councilors, Rihal also revealed 
the shaky scientific link between these vendors and public health realities in the city. He disputed 
the idea that “because not many people have died” that street food was safe, and argued that “Our 
feeling is that cases of Dysentery … are quite considerable and some of them might be patronizing 
the foodvendors.” In such situations, Rihal argued, “we feel that prevention is better than cure.”31 
With only thin evidence that vendors contributed to public health problems, and with councilors 
concerned to keep their constituents happy, over the next month the council continued to reaffirm 
that Rihal needed to identify cleanly operating vendors and provide them with licenses.32 
The following month, Rihal sent a memo to the council regarding the issue of licensing 
food vendors, and in it repeated his concerns over sanitation, but also drew, as had Rosenwald, on 
circulating ideas about modernization, aesthetics, and economic development. He explained to the 
council that the objective of the Department of the Medical Officer of Health was not only to 
maintain food sanitation in the city, but also to foster the “establishment of food-catering premises 
(canteens, restaurants, eating houses, etc.) rather than foodvending on the roadside.” Their mission 
was as much aesthetic and social, as medical. It was, “in other words, to remove the unsightly 
features of the food-vending trade from the roadside into properly run premises.” He concluded 
his thoughts by linking this aesthetic and social project to a modernizing and economic one, 
rearticulating the vision of Rosenwald, by arguing that “a consistent and forceful policy is required 
by the Council so that the unsightly aspect of the Foodvendors’ trade be removed from the 
roadsides in view of the increasing Tourist Trade.” Governing representatives of a new, 
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modernizing nation-state, “It becomes incumbent on all of us to present a good image of this 
country.”33 
First with Rosenwald, and then Rihal, the Medical Officer of Health failed to convince the 
council with unsubstantiated claims that foodvendors were responsible for a deterioration of 
Mombasa’s public health, but succeeded when linking the sanitation project to the aesthetics and 
economics of modernization and the growing tourism industry. After reading his letter at an April 
meeting, they reversed their decision to require the Medical Officer of Health to license people 
beyond a quota of 60.34 Though a month behind the unfolding of these events in Mombasa, once 
the Ministry of Local Government in Nairobi read of the council’s attempt to again expand the 
licensing of people vending food in Mombasa, they chastised the councilors, writing that the 
“Medical Officer of Health has explained very clearly to your Council the health hazards involved 
in increasing the number of food vendors.” Greatly concerned at the implications of the actions of 
the council, the ministry worried that the city’s councilors were moving towards making “food 
vendors a regular and permanent feature in the town.”35 
If fact, Mombasa’s councilors were trying to do something far less radical than that. Most 
seemed fully committed to the idea of transferring roadside vendors into municipal canteens, but 
they faced a constituency of street-food vendors who were mostly uninterested in that particular 
vision of post-colonial Mombasa. The councilors were caught in between, trying to stay within the 
modernization logic of the state, but while not losing the support of their constituencies who had 
a quite different set of priorities for Mombasa’s comestible landscape. 
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Moreover, as the 1960s unfolded, the incentives to join municipal canteens were only 
further eroded. While the council had been pressured into easing enforcement and to license at 
least a limited number of foodvendors, they were still concerned with revenue. Food-vendor 
canteens and the licensing of food more generally had never been about producing surplus revenue 
for the state, but officials, both colonial and post-colonial, were concerned that they not operate at 
too high a loss. For those operating in these canteens, up to the mid-1960s the restricted mobility 
and higher prices that municipal vending necessitated, to a curtained extent, been mitigated by one 
factor; that they received free and unlimited water in the canteens. Despite health officials’ 
anxieties to the contrary, street-food vendors did use water consistently, for their cooking and 
washing. It just was not running water most of the time, but purchased in a portable jerry-can. 
Municipal vendors, though paying fees and unable to respond to shifts in consumer-market 
geographies, at least did not have this expense. However, during the mid-1960s, it came to the 
attention of the council just how much this small luxury for its vendors was costing the city.36 
Looking at older numbers, the council noted how in 1957 it received only Shs. 3424/- for stall 
rents, but paid out Shs. 8,245/70 in water bills.37 Moreover, while these rents fell well below the 
revenue they received, that revenue itself was quite inconsistent. For municipal vendors on the 
margins, delaying or not paying the council rents became an obvious way to make up for precarious 
profits. At the High-Level Godown Canteen, the vendors collectively carried arrears of over Shs. 
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1,000/-, month to month.38 Looking to balance their deficits, the state decided both to enforce 
eviction notices on people in arrears, and to begin charging for water inside the canteens.39 
Just as the the new canteens were opening, the state was working to make them even less 
desirous spaces in which vendors would work. During the mid- to late-1960s, canteens across the 
city were completed and, in anticipation of stalls becoming available, the council began to lay 
down policies for how roadside vendors would be cleared from Mombasa’s landscape. The 
vendors who held temporary licenses would be provided first option to occupy stalls in the new 
canteens. However, once offered a stall, if vendors declined, their temporarily licenses would be 
cancelled, thus rendering them again illicit.40 Perhaps realizing that the incentives were aligned 
against them, the council also shifted back towards more coercive tactics to try to make its project 
of canteens work. In their orders to Rihal, they included that he “be instructed to allocate stalls of 
the food vendors Canteen immediately after the water and drainage works had been carried out,” 
and “that those people who decline to accept the stalls allocated to them be not permitted to trade 
in the illegal sale of food and be removed from the road reserves.” Revealing their anxieties about 
whether their licensed vendors could compete, the council concluded “that all unauthorised 
vendors operating in the vicinity of the Council’s Food Vendors Canteens [will] be removed in 
order to permit the authorized food vendors to trade without any competition.”41 
With his orders, the Medical Officer of Health began moving around town and issued 
citations not only to establish public food vendors, but also in ways that disrupted socio-economic 
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relationships between friends, co-workers, and cooks. While many people visited food vendors for 
lunch, others created their own more personal arrangements for acquiring food during the working 
day or leisure time. Curio woodcarvers, most of them Kamba and who faced their own eviction 
problems, had claimed and worked out of public space in the Tudor Housing Estate on Mombasa 
island.42 They had arranged four cooks who worked directly for them, cooking lunch. After 
receiving citation, an advocate for the woodcarvers, Mohamed Jahazi, appeared in front of the 
council and said that “the Wood Carvers wanted a cheap meal of their preference and if the Tudor 
Rest House provided such cheap food they would discharge their cooks.” The council noted that 
“owing to undue competition from the unauthorised food vendors the Tudor Rest House had to be 
shut down,” and the Medical Officer of Health also added that these cooks “had been operating in 
the most unhygienic and insanitary conditions and should be treated like other unauthorised food 
vendors.”43 Staying within the logic of the council, but while seeking accommodation, it was 
decided to provide temporary licenses to these cooks, but then require them to occupy a municipal 
canteen that would be built in Tudor. Two months later, a member of Mombasa’s Chelsea Football 
Club was brought before the council with charges that he prepared and sold “meat soup, tea and 
mahamri” to the other members of the club. After negotiation, the Medical Officer of Health agreed 
to allow him to continue if he met basic health department standards.44 
While both these small-scale comestible arrangements survived the council’s inquiries, 
many larger concerns, the businesses that sold food to the general public, those that posed a greater 
threat to canteens, did not. In the same meeting when the wood-carvers’ cooks were provided 
temporary licenses, it was also resolved to “take action against all those whom the Council had 
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served notices to remove their unauthorised structures and quit the place.”45 Momentum was 
building against vendors. When the Coast’s Provincial Commissioner I.M. Mathenge was taken 
on a tour of the many sites of development in the city, he could not help being offended by the 
ubiquity of food vendors throughout the city, and noted “that people who have constructed illegal 
structures must stop this practice forthwith.” Mathenge announced that food vendors would have 
“two weeks notice … to move into council stalls at Majengo which are lying vacant.”46 In fact, 
they had less time than that. Twelve days later, municipal authorities struck with its largest 
demolition since independence. Responding to the pressure from Mathenge, municipal authorities 
demolished around 100 food stalls in the industrial areas of Mombasa.47 
Over the coming months, as canteens opened, the council continued to try to phase out 
temporarily licensing, bring vendors into the canteens, and rid the city of roadside vendors. The 
council found some success convincing vendors to join the canteens, but others who lost their 
licenses chose the precarity of illicit vending over working inside expensive, state institutions. The 
Medical Officer of Health noted at a June meeting in 1966 that many of the new food stalls were 
filled by former roadside vendors, but that “a few stalls remained to be taken up,” though he was 
“trying to get these occupied as soon as possible.”48 However, while these new institutions of urban 
development opened their doors, those who had tried to operate outside these spaces were feeling 
the violent edge of modernization. Nicholas Ntinda, the provincial Secretary of the Kenya National 
Traders Association, told the Daily Nation that the “Hawkers and food-vendors whose bandas 
[structures] have been demolished by the Municipal Council are suffering from starvation.” 
Looking to the council, Ntinda tried to appeal through a discourse of patriarchy, with the councilors 
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as paternal patrons. Using specifically gendered and generational language, he pleaded the 
councilors see how these food-vendors and hawkers were mostly “elderly widows who had no 
means of support since their bandas were demolished.”49 These elected representatives were failing 
in their duty to creation an environment in which wananchi, especially those who were understood 
to be vulnerable, “elderly widows,” could make a living and support themselves. Councilors’ 
requirements were not the same as nineteenth-century patrons who had to provide such patronage 
in exchange for subaltern labor, but they were at least obligated to the provide conditions, in 
capitalist Kenya, where people could make their own way. 
Such arguments seem to generally have held some sway. The council continued to funnel 
food vendors into municipal canteens, but the limited number of stalls could not possibly have 
accommodated the hundreds of roadside vendors who operated in Mombasa, even assuming they 
all would have wanted to work within those spaces.50 The council had used the tool of violence, 
demolishing at least 100 vibanda throughout the city in the preceding months, but in the following 
years councilors, tied to constituents angry about these demolitions, also tried to reach a negotiated 
settlement with the city’s comestible traders. They continued to vigorously police people who set 
up on roadsides and other open, public places, and especially those who were near municipal 
canteens, but they also looked to revive and expand an order urban institution as a concession to 
the “elderly widows” who had been displaced.51  
In 1967, the council created a new comestible licensing category, one in which people 
could operate small eateries out of their homes. This had long been one form of prepared-food 
vending in the city, and as an alternative to roadside vending it suited the council, as it allowed 
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vendors to work, but while keeping them off the street and away from the landscape’s that tourists 
and international visitors would see. Their licenses were quite specific, and had stipulations, but it 
was a way to prepare and sell food legally outside the canteens. They were allowed to sell mbaazi 
(cooked beans), muhogo (cooked cassava), uji (porridge), and fried fish.52 By late 1968, many 
vendors had seized on this opening, and started businesses out of homes, even creating small-scale 
food bazaars verging on restaurants within residential buildings. These created tensions with other 
residents who complained that their homes were being transformed into eateries, as during the day 
and evening, people living in these buildings dealt with “excessive noise from the clients who 
come to have food” and their communal kitchens were “loaded with food vendors cookery to the 
exclusion of tenants.” However, with the streets under heavy surveillance, and these home eateries 
presented as the legal alternative, these businesses were only growing throughout the city. The 
Medical Officer of Health, not pleased by either the sanitary arrangements of these spaces or the 
noise they created, recommended to the council that no new licenses in this category be approved, 
and all others not be renewed once they expired. The council, however, having found its temporary 
solution, ordered the health department to continue issuing licenses to allow these home 
restaurants.53 
As the 1960s came to a close, vendors in Mombasa looked out at an ambiguous comestible 
landscape, and likely had, at best, mixed feelings about how they had faired during the early years 
of uhuru. Those seven years had been tumultuous, at one point offering the possibility that vendors 
would be provided with free licenses, validating their businesses and liberating them from the daily 
anxieties of citations and demolitions. However, these spaces had, to a certain extent, opened only 
temporarily in order to facilitate the entrenchment in independent Mombasa of the colonial 
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program of moving roadside vendors off the streets and into municipal food canteens. Once these 
canteens were ready, the violence of demolitions and expulsions they had endured during 
colonialism returned. However, municipal officials also seemed, at a certain level, to understand 
the limits of their own power, and the need to accommodate themselves to the economic realities 
of a city ravaged by unemployment. While home restaurants lacked the mobility to situate one’s 
business most advantageously, and to respond to the shifting geographies of consumer markets, 
they did provide a respite from the municipal authorities and their demolition crews. 
Conclusion: Post-Colonial Contingency and Comestible Politics in Independent Mombasa 
 Shariff Nassir in 1970 was the deputy chairman of the Kenya African Nation Union 
(KANU) and a rising figure within the party ranks. On March 26 of that year, he was working out 
of KANU’s Mombasa office when 150 Muslim women showed up in protest “to make their 
feelings known over the way municipal inspectors treat them when found vending their wares in 
Mombasa.” These women pushed Nassir, a descendent of a coastal patrician family, to fulfill his 
role as their official, their patron, and to take their case to the council. These vendors “had been 
refused licences to sell pre-cooked food,” and drawing on a gendered language of paternalism, told 
him that they were “widows and need money to send their children to school.” Persuaded, 
pressured, or both, Nassir went to the Town Clerk, N. Adembesa, who he convinced to take the 
issue to the Municipal  Council.54 
 Little more than a week later, on April 3, the council discussed “the ban on selling food in 
the streets” of Mombasa. Juma Ferunzy, not part of the council but the East African Legislative 
Assembly, came to the meeting and spoke to the councilors, framing the challenges vendors faced 
in the longer unfolding of anti-colonial struggle, noting that the council’s by-laws “have been a 
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nuisance to mothers [selling food] for quite a long time and should be relaxed.” He reassured his 
perhaps nervous municipal colleagues that it was not his “intention to blame this council, but surely 
these by-laws were formed during colonial times and they should now be changed to keep up with 
the wind of independence.” The deputy mayor and councilmember, A.N. Mwindau, perhaps 
influenced by the presence of KANU and Ferunzy, or just acting from personal conviction, added 
that “we cannot deny the fact that most of us were brought up and educated by money earned by 
our mothers through cooking and selling food—which is now being denied them.” Emphasizing 
his point, be continued that “I, for one, was educated by money earned by my mother in this way 
during colonial days.” Councilor Mwaruwa added that these vendors were vulnerable figures, 
needing paternal assistance, as they often were unmarried and had children in school, and that 
these vendors “have to get money to educate their children otherwise they will be a bother to the 
council.”55 These sons were failing their mothers who had raised them to become leaders of the 
nation through the money they earned working as street-food vendors, and worse still they were 
preventing other mothers from doing the same, creating the next generation of productive Kenyan 
citizens. 
 The General Purposes Committee that same month took up the council’s call to reconsider 
food vending in the city. Far short of the unlimited temporary licenses that had been considered 
and a brief reality during the mid-1960s, the committee was flexible but narrow in its imagination 
of how the street-food industry might change. They took the already existing category of the home 
restaurant, and augmented it. In drafting this new license, they outlined that food needed to be 
cooked indoors, and about this they were emphatic: “no cooking [was] to be allowed outside the 
premises … or on the pavement except warming of the already cooked food.” With this stipulation, 
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they were being quite precise in their language so as not to again legalize full-scale eateries on the 
city’s roads and open spaces. Thus, people could again be mobile, better situate themselves within 
the consumptive markets of the city’s comestible geography, but the food could only be the limited 
items of mbaazi, muhogo, uji, and fried fish, and it had to be pre-prepared, inside their homes.56 
 The door to a different comestible Mombasa had been propped open again. Women food 
vendors had used their collective power to shame the council into creating a more flexible licensing 
category, providing a way that women could sell food on Mombasa’s streets, where their visibility 
and mobility could provide better access to more diverse consumer markets. These women had 
instrumentalized gender, generation, and discourses of obligation to push politicians to take their 
position seriously. These political languages have deep roots in East Africa, but were repurposed 
and remade by these women and others within the modernist bureaucracy and commercial 
economies of decolonizing Mombasa to stake claims to space, ways of making a living, and to 
lodge and push their voices into elite enclaves such as the Municipal Council. 
The urban social structure that was made in independent Mombasa out of such struggles is 
inexplicable outside of an understanding of how the colonial period shaped the parameters of what 
the economy and governance could be, but such “continuities” and “legacies” of colonialism are 
only the starting point of the analysis. Decolonizing Mombasa was made by people who drew on 
a bricolage of discourses, some colonial and others with long pre-colonial genealogies, and they 
used them to wage a new kind of politics to make sense of, challenge, and fight for space within a 
grossly unequal urban economy. 
 The partial opening women food vendors created in 1970 produced a new administrative 
category around which they could mobilize, decided to fall within, or to repurpose into a form of 
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vending they found preferable. Providing a legal way to once again operate on the street, the 
category generated a diverse set of possibilities for these women and others to prepare and sell 
food around the city. However, a year later the context would change dramatically for everyone 
who tried to make a living selling food and beverages on Mombasa’s streets. The fear of food 
vendors as vectors for infectious diseases during the 1950s and 1960s in Mombasa had been mostly 
theoretical, as foodborne illness existed, but did not present a great threat to public health. 
Sanitation as a form of urban control had been deployed against vendors throughout colonialism 
and the early independence periods, but, especially during the 1960s it seems clear that the 
aesthetics of the modern city, and its connection to the tourism economy, were as much, if not 
more so, the reasons for the ferocity of the state’s attack on roadside vending. However, during 
1971, cholera outbreaks began in Mombasa and other parts of Kenya. While the evidence linking 
these outbreaks specifically to food vendors was often suspect, the specter of cholera, the spreading 
fear of contagion, provided a new and potent justification for municipal authorities in their drive 
to suppress and eradicate street-food vendors from Mombasa. The door, just as it opened, slammed 











Image 6: Unauthorized structure, c. 1960s 
 
Photo from the 1960s of an unauthorized structure in Mombasa. The source is not clear if this is a home or 
a business, or both, but regardless is similar in design to roadside, street-food eateries. Note the use of 
corrugated-iron sheets with supporting wood beams. Source: Harm J. de Blij, Mombasa: An African City 












Map 4: Mombasa, 1969 
 







CONTAGIONS AND CONFLICT: THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF WORKING-CLASS 
FOOD IN 1970s MOMBASA 
 
 The early years of Kenya’s independence were genuinely transformative ones for the 
people in Mombasa who sold prepared food and drink to the city’s poorer classes. Having spent 
the final decade of colonialism as pariahs of the urban landscape, targeted for removal through 
prosecutions and demolitions, after independence they were able to successfully mobilize their 
new power as wananchi (citizens) by building a constituency through which they pressured 
officials in the Mombasa Municipal Council to redefine how prepared food and drinks could be 
sold in the city. While for most of the colonial period the only legal categories of street-food 
vending outside municipal canteens were beverage-only tea and coffee licenses, food vendors 
during the 1960s and early 1970s used their influence inside the council to push officials to create 
two new licensing categories that in effect legalized the right of people to sell prepared food 
throughout the city without having to be inside the formalized confines of a restaurant or a 
municipal canteen. Despite these achievements, selling prepared food and drink on the city’s 
streets or inside one’s home remained a precarious and difficult way to earn income, as some 
zealous officials still conducted raids and demolitions, only a few types of food could be sold, and 
the licensing quotas were capped well below the amounts needed to legalize everyone who wanted 
to do such work.1 Nonetheless, the very fact that they had redefined the official vision of urban 
modernity so that the professions of in-home and roadside eateries were written into the city’s by-
laws, even if in a limited fashion, was indeed a tiding of the radical possibilities of how the 
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wananchi might remake independent Kenya.2 However, a transformation in the global ecology of 
disease that began on the other side of the Indian Ocean during the early 1960s would profoundly 
change the position of street-food vendors in Mombasa during the remainder of the 1970s, and in 
many ways stills effects the politics of urban food in Kenya up until the present day. 
 During the final years of colonial rule in Kenya, an outbreak of a relatively new strain of 
cholera began thousands of kilometers away in rural Indonesia in May and June of 1961. The 
cholera that struck Makassar on Indonesia’s Sulawesi Island, Vibrio cholerae 01 El Tor, had not 
caused much concern for medical researchers since its discovery during the 1930s because it was 
seen as less virulent than its classical relative, Vibrio Cholerae 01, the bacterium that had ravaged 
the Indian Ocean World and beyond during the nineteenth century. However, with alarming speed, 
the disease spread beyond Sulawesi and drew the attention of the international health community. 
By the end of 1961, additional cases of El Tor were recorded in Hong Kong, Macao and the 
Philippines. During 1962, the infection spread to Turkey, Taiwan, Iran and Borneo. That same 
year, the World Health Organization officially moved to include El Tor vibrio as part of how it 
defined Cholera, upgrading it from its previous designation as the diarrheal disease “Paracholera.” 
For the quarter century before the Sulawesi outbreak, cholera infections had been sporadic, isolated 
to a few endemic areas, and short-lived. Whatever hopes that the disease may have been nearing 
its effective eradication were quickly dashed, however, as this new bacterium exploded into 
world’s Seventh Cholera Pandemic during the 1960s.3 
																																																						
2 The urban politics of the street-food industry in late-colonial and early-independence Mombasa is covered in 
Chapter Three and Chapter Four. 
3 The information in this paragraph is drawn from the overviews in Myron Echenberg, Africa in the Time of 
Cholera: A History of Pandemics from 1817 to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 87-89, 
and Dhiman Barua, “History of Cholera,” in Cholera, edited by Barua and William B. Greebough III (New York: 
Plenum Medical Book Company), 16-17. 
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 For much of that decade, the pandemic was primarily limited to Asia, but it began to move 
into Europe and Africa during the 1970s. It first spread through the Persian Gulf and then into the 
Levant and North Africa. El Tor then jumped all the way to coastal West Africa when students 
returned home via airline travel to The Gambia after having been infected while abroad. The 
disease went inland, reaching Mopti in Mali, and spread eastward down the coast with an alarming 
quickness along fishing and trade routes, reaching as far as Nigeria. By 1970, cholera also arrived 
in East Africa. It travelled west from the Persian Gulf region and crossed into Africa via the Rea 
Sea, infecting people in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia. Cholera would soon move south across 
the Somali border and into Kenya.4 
 Cholera was not new to East Africa, but by the early 1970s it had not posed a major public-
health threat for more than a half century. The region had been hit by the first four cholera 
pandemics that swept through the Indian Ocean World during the nineteenth century. The Fourth 
Pandemic in particular struck the commercial port of Zanzibar especially hard from 1869-70 and 
Myron Echenberg estimates that the death toll may have been at least 100,000 people. That the 
devastation of cholera was etched into the consciousness of the coastal population is evidenced by 
the linguistic indigenization of the disease into regional languages. By mid-century, even before 
the Fourth Pandemic, kipindupindu had become the Swahili word for cholera, and this remains 
unchanged as the term for the infection today.5 In Mijikenda languages, those predominant in the 
rural areas of what is now the Kenyan coast, cholera was specifically defined as muandzala during 
the mid-1800s, and by the end of the century a word that had previously meant a person “who is 
																																																						
4 Barua, “History of Cholera,” 18. 
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first outbreaks in the region began during the 1820s. Ludwig Kraft, A Dictionary of the Suahili Langauge (London: 
Trübner, 1882), viii, 153. For the cholera in nineteenth-century Zanzibar, see Echenberg, Africa in the Time of 
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cold, spiritless; he is not sprightly as to his limbs, he resembles one who is sick,” peho, had had its 
definition expanded to mean “epidemic.” In a modified form, peho ya kumwaga, it meant cholera.6 
The epidemic of kumwaga, a term that at mid-century meant “to spill, to scatter, to shed,” though 
by the end of the 1800s had changed to “diarrhea,” affected people throughout the century in East 
Africa and the wider Indian Ocean World.7 However, the devastation of cholera during the 
nineteenth century was not matched during the first seven decades of the twentieth, as East Africa 
remained largely free from the disease except for a few small outbreaks.8 Classical cholera, Vibrio 
Cholera 01, did not become endemic to the region during the 1800s. Once the disease was 
contained and eliminated after each outbreak, cholera no longer posed an immediate threat to 
public health.9 The lull was broken in February of 1971. That month, reports of cholera infections 
emerged from Kenya’s northern coastal region in the Tana River District near the Somali border, 
and by March the Daily Nation confirmed that 52 people had contracted the bacterium and 20 of 
them had died.10 Over the coming years and decades, Kenyans, and many other communities 
throughout the world, would come to realize that this newest strain of cholera, El Tor, was far 
more adaptive, mobile and lasting than its classical predecessor, Vibrio Cholera 01.  
The El Tor cholera that arrived in Kenya during the early 1970s became endemic in the 
region and elsewhere in Africa. This was transformative not only to the health of people living in 
Kenya, but also for the political context in which urban struggle could be waged. Historians of 
post-colonial Kenya, and Africa in general, have paid little attention to the ways disease and urban 
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9 Barua, “History of Cholera,” 14-16. 
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life became ever more intertwined during the 1970s, and so have missed how environmental 
history helps to explain changing patterns of urban administration and the strategies that city 
residents have employed in response. Much has been written on sanitation and disease in colonial 
Africa, but less clear are the ways that post-colonial urban governance was also structured through 
attempts to control the natural world. As a consequence, this chapter argues, the scholarship has 
overlooked a key causative force in urban formation in post-colonial Africa.11 
While historians have to this point not fully recognized the significance of the political 
ecology of informality, disease and urban sanitation in post-colonial Africa, novelists have been 
more discerning observers of how these forces have made the lives of those selling food and drink, 
as well as their customers, far more precarious. In Meja Mwangi’s classic novel of 1970s working-
class Nairobi, Going Down River Road, his narrative generates a clear argument that council 
demolitions of food kiosks during cholera campaigns were short-sighted attacks on visible targets, 
generating political spectacle, rather than being long-term solutions to infrastructural problems.  
With his usual sardonic style, Mwangi describes how “the City Council’s good-health brigade” 
goes to “work” on the eateries that feed the workers of a large construction site now that the 
“cholera killer is in town,” pulling them down and demolishing them. He continues that “There 
are rumours rife that the Council will build organized sanitary Food Kiosks but no mention was 
made of when. Or what the food prices will be like.” Chapters later, the food kiosks reopen, and 
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in colonial Africa, see Philip D. Curtin, “Medical Knowledge and Urban Planning in Tropical Africa,” American 
Historical Review 90, no. 3 (1985): 594-613. The closest we have to a post-colonial political ecology of cholera and 
sanitation is Echenburg’s Africa in the Time of Cholera, but his analysis is more one of how politics affected the 
spread of cholera, rather than how cholera itself, the concern of this chapter, was affecting politics. Moreover, 
Echenberg is uneven in precise attention to cholera in urban areas, opting instead to operate at the analytical level of 
nations and regions. See Africa in the Time of Cholera, 140-183. 
	 215 
Mwangi narrates that even the government understands the role vendors play in the social structure 
and political economy of the city, as “someone realized that in order to keep them working, the 
workers had to be fed. The ministry ordered them to get clean and reopened the workers’ hotels 
[restaurants].”12 
Mwangi’s fiction points to the changing reality for vendors during the 1970s as cholera 
came to reinvigorate the practice of demolitions that had been on the wane since independence in 
1963. While no evidence remains that directly ties cholera to specific food vendors in Mombasa, 
it would also be disingenuous to contend that the food and drink being sold to the public did not 
at some level act as a vector for the disease to spread throughout the city. However, this chapter 
also argues that food vendors were at most a surface-level effect of the more structural causes of 
why Mombasa and other cities in Kenya were vulnerable to cholera. Their role as potential vectors 
was epiphenomenal to the underlying problem that the city’s infrastructure, the responsibility of 
the government, was insufficient to keep the city adequately sanitary. The demolishing of vendors’ 
structures, as well as arresting and prosecuting them, was much easier, cheaper and faster than 
extending clean water and sewerage to the entire city, and these tactics also provided a political 
spectacle that allowed politicians to demonstrate their commitment to sanitation. It can be 
simultaneously true that in banning and prosecuting food vendors, as well as demolishing their 
businesses, that health officials were genuine in their concern, acting in good faith and trying to 
keep the city safe from the pandemic, but also in so doing were pursuing the path they deemed 
most politically possible, given their realistic lack of resources to remake the city’s infrastructure. 
However, these points of finer context likely would have not been persuasive to those whose 
livelihoods were made illegal, had their eateries demolished, or were arrested because they 
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continued to work in order to feed, shelter and educate themselves and their families. This chapter, 
then, is a study of a political ecology in which food and drink vendors were made to bear the most 
intense burdens of these “cholera campaigns” in 1970s Mombasa. 
Urban Politics, Cholera and “Operation ‘Clean-up’ Mombasa” 
 By the end of March 1971, as cholera was spreading in the Tana River District, municipal 
officials in Mombasa banned the sale of prepared food and drink by hawkers and vendors in the 
city. In arguing for these policies, the municipal council stated that, as “cholera had already 
appeared in the neighboring areas … urgent steps should be taken to control foodvendors” and  
“tea and coffee hawkers who do not have running water supply, drainage facilities and access to 
sanitary accommodation if this council was to keep this disease out of their area.”13 Municipal 
authorities also used the new political leverage of cholera to accelerate plans to reshape the 
architectural landscape of the city. The previous month, prior to the outbreak of cholera, the council 
had made one of its more aggressive moves since independence against not only food but all 
vendors who had built unauthorized structures when it issued notices that all such buildings would 
be demolished, though, conceding to the political climate of the moment that made such actions 
less permissible, the council also allowed vendors six months to vacate these premises before they 
would be demolished. However, in March, the urgency of cholera allowed the council to rapidly 
speed up the timeline, resolving that their order “be amended by the deletion of the words ‘six 
months’ appearing therein and substitution therefor of the words ‘ten days’ and the Town Clerk be 
instructed to serve the notices forthwith,” and it was recommended “that any other unauthorised 
structures handling food which require demolition would be reported … in pursuance of the 
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plenary power of that Committee … with a view to their demolition.”14 Cholera posed a danger to 
the health of everyone in Mombasa, but, for food and drink vendors, it also threatened their 
livelihoods. 
 Since the emergence of development as a new mode of urban governance during the late-
colonial period, the state had been attempting to divide Mombasa’s hawkers and vendors into two 
categories, licensed and unlicensed, the former legitimate and supported, and the other illicit and 
targeted for removal. While the state succeeded only partially in creating a consciousness among 
licensed vendors as distinct from those operating illicitly, people who had licenses were generally 
free from the threat of demolitions and prosecutions. However, this divide began to crumble during 
the “cholera campaigns” of the 1970s, as suspicion fell on everyone selling prepared food in the 
city. In addition to vendors working in unauthorized structures, the state in 1971 also closed down 
many of the municipal food canteens, putting their vendors out of work, and cancelled the licenses 
of state-approved tea and food hawkers.15 Cholera provided the post-independence council with 
unprecedented political capital to reshape the comestible geography of the city, but the very logic 
of sanitation upon which this relied was also dissolving the distinction between licensed and 
unlicensed that state authorities had been trying to forge since the late-colonial period. 
 During the 1971 epidemic, the council acted decisively in banning all vending and hawking 
of food in the city, but putting thousands of people out of work overnight had political 
consequences. By April, municipal officials in Mombasa were beginning to feel intense pressure 
both from constituencies within the city and from a wider context of cholera control across Kenya. 
Responding to protests from food vendors whose licenses had been suspended, the council 
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contended that it would “not yield to any pressure to relax its decision on the withdrawal of 
licenses.” Some councilors tried to be sympathetic by acknowledging the difficulties that their 
policies placed on vendors, but remained firm on the importance of sanitation. Councilor 
Adembesa observed that even though “those whose licenses have been withdrawn could to a 
certain extent ask for consideration on humanitarian grounds, it would have to be borne in mind 
that plans to tackle threats to human lives must be given priority.”16 However, Mombasa’s 
councilors did not administer in political vacuum and, though they had quickly passed their own 
food ban in March, the capital city of Nairobi had been struggling to enact similar emergency 
measures. On April 8, Nairobi’s attempt to ban food, tea and vegetable vendors had failed, and the 
same Councilor Adembesa conceded that now “it was inevitable that as a result of this decision 
‘pressure will mount on us to do the same.’” The vendors in Nairobi had framed their debates, as 
had those Mombasa in previous years, through discourses of state and citizenship. Nairobi’s 
vendors “hailed” the city’s councilors as having made a “statesmenlike decision” by not passing 
the ban. Nathaniel Njagi, President of the Kenya Street Traders Society, continued to flatter the 
republicanism of the council, noting that its officials “had come to the aid of the electorate at the 
correct time and that they deserve praise for rejecting the proposal.” With this now publicized 
inconsistency between Nairobi and Mombasa in how the wananchi were being governed, 
Adembesa concluded, after holding virtually the opposite position the day before, that he was 
“inclined to recommend that the actions [against vendors] we earlier took be relaxed, at least for 
the time being.”17 
 The next day, the Mombasa council shifted its focus from enforcing the ban towards 
accommodation. Even the Medical Officer of Health, while expressing concern “that these 
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licensed hawkers and foodvendors were a hazard to health,” conceded that “sight should not be 
lost of the fact” food vendors had been “earning their livelihood in this business for a number of 
years.”18 However, despite this shift in official language, in practice the ban remained.19 
 The political context of Nairobi had moved councilors in Mombasa, but it was not 
sufficient to convince them to allow people to begin selling food and drink again on the streets of 
the city. However, vendors themselves were more persuasive. Since independence, the city’s 
vendors had been developing new strategies for how to pressure councilors to bend and reshape 
the state’s laws to conform to a vision of the city in which their businesses also had a place. Among 
these strategies were interpersonal confrontations in which vendors stormed government offices 
in large numbers to publically shame officials. As they faced a total ban on their livelihoods, 
vendors went to the top of the city’s vertical power structure. On April 8, the Mayor told the 
General Purposes Committee that his office “had been receiving delegations of hundreds of 
hawkers and food vendors for the past few days pleading that the ban should be lifted.”20 Through 
these protests, vendors shamed their councilors that they were denying Kenyans the ability to care 
for their children, as the Daily Nation reported that these delegations “had been bringing with them 
children, claiming they had nothing to eat.”21 
 While the pressure from Nairobi had been insufficient, that from the vendors pushed the 
council to action. In their effort to resolve the “controversy in the town among food vendors and 
hawkers who live entirely on the trade,” the Council on April 14 decided to end the ban on selling 
prepared food and drink in the city. Indicating the level of resistance that the administrators had 
felt, “An official of the council said the ‘tension’ had been growing day by day and there was fear 
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‘that some hostile people might resort to taking the law into their own hands.’”22 However, if the 
council lost its initiative on banning all food vendors and hawkers, they in defeat tried to reassert 
the legitimacy of their licensing system, to retain some control over the city. Though the ban was 
“lifted forthwith,” the council emphasized that “Only licensed hawkers, however, will be allowed 
to trade.”23 
 However, from as far back as the 1950s, licensing had proved an illusory mechanism for 
controlling the composition of eateries in Mombasa. People who had licenses often worked outside 
their parameters if they thought it more advantageous to their businesses, and those without them 
kept on cooking and selling as long as they could avoid the authorities. Whatever efforts the 
council had made, it was clear by May that vendors were operating much as they always had. 
Many of the licensed hawkers and vendors in 1971, as they had before, ran comestible businesses 
that only loosely aligned with the vision of the urban food landscape laid out in the city’s bylaws. 
Ali Matano, who had a tea, bread and mahamri (Swahili donut) license, had been “cooking ‘ugali’ 
[maize-meal porridge], meat and other foods,” while coffee hawker Macharia Njau had been 
denied a renewal on his coffee license because he was “food vending instead of coffee hawking.”24 
Additionally, while the state required for sanitation reasons that cassava be grilled and not fried, 
people continued to fry it to bring in customers who preferred that style of preparation, as 
demonstrated when Mbaruk Hassan was convicted and fined for “frying cassava instead of grilling 
it” and “failing to heed warnings” to the contrary in June of 1971.25 
 The El Tor strain of cholera arrived in Kenya during 1971, but failed to spread as widely 
as had been feared and did not fundamentally reorder urban politics. In Mombasa, six patients 
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were brought to the city’s health facilities from Tana River where the outbreak began to receive 
treatment, and three others from the north coast had slipped through quarantines and caused panic 
among officials, but they were quickly found and admitted to the Infectious Disease Hospital. That 
was the extent of Mombasa’s first cholera threat since the nineteenth century. “Operation ‘Clean-
up’ Mombasa” that had been conducted to combat it revealed both strategies that would form the 
foundation of cholera campaigns in the future, as well as the continuing power of poor urban food 
and drink vendors to influence politics in the city. The Medical Officer of Health, reviewing 1971 
in the annual report, pointed directly to the political action by hawkers and vendors as to why the 
ban was repealed, noting that this “small but vociferous section of the community” had pressured 
the council into lifting the prohibition.26 
Infrastructure, Vendors and Public Health 
 The Medical Officer of Health did face a potential public-health crisis in 1970s Mombasa, 
and was right to be worried about the possibility a cholera outbreak far more devastating than the 
scare of 1971. The annual report of that year reflected that “Considering living conditions in slums 
and mushrooming shanties and the extreme unhygienic state of unauthorised structures handling 
food, it is more to Providence that no epidemic of a communicable disease has broken out up to 
now.”27 However, the intensity of the municipality’s focus on food vendors was far 
disproportionate to their place within the broader diagnosis of why Mombasa was vulnerable to a 
catastrophic outbreak of an infectious disease. Much more fundamental to the question of the city’s 
public-health was the reality that declining public investments in infrastructure and municipal 
staffing were being compounded by a rapidly growing urban population. The city’s sewers, water 
																																																						




system and other public facilities were not adequate to accommodate the more than ten thousand 
additional people moving to and being born in the city every year. While some and even many 
street-food vendors may have been unhygienic as it was defined in the law, most of the reason for 
this falls to fact that there was not sufficient access in the city to clean water or adequate sewerage. 
 John Iliffe has focused the attention of historians to the importance of demographics in 
African history and, in particular for the purposes of this study, to that of the rapid population 
growth that occurred during the post-war and early-independence periods.28 Population alone does 
not explain the economic struggles of African states since the 1970s, but, when considered 
alongside a global political economy in which African officials had to account for quickly 
increasing populations with public resources made ever scarcer by global recession and the 
government cutbacks of structural adjustment that followed, the challenge of maintaining urban 
infrastructures equal to the task of keeping cities sanitary was an understandably daunting one. 
Mombasa, like many cities across Africa, had been growing quickly since the Second 
World War. After independence, the population grew by 4.7 percent each year, reaching 225,000 
by 1969. Growth would continue through the 1970s, with the population of the city topping 
340,000 by 1979, an increase of two thirds during the 1970s.29 The highest concentrations of 
population growth during this period were in Mombasa’s peri-urban areas that surrounded the city, 
in particular Changamwe, Kisauni and Likoni. As residents in these neighborhoods increased in 
number, the housing crisis became acute. A University of Nairobi study during the early 1970s 
reported that, in Kisauni north of Mombasa island, the occupancy rate of an average habitable 
room was 3.6, and the author estimated that this low-income area required 640 more houses to 
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reach more sustainable levels of accommodation. Such density also overstrained the city’s patch-
work sewer system. The coastal area north of Mombasa island was and remains one of the more 
overtly stratified parts of the city. Nyali on the east side, with tourist hotels and high-income 
homes, had been fitted with an underground, flush sewer system, but, with only minor exceptions, 
people living in the neighborhoods a short walk to the west only had access to pit latrines. While 
pit latrines certainly can be sanitary in many situations, their carrying capacity is quite literally 
finite in relation to the ground in which they are situated. In 1971, the Medical Officer of Health 
reported that “Disposal of sewage is another problem which the Council should tackle without 
much delay,” and “that disposal by pits is becoming more and more difficult.” The following year, 
the situation had not been addressed, and the office wrote with increasing concern that “sewerage 
in private individual plots is becoming more and more of an acute problem, some areas have 
become sewage sick [saturated] and can take no more soakage.”30 Recognizing the problem as a 
structural one, the Medical Officer of Health urged that “The need, therefore, for a sewerage 
system of the treatment and disposal of sewage cannot be overemphasized.” As another year 
passed with no large infrastructural changes, the 1973 report ended with little hope that the money 
would be forthcoming to enact the changes required to house and provide infrastructure to Kenya’s 
cities, concluding that “The continued trek of people from rural areas to urban centres has not only 
created housing problems for larger local authorities like Nairobi and Mombasa but strained all 
their other services, so much so that it is becoming a financial nightmare to those authorities.”31 
People selling prepared food and drink from their homes and on Mombasa’s streets may not have 
had consistent access to sanitary facilities, but few others in the city did either. 
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Another problem for the Municipal Council and its health authorities was that, despite their 
efforts to focus attention on roadside vendors operating from “unauthorised structures” as the 
vectors of disease, the reality was that the state-run food canteens that were their responsibility fell 
below the very standards they demanded of people operating outside them. In the month before 
the cholera outbreak of 1971, the Foodvendors Canteen on Kinyozi street had been shut down for 
an indefinite amount of time for repairs and, since the progress towards reopening had been “very 
slow,” it was reported that “the stall-holders of this canteen were now operating outside the 
Canteen on the road-reserves.” Having secured legal stalls, these municipal vendors nonetheless 
had to construct their businesses on the roadside as an illicit vendor would since the authorities 
had been unable to make the needed repairs to their canteen. However, rather than understanding 
the need for such a compromise, the council turned towards coercion to make up for its own 
failings, asking the Town Clerk “to write a letter forthwith to the Police instructing them that strict 
enforcement of the by-laws be carried out” against their own vendors.32 
However, even in open canteens, their infrastructures were insufficient to meet the city’s 
health standards. As reported in March 1971, as cholera struck the coast, the “Council’s Canteens 
at Liverpool and Cardiff Streets lacked … sanitary accommodation and drainage facilities and 
[the] general hygienic standard prevailing in these two canteens and in Mwembe Tayari 
Foodvendors Canteen was poor.” As a result, Liverpool and Cardiff were closed during the cholera 
campaign “until such time as drainage facilities and water borne sanitation to the satisfaction of 
the Medical Officer of Health have been provided.”33 Three weeks later, the decision on whether 
to fund repairs in these canteens had still not made it out of the Council’s finance committee and, 
while Mwembe Tayari had been allowed to remain open, with its funding for repairs having been 
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already secured, “the construction had not yet started.”34 Consequently, the council demanded 
higher standards of the city’s roadside vendors and hawkers than it could maintain in its own 
canteens and, whatever the sanitation in these council institutions, they were also unavailable for 
significant periods of time during 1971 and in the years that followed even if vendors wanted to 
operate inside them.35 
For the remainder of the 1970s, food-vendor canteens were shut down and hawkers had 
their licenses suspended for at least a short period nearly every year. For food hawkers, even when 
their businesses were allowed, the quota of licenses remained fixed far below the number of people 
who wanted to work in the industry. Therefore, food vendors and hawkers had only uneven access 
to working in a fashion legitimated by the state during a time when the reintroduction of cholera 
into East Africa and the resultant public-health campaigns were making the prospect of working 
outside municipal licensing an increasingly precarious proposition. Cholera pushed more people 
into illicit operations, even though the potential consequences for doing so were becoming more 
and more dire.  
The attraction of food vending despite its illegality can be understood in the ever growing 
market for such services that the rise in population was creating. Dense demographic data on 1970s 
Mombasa is thin, but what we have suggests that the overwhelming majority of people in the city, 
if they did not pack food, needed to purchase it while at work. For example, in 1973, most people 
living in the working-class areas of Mainland North had to leave their neighborhoods to go to 
work, and the majority of those, 86 percent, had to commute to Mombasa island.36 In 1978, David 
																																																						
34 Ibid., and Minutes of the GPC, MCM, (UY/12/528), KNA-Coast. 
35 Eventually the Council Mwembe Tayari’s food canteen, as well as the one inside Makupa Market. MOH-AR, 
1971 (UY/14/249), KNA-Nairobi.   
36 Mombasa: Mainland North, 40.  
	 226 
E.L. Angote, who worked in the industrial area on the island, explained the necessity of food 
vendors for workers in the city in a letter to the editor that appeared in the Daily Nation: 
I could say along Dar es Salaam Road [in the industrial area] there are about 400 labourers 
who depend entirely on the kiosks for their meals. They are expected on duty much earlier 
than 8 a.m. and the nature of their work can affect their health if they do not even get a 
scrap of food for lunch. They cannot afford hotel [restaurant] meals, which range from 5/- 
for the cheapest.”37 
 
The poor entrepreneurial classes in Mombasa understood this as Angote did, and the number of 
people selling cooked food and drink in the city continued to grow during the 1970s. We see the 
word “mushrooming” appear for the first time during this period as a verb to describe the growth 
of food hawkers and vendors around the city, demonstrating the sense that officials and others had 
that these businesses were continually springing up all over Mombasa. The Medical Officer of 
Health complained in 1973 that “All sorts of unauthorised structures selling food under extremely 
unhygienic conditions could be seen mushrooming even [on] the main thoroughfare and open 
spaces of the town.”38 
 That such an industry not only continued, but grew, during the 1970s despite its increasing 
illegality is explicable through the political economy that Angote described, that workers needed 
food to work, and so at a certain level the state had no choice but to allow at least some of them to 
operate. However, also crucial was the reality that municipal authorities simply did not have the 
resources to enforce its prepared food and drink bylaws. The state not only struggled to fund 
sanitation-infrastructure projects in Mombasa, but also to fully staff the city’s health department. 
During the late-colonial period, 16 public-health officials monitored and enforced the city’s health 
codes, but by 1978 the municipality employed only 10. The growth in urban population made this 
deficit in personnel even more extreme. Considering that the 16 colonial-era health officials were 
																																																						
37 “Why not occupy these people more usefully?” Daily Nation 21 June, 1978 (McMillan). 
38 MOH-AR: Mombasa, 1973, and Social Services and Housing Department, Mombasa: Annual Report, 1975. 
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responsible for monitoring a much smaller city and even then failed to stop or even control illicit 
vending, as the population in Mombasa more than doubled to 340,000 by the end of the 1970s, it 
is unsurprising that food vendors and hawkers were able to operate throughout the city on a daily 
basis.39 
“To tackle the problem of selling food in the streets”: Cholera and Inequality 
 After the first cholera scare during 1971, the threat of an urban outbreak remained a concern 
for Mombasa’s officials during the following years. With each successive time the disease broke 
out in other parts of Kenya, Mombasa’s urban authorities sharped the administrative and 
operational structure for how to combat the disease in their city. Since cholera was mobile, officials 
would be too. In 1974, when cholera infections were reported in Nyanza Province in western 
Kenya, the Ministry of Health and the Department of Public Health and Social Services in 
Mombasa created three Mobile Surveillance Teams. Composed of a nurse and health assistant, 
these teams would inspect every reported diarrheal case in the city, administer anti-bacterial 
medications, and take a swab for lab testing. Officials also began to rethink the city through an 
ecological geography of infection. They identified Mombasa’s peri-urban neighborhoods, working 
class and with minimal state-provided infrastructure, as “those areas which because of the 
prevailing sanitary conditions and the migrant population therein were considered high risk areas 
of the Community to warrant extra precautions.”40 Health authorities, in effect, created an 
epidemiological map in which cholera came from the outside and saw as the city’s vulnerable 
points those neighborhoods where migrants came to live, the same neighborhood’s that urban 
authorities had failed to integrate into a comprehensive sanitation infrastructure. If cholera entered 
																																																						
39 MOH-AR: Mombasa, 1979 (UY/4/264), KNA-Nairobi. 
40 Public Health and Social Services, Mombasa: Annual Report, 1974, and U.K. Nathwani, Medical Officer of 
Health, to the Chairman and Members of the Education, Public Health and Social Services Committee, 8 January, 
1975 (UY/7/38), KNA-Nairobi. 
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Mombasa, according to this geographical rendering, the vendors and hawkers who sold prepared 
food and drink to these communities would become the primary vector that would then spread the 
disease to the rest of the city. 
 Until 1978, cholera was as much an idea as a reality for most people living in Mombasa. It 
was an idea that greatly affected the lives of vendors and hawkers, but the majority of the city’s 
residents were not greatly affected outside losing easy access to prepared food during cholera 
prevention schemes that had become increasingly commonplace during the 1970s. However, in 
1978, Mombasa experienced the first of what would be many subsequent outbreaks of cholera over 
the following decades. The epidemic started outside Kenya’s borders. During October 1977, 
people in the coastal district of Rufiji in Tanzania became infected with cholera, and it spread 
through the coastal region and north to Arusha, and across the channel to Zanzibar. In Tanzania, 
reports recall that over 3,000 people were killed by the disease during 1977 and early 1978.41 
Kenyan authorities were concerned that the infection might spread over the border and into their 
increasingly densely-populated cities. By March of 1978, people with diarrheal disease were being 
inspected, and it was believed that at least one person in Kwale, a rural area outside Mombasa, had 
died of cholera that they suspected had come from Tanzania. By April, the arrival of cholera in 
Mombasa had been confirmed.42 
 Cholera was certainly devastating to those who contracted it, but the disease also induced 
a crisis for vendors of prepared food and drink whether they caught it or not. In March, as a 
precautionary measure, the demolitions began. The Provincial Medical Officer of Health for the 
Coast, Dr. A.E.R. Fernandes, reported that “several unhygienic food kiosks in the port area have 
																																																						
41 “Dirty rag market is a ‘danger to life,’” Daily Nation 25 April, 1978 (McMillan). 
42 “Hospitals clear cholera suspects,” Daily Nation 17 March, 1978 (McMillan), and “New moves as cholera hits 
more at Coast,” Daily Nation 17 April, 1978 (McMillan). 
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been pulled down,” and added that “[t]his exercise will be carried out in all high risk areas,” and 
that “his office was coordinating with the local authorities to carry out the exercise.”43 By mid-
April, state-enforced closures of eateries throughout Mombasa started as cholera cases were 
confirmed inside the city. The Daily Nation reported that cholera “measures include the closing of 
mass food kiosks which do not have amply sanitary facilities,” as well as “[d]irty hotels 
[restaurants]” and “meat and cassava roasters.”44 
 Over the next two and a half months, state authorities enacted the most intense intervention 
into urban life that Mombasa’s residents had seen since the end of colonialism, and the city’s 
vendors and hawkers were among the central targets. The city’s three surveillance teams were 
expanded to ten. These teams of health officials were also able to hire casual laborers who would 
be in charge of demolitions, and they were to coordinate their efforts with the police if people did 
not abide by their orders. Mombasa residents who were not vendors or hawkers would have 
encountered these teams if they were among the thousands who were swabbed for testing after 
becoming sick with diarrheal disease, or if they attended an educational sanitation presentation.45 
For vendors and hawkers, their interactions with these roving teams most often resulted in the 
confiscation of their foodstuffs, an arrest and eventual prosecution, and, if they had one, the 
demolition of their structure.  
 From March to the end of June, 1978, vendors and hawkers experienced health officials, 
casual hired-laborers, and police who surveilled their neighborhoods looking for people violating 
the cholera campaign’s measures. During April, after clearing people out of the structures they had 
																																																						
43 “Hospitals clear cholera suspects,” Daily Nation.  
44 “New moves,” Daily Nation. 
45 Minutes of the Cholera Meeting, Mombasa (UY/12/710), KNA-Nairobi. The information on coordination with 
police and their employment of casual laborers, as well as information on their activities, is aggregated from daily 
minutes of the cholera meeting during May and June in the same file. 
	 230 
built to be their eateries, the authorities returned and their teams demolished them and broke and 
smashed cutlery and utensils so as to be “sure that no food is bring served in abandoned kiosks.”46 
By May, the cholera committee estimated that “90% of kiosks visited were closed in all the 
wards.”47 However, with people needing this work to survive, such state optimism was soon 
replaced with the realization that food vendors would do what they could to continue to operate by 
evading the cholera teams. On May 12, the Medical Officer of Health told the Daily Nation that 
“We know there are a number of kiosk dealers who do private business after making sure that 
council officers are not around, but we will catch them,” and, emphasizing the point, observed that 
“Some kiosk operators defied the order to close down,” and so “We now make sure we destroy 
whatever they have.”48  
As the campaign continued during late May and into June, authorities surveilled major 
work zones on the island and moved through the working-class and mostly migrant communities 
on the mainland where hawkers and vendors often did business. In Changamwe, Dr. Mutunga, part 
of the cholera committee, reported that they had “discovered a number of people selling tea and 
other foods,” and the team had “confiscated everything.” Nearby, in Chaani, officials found the 
“roasting of meat and fish” and “the culprits had their licenses taken away and everything they had 
confiscated.” In early June, “A tea hawker at Changamwe was got and taken to the police,” and 
the next day “The team started with the Likoni Ferry where they found people roasting maize and 
at Mama Ngina drive they caught a man who was roasting cassava and took him to Central Police 
where he will be charged.”49 The next day, they found more people selling food from structures, 
																																																						
46 Minutes of the Cholera Meeting, 29 April, 1978 (UY/12/710), KNA-Nairobi. 
47 Minutes of the Cholera Committee Meeting, 6 May, 1978 (UY/12/710), KNA-Nairobi. 
48 “180 fined for breaking cholera campaign laws,” Daily Nation (McMillan). 
49 Minutes of the Daily Cholera Meeting, 5 June, 1978 (UY/12/710), KNA-Nairobi, and Minutes of the Daily 
Cholera Meeting, 6 June, 1978 (UY/12/710), KNA-Nairobi. 
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and at a kiosk in Jomvu Kuu “Everything was to be confiscated and it will be demolished 
tomorrow,” and nearby they also needed to “arrange to demolish a kiosk structure near the new 
Airport.”50 
As June wore on, these arrests, prosecutions and demolitions continued apace without 
relief. David E.L. Angote, who above explained the necessity of food kiosks, also described a 
scene that had been playing out daily in Mombasa since March. Near where he worked in the 
industrial area of Mombasa island, he recalled that “On June 16 I noticed the brutality of Mombasa 
Municipal askari [police] in the execution of an ‘operation close-down kiosks’ in the name of 
cholera.” He observed that, “On that day, precisely at noon, the said askari invaded two vibandas 
[kiosks] opposite Magnum International and next to Express Handling Services Building. The 
askaris with their labourers moved in and uprooted the kiosks and used very bitter language during 
the operation.”51 Angote may very well have been describing the four people the cholera 
committee referenced the following day who, in that area, were caught “selling tea and maaragwe 
[beans]” and were then “arrested and taken to the Police Station.”52 
The actions of the state against these hawkers were not uniformly embraced by Mombasa’s 
urban residents. In the pages of the Daily Nation, Angote and others questioned the utility of 
dedicating such enormous financial resources of the state towards these measures while other 
development projects remained unfunded. Angote agreed with another reader who had written 
when he wondered why “the council is more ready to pay 20 labourers to uproot two kiosks rather 
than having the same number at the same rate of pay repair the worst roads [in Mombasa] I have 
ever seen in the republic,” and he also pushed the government to see to consequences of such raids 
																																																						
50 Minutes of the Daily Cholera Meeting, 7 June, 1978 (UY/12/710), KNA-Nairobi. 
51 “Why not occupy these people more usefully,” Daily Nation. For another critique of the Cholera Campaign, see 
Letter to the Editor: “Repair roads in Mombasa,” Daily Nation 14 June, 1978 (McMillan). 
52 Minutes of the Daily Cholera Meeting, 17 June, 1978 (UY/12/710), KNA-Nairobi. 
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in “the loss of income to kiosk proprietors” and “the loss of health and social justice to customers” 
who no longer had access to cheap food.”53 
Municipal and provincial authorities also had to the confront the sustained resistance of 
hawkers and vendors against these actions. That the cholera teams needed to engage in daily 
surveillance and raids tells us that people continued to take significant risks to keep working and 
earning income. This resistance came in a variety of forms. For some people, it manifested as 
simply continuing to operate each day, and evading authorities as best they could. Other people 
were more confrontational, as in early June when the cholera team was trying to stop maize roasters 
working outside the Coast Province General Hospital, and the hawkers “brought problem and 
Police assistance was sought.” Later in the month, a man was caught selling tea near a municipal 
market, but “refused to accompany the team to the police station” and so “The matter was reported 
to the Police for action.”54 
Vendors and hawkers also tried to directly engage and pressure municipal officials as they 
had done since the 1960s, but the reality of cholera actually being in Mombasa drastically 
diminished the political capital of public shaming. The evidence of vendors politically mobilizing 
as a group during 1978 is scarce, which itself is an indication of their declining influence. The one 
moment we have on record was an attempt in late June to convince state officials to drop the ban, 
a proposition that was promptly rejected.55 During 1971, when cholera had been merely an idea, a 
threat that caused anxiety, food vendors had been able to exert tremendous influence as a “small 
but vociferous community,” but the political ecology of cholera arriving in Mombasa had shifted 
the balance of power back towards health officials and the strict enforcement of sanitary laws and 
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preventative measures. Without formal access to the state, the resistance of vendors and hawkers 
became concentrated in the daily struggle to continue operating while evading cholera patrols.   
While “objectively” breaking the city’s laws, these vendors were also subject to the cholera 
campaign in ways made harsher because of their location in Mombasa’s racial and class structures. 
The city’s comestible culture for much of the twentieth century, and as it remains today, has been 
divided along class lines that have often also been racialized. “Restaurants,” contained inside 
municipally-approved buildings with kitchens, dining rooms and access to lavatories, were 
frequented only by those who could afford them, the middle and upper classes, which during the 
colonial period were white, Arab, South Asian and with a small number of Africans. While more 
Africans since independence have ascended into these higher classes, the divide remains and 
disproportionate numbers of whites, Arabs and South Asians are in the middle and upper classes. 
In Mombasa, those with financial resources are able to eat in restaurants when they chose, while 
the remainder and majority of the city eats out by purchasing food from hawkers and vendors. 
These classed and racialized patterns of consumption have also been reflected in the ownership of 
the city’s eateries. To afford the licensing and the rental or purchase price of an approved restaurant 
facility, one needs to certainly earn far more than the working poor do. However, since the earliest 
years of the twentieth century, many Mombasa residents have turned to food and drink vending 
and hawking as a way to earn income in a city that has most often offered few other viable 
employment possibilities. The inequalities of Mombasa’s social structure shaped the formation of 
the city’s eatery culture, and these same inequities inflected how people in the city differentially 
experienced cholera measures. 
While the Cholera Campaign represented an existential threat to vendors and hawkers, for 
restaurant and bar owners, it was more an inconvenience. People operating on Mombasa’s streets 
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faced arrest, prosecution and demolitions, but often the worst consequences for restaurant owners 
were cleaning up, making minor repairs, or a fine. Restaurants were closed temporarily if they had 
sanitation violations, but once these had been addressed they could reopen and operate thereafter. 
Owners of restaurants had the advantage that usually their establishments were inherently more 
sanitary according to the logic of the municipal bylaws. With their access to capital, restaurant 
proprietors were able to set up their businesses inside licensed buildings that had lavatories and 
running water, either by tank or plumbing. These were the most crucial conditions in the bylaws’ 
definition of what made an eatery sanitary, which in practice meant that all restaurants needed to 
do was follow basic rules and keep their space clean, and they could remain operational during the 
campaign. However, vendors and hawkers could not afford such facilities, and so instead of having 
their businesses in such buildings, they squatted on public and private land selling prepared food 
and drink, and often from unauthorized structures. The political economy of the city made this 
profession necessary because of the needed income it provided to these proprietors and because 
the working poor required the cheap food they sold. However, that same political economy through 
business licensing, alienated private and state property, and its processes of class formation also 
made it so these vendors and hawkers could not afford to conduct their businesses in a way that 
was legal. This had been the case during and since the colonial period, but the political ecology of 
cholera in urban Kenya only exacerbated the ways that class and race shaped peoples’ access to 
having a business legitimated by the state. 
Therefore, the city’s bylaws and the cholera campaign premised upon them were classed 
and racialized in such a way that restaurants were better situated to endure the 1978 “clean-up,” 
but structural prejudice also made it so that, when restaurants did break laws, the consequences 
they faced were less impactful. In late May, for example, two restaurants were found to be 
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operating despite closure orders. Chetna restaurant was advised that “It should close immediately 
otherwise Police will be brought in,” and the other restaurant was told that, unless it acquired a 
water-storage tank, the police would visit them as well.56 The key point, however, is that they were 
not immediately arrested, as so many vendors and hawkers were, and instead were provided a 
second chance. Later in mid-June, a surveillance team visited the Dockers Club where people had 
been roasting meat, which was a violation of cholera measures. Instead of being arrested, they 
were advised to cease their activities, which “they accepted and stopped,” and later the “Gulshan 
Hotel was warned to not roast meat.”57 The next day, two people in the working-class 
neighborhood of Likoni were “found roasting maize” and “were arrested and taken to [the] Police 
station” to be charged.58 
During June, one health official noted that “most of the hotels [restaurants] and bars have 
been very cooperative and the problem was with the food vendors.”59 This, in a sense, summarized 
the situation well, as restaurant owners had to do little to conform to the cholera measures and, 
even when they did not, faced limited if any consequences, while vendors and hawkers, to comply, 
had to completely stop their businesses and, without preparation, find a new way to generate 
income in a city with few opportunities. We should not be surprised that vendors and hawkers 
resisted and created a “problem” for urban authorities, as the cholera campaigns represented the 
potential end, at least for many months, of a way that they had devised to survive in this coastal 
city. 
The many proprietors of food and drink businesses in Mombasa continued to create a 
“problem” for the cholera teams, but their resolve did seem to waver over time as raid after raid 
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built incredible instability into their daily lives. By late June, it seems that the cholera team had 
substantially reduced the number of people still operating, noting that as the team surveilled the 
North Mainland area “mainly to check on hawkers” that they found “very few” and, returning to 
the same neighborhoods days later, observed that “There were no hawkers.”60 Reports of hawkers 
and vendors would continue to emerge, but their numbers were fewer.61 The cholera campaign, 
with its 10 teams of inspectors and paid laborers, and the support of the police, was a far more 
disruptive force than had been the understaffed and under-resourced municipal council of the past. 
Conclusion: The Political Ecology of Urban Struggle in Africa 
 For street-food vendors, the 1970s began with tremendous optimism as their businesses, if 
only in a limited way, had been recognized as legitimate by Mombasa’s government. The decade 
closed with the most concerted effort to that point to wipe them from the city’s landscape. The 
explanation for this lies in the political ecology of cholera, sanitation and informality in post-
colonial urban Africa, a set of conditions found throughout the continent during the 1970s that 
persist up to the present.  
The cholera that arrived in Kenya during the early 1970s and transformed this newly-
independent nation’s politics, El Tor, became endemic in the region and in other areas throughout 
the continent. While Africa had previously only experienced cholera through outbreaks that came 
from the outside, this new strain has been vying for a more permanent residence in African 
ecosystems. El Tor’s weakness has been its strength. The bacterium has far more asymptomatic 
cases than did its classic relative, and is also less deadly. While better for the people who contract 
it, this also means there have been a far greater proportion of survivors and asymptomatic carriers 
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to either spread the disease to new areas or to keep it active within communities where it is already 
present. During the seventh pandemic, Africa has turned from an outer periphery in the global 
ecosystem of cholera that was vulnerable to occasional epidemics, to now being the epicenter of 
the disease. Recent data indicates that, from 1995-2011, 95 percent of world-wide cholera 
infections occurred in Africa.62 Kenya has had outbreaks every decade since the 1970s, and most 
recently during 2009 when over 10,000 people contracted the disease.63 
This chapter has shown how the “struggle for the city” for these vendors and hawkers in 
Mombasa was economic and political, but also one in which politics and economics were 
inexplicable outside a changing global ecology.64 By 1978, as a result of cholera, vendors had lost 
much of the political capital in Kenya’s government that they had been building since 
independence, and were pushed from the city’s landscape with a force they had not experienced 
in the past. However, the broad contours of the urban political economy that had fostered the 
emergence of these businesses during the preceding eight decades had been little changed once the 
1978 cholera epidemic was contained. After cholera measures were relaxed, vendors rebuilt, and 
hawkers returned to the streets, providing cheap food to people who needed it, and earning income 
to support themselves and their families. Having become endemic in the region, cholera would 
remain both a specter and reality in the decades that followed, and so too would arrests, 




62 Echenberg, Africa in the Time of Cholera, 1-12. 
63 “Cholera Country Profile: Kenya,” World Health Organization: Global Task Force on Cholera Control. 29 April, 
2010.  
64 The phrase “struggle for the city” comes from the edited volume Struggle for the City: Migrant Labor, Capital, 
and the State in Urban Africa, edited by Frederick Cooper (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983). 
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Maps 
Map 5: Changamwe, c. 1960s 
 
Close up of Changamwe, mid-1960s, the growing peri-urban neighborhood west of Mombasa 
Island. Generally poor and working class, Changamwe was also a crucial node in the economic 
geography of Mombasa and Kenya, being the location of Moi International Airport and with the 
Mombasa-Nairobi highway running through it. Source: Harm J. de Blij, Mombasa: An African 







“GIVING A NEW LOOK TO PWANI”: BEAUTIFICATION, ELECTORAL POLITICS AND 





“Woe unto you if you are poor, ugly and, therefore, undesirable. The message is violently clear: 
Kenya’s urban centres are not for you.”1 
David Kakali, columnist for the Daily Nation, 26 January, 2002 
 
“Is beauty more important than livelihood?”2 
K.K. Wales, letter to the editor, Daily Nation, 29 January, 2002 
 
 
 By early January 2002, the operation seemed to be winding down. After more than a week 
of demolition crews moving through Mombasa island and the close mainland neighborhoods of 
Chamgamwe, Kisauni and Likoni, pulling down and bulldozing thousands of food, tea and other 
vendors’ kiosks, the “exercise” abated during a pre-planned visit by President Daniel arap Moi for 
New Year’s celebrations.3 The quiet lasted for more than a week thereafter until MP Shariff Nassir, 
representative of the Mvita constituency on Mombasa Island and leader of the demolitions, 
announced on January 11 that his operation would now resume once again. Rather than clouding 
his aims in euphemism, Nassir explicitly warned that the vendors and hawkers who continued to 
work in Mombasa “will have to reckon with Force Number Two, which will be more vicious than 
any other demolition they have seen before.”4 
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McMillan Library, Nairobi (hereafter McMillan). 
2 K.K. Wales, “Election link to kiosk destruction,” Daily Nation 29 January, 2002 (McMillan). 
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Nation. 
4 “Nassir’s new kiosks order,” Daily Nation 12 January, 2002, McMillan. 
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On January 13, “Force Number Two” materialized. At Makadara Gardens, a visible and 
centrally-located park just outside Old Town on Mombasa Island, a lorry carrying 30 state police 
officers, or askari, arrived “brandishing metal bars and rungus [clubs].” The askari moved from 
one kiosk to the next, looting the wares and other goods inside, and demolishing not only the 
structures, but also the furniture inside. To these vendors who had just had their investments 
destroyed, they looked on curiously and angrily at two kiosk restaurants that remained standing 
once the demolitions had finished. As their eateries were in ruins, vendors watched as business 
continued “as usual at the Coconut Café” and “patrons sat comfortably at Camel’s Joint,” the 
former owned by an assistant government minister and the latter by a Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) campaign officer. Nassir the MP denied accusations that the demolitions had been 
selective, and focused instead on how this was part of a broader project of aesthetic and economic 
modernization of Mombasa, telling reporters that “the place would be beautified and turned into a 
recreation resort.”5 
While these January 13 demolitions reinitiated Nassir’s “beautification” campaign in 
Mombasa, the true ferocity of “Force Number Two” became apparent the next day. During the 
early morning of January 14, 300 askari and youth militia moved on kiosks in Bombolulu, a 
working-class suburb north of Mombasa town. Arriving around 3 a.m., these demolition crews, 
many of whom were reported as being drunk, began dismantling kiosks and looting the valuables 
inside and, when bulldozers later flattened the area, they “cheered wildly.” As the light of day 
revealed the extent of the destruction, “more than 1,000 kiosks, business premises and bars built 
on the road reserve at Bombolulu” had been demolished.6 
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These kiosk owners, running restaurants, tea houses, bars and other comestible businesses, 
were not alone in experiencing the sharp, coercive and at times violent edge of how political 
liberalization was changing the practice of politics in Kenya during the 1990s and 2000s. However, 
as Daniel Branch and Jacqueline M. Klopp have separately argued, the issue was not that multi-
party democracy was incompatible with Kenyan society, as the autocratic Moi strategically 
claimed, but rather it was that the president’s regime encouraged and tacitly authorized violent 
political and ethnic cleansing in order to assure electoral victories for ruling-party candidates, and 
to generally give the impression that multi-partyism would destabilize a Kenya that only Moi could 
keep under control.7 While KANU elites were complicit in these violent ruptures, Branch argues 
that they were also rooted in decades-long, local struggles over land and what Jeremy Prestholdt 
has elsewhere called the “politics of the soil,” the competing claims over who in Kenya can assert 
indigeneity in particular regions and even over specific parcels of land. These were not, therefore, 
conflicts invented by elites, but KANU politicians did exacerbate and instrumentalize them in their 
attempts to retain power as political liberalization swept through Kenya.8 
These methods of politically-targeted ethnic cleansing took the form of intense 
interpersonal and communal violence, exemplified in the killings, assaults and intimidation in the 
Rift Valley before the 1992 election and then in the Likoni neighborhood of Mombasa in the lead-
up to the vote in 1997, but, as Klopp argues, KANU also repurposed the old administrative tactic 
of urban demolitions and attacks on the property of the poor as a new political strategy to drive 
supporters of opposition candidates out of Kenya’s cities.9 Klopp, across two related studies, 
																																																						
7 Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 195-215, 222-244, 
and Jacqueline M. Klopp, “Remembering the Destruction of Muoroto: Slum Demolitions, Land and 
Democratisation in Kenya,” African Studies 67, no. 3 (2008): 295-314. 
8 Branch, Kenya, throughout chapters six and seven, but especially pgs. 203-07, and Jeremy Prestholdt, “Politics of 
the Soil: Separatism, Autochthony and Decolonization at Kenya’s Coast,” Journal of African History 55, no. 2 
(2014): 1-22. 
9 Klopp, “Remembering the Destruction of Muoroto.” 
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demonstrates how these demolitions served the dual purpose of cleansing areas of potential 
opposition, while also clearing land that could then be doled out as patronage to “well-connected 
individuals and land-buying companies” in order to bind these elites and large businesses to the 
regime, thus buttressing Moi’s system of neo-patrimonial control. In response to this mass 
appropriation of squatter and public land that Kenyans criticized as “land grabbing mania,” Klopp 
argues there emerged a decentralized but vast resistance against it organized by “a cross-section 
of society from rural communities, pastoralists, and urban squatters to middle-class Nairobians.”10  
Klopp’s research into these urban conflicts dislodges debates about corruption from the 
arena of high politics, and shows the devastating effects that KANU’s machinations to stay in 
power had on the poor living in Kenya’s cities. While this chapter will build on her findings by 
placing the 2001-02 demolitions in Mombasa into this broader context, it will also show that her 
analytical framework of “land-grabbing” in Kenya as KANU politicians and their elite patrons set 
in opposition to the resistance of informal vendors, squatters and sympathetic sections of the 
middle-classes reduces to a binary what was a far more complex social field. Drawing on Antonio 
Gramsci, Jonathon Glassman has shown how subaltern “resistance” in highly-asymmetric power 
structures does not always manifest itself as the outright rejection of the oppressive society, but 
instead exploited people, with few other viable alternatives, have often appropriated and used the 
structures of that social system in order to advance their position within it.11 By the 1990s, the 
people selling prepared food and drink to Mombasa’s poor had experienced little respite from a 
																																																						
10 Ibid. and Jacquline M. Klopp, “Pilfering the Public: The Problem of Land Grabbing in Contemporary Kenya,” 
Africa Today 47, no. 1 (2000). For the quote, see page 18. 
11 Studying the forms of resistance on the nineteenth-century Swahili coast, Jonathon Glassman rejects a “class-
theoretical analysis” that would impose “false-consciousness” on the slaves and other dependent-groups who did not 
outright reject coastal society, but instead chose to further embed themselves in it in order to gain relative social 
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his Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856-1888 (Portsmouth, 
NH: Heinemann, 1996), 1-25. 
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state that had been trying to erase them from the city’s landscape since the 1950s. The increased 
political competition and desperation of both KANU and opposition parties to secure and 
consolidate constituencies during multi-partyism opened opportunities not only for “well-
connected individuals and land-buying companies,” but also for the poor whose votes suddenly 
mattered far more than they had. Mombasa’s street-food vendors and hawkers seized on this 
changing political climate, and engaged in their own form of “land-grabbing” from the late 1980s 
to the early 2000s by exchanging their political loyalty for unprecedented access to urban land, 
which in turn allowed them to gain some much needed stability in their livelihoods. 
However, Kenya’s social inequalities also crucially differentiated the experiences of these 
poor urban residents from those of elites within the political economy of land-grabbing in 1990s 
and 2000s Kenya, and requires that comparisons between them only be made when considering 
how power shaped these transactions. Elite land-grabbers expropriated land that had been 
controlled by squatters or gazetted for public use through a process of state-sponsored privatization 
that transferred ownership of these assets of the poor and the general public to a small, politically-
connected clique.12 The situation for Mombasa’s hawkers and vendors was both radically different 
and produced by the same political moment. These small-scale proprietors leveraged their support 
for councilors and MPs in exchange for licenses that granted them temporary occupation rights to 
public lands such as road reserves, parks and other open spaces. Many of these transactions were 
extra-legal, as officials in granting access were often operating beyond the authority of their 
docket, but, by bringing the police and other enforcement agents into the relationship through 
bribery, vendors’ land claims became legal in practice. Using this opportunity, prepared food and 
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drink proprietors built an unprecedented number of new small kiosk restaurants across Mombasa 
along roadsides, in parks and on whatever other open land they could. 
Faced with few other alternatives, Mombasa’s vendors and hawkers engaged in this 
tenuous form of land-grabbing as “resistance” against an urban political economy that otherwise 
did not present them with viable ways to earn a living in a city a rife within unemployment and 
low-wage jobs. However, despite increased legitimation during the 1980s and 1990s, this period 
also saw the perpetuation, augmentation and re-accommodation to changing political 
circumstances of the long-standing urban-planning notion that street-food vendors, the 
architectures of their structures, and the social webs their businesses created as being antithetical 
to urban modernity. Combining this discursive context with the tenuousness of their legality, this 
made vendors extremely vulnerable to the predations of elite land-grabbers who desired their plots 
and to politicians who came to view them as a threat to their electoral success. 
By late 2001, Shariff Nassir had much to be concerned about both his and his party’s 
electoral prospects in Mombasa, Kenya’s second largest city. Support for KANU and Nassir had 
been rapidly declining during the 1990s, and the 2002 election presented the real possibility that 
the regime would fall from power. Since the upcountry Africans who comprised the majority of 
informal vendors in Mombasa also happened to generally be opposition supporters, the more than 
half century of urban planning policy that had attempted to negate and then erase these people 
from Mombasa’s landscape provided him an opportunity. Using demolitions in the name of 
“beautification” and economic development, Mombasa’s urban past provided Nassir with the 




Land and Legitimation in Late Twentieth-Century Mombasa 
 During the final decade and a half of the twentieth century, the vendors and hawkers selling 
prepared food and drink to Mombasa’s working classes achieved a hitherto unprecedented level 
of stability in their working lives through increased access to licenses and urban land on which to 
conduct their businesses. During the 1980s, the increasing inflow of migrants from rural areas to 
Mombasa, combined with the economic declines of decade, meant that the unemployment and 
underemployment problems that had wracked Mombasa since the 1930s only worsened.13 As 
much as Kenya was an authoritarian, one-party state under Moi and KANU, government officials 
still felt a certain obligation to pay attention to the needs of everyday Kenyans (wananchi), if only 
to maintain social stability through patrimonial control. Much scholarly attention has been focused 
on the ways in which many authoritarian states in postcolonial Africa have maintained power 
through drawing economic and other political elites into dependency relationships with the ruling 
regime, but they also needed to assuage, at least to a certain extent, the lower-earning majority in 
order to keep the country functioning.14 While during the 1980s the unemployment problem on its 
own pressured politicians to reconsider their administration of informality, the combination of this 
economic situation with multi-partyism during the 1990s only increased the need for urban 
officials to soften their approach towards people operating businesses on Mombasa’s streets. With 
growing competition for votes, politicians much more directly needed the support not only of 
powerful elites, but also of the wananchi. Within these shifting economic, demographic and 
political contexts, street-food vendors were able to forge chains of dependency and obligation with 
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both municipal and national officials, exchanging political loyalty for access to licenses and urban 
land to conduct their businesses. 
 Aggregated statistical evidence demonstrates how these transformations in Kenya’s 
political economy remade urban landscapes, as the number of street-food vendors increased 
dramatically in Mombasa and other cities in the country. During the 1980s and 1990s, with a 
general economic slump exacerbated by structural-adjustment policies, job growth in the waged 
“formal” sector could not keep pace with the country’s rapid rural to urban migration, and 
presented a potential unemployment crisis in Kenya. As a result, employment in the “informal” 
economy grew dramatically not only in gross terms, but also as a share of the labor market during 
this period, and working-class eateries were among the most popular sectors in which people 
started businesses.15 While formal wage employment was stagnant during a period of rapid growth 
in the size of Kenya’s urban workforce, the informal sector underwent a period of “spectacular” 
expansion. According to government statistics, in 1979, 121,600 people worked in informal 
industries in Kenya’s cities. By 1994, that number had grown to just under 1.8 million.16 In effect, 
informality was a buffer against a potentially catastrophic unemployment crisis. The authoritarian 
government was neither unaware of the political instability that such an unemployment situation 
could produce, nor of the role of informality in assuaging it. The 1995 Kenya government 
Economic Survey noted that the period from 1991-1994 was one of “serious contraction of 
employment in the formal or modern sector, and the informal sector has definitely played a vital 
role in absorbing surplus labor.” Recognizing this, the state “has promoted the sector as a major 
source of employment and income” in a variety of ways including “allocating or setting aside land 
																																																						
15 Economic Survey (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1980), 54-60, Economic Survey (Nairobi: Central Bureau 
of Statistics, 1985), Economic Survey (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1990), 42-47, and Economic Survey 
(Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995), 48-59. 
16 Economic Survey (1980), 54, and Economic Survey (1995), 58. 
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for carrying out informal activities … and sensitizing the public on the significance of the sector 
to the Kenyan economy.”17 As we will see, the report seems to have exaggerated the extent to 
which the government was working to create a more positive perception of informality, but it was 
certainly correct in identifying a tangible increase in vendors’ access to urban land as a result of 
the late-twentieth century economic crisis that Kenya and many other African states were 
enduring. 
With this changing political framework that provided informal vendors more official 
legitimation, working-class restaurants proliferated throughout Mombasa during the 1980s and 
1990s.18 For the city’s poorer residents, this meant an incredible expansion of access to prepared 
food, as these cheaply-priced eateries could be found all around the city on road reserves, 
sidewalks, in parks and even inside peoples’ homes. Their menus reflected the cosmopolitan nature 
of Mombasa, with the cuisines of both the Swahili coast and upcountry areas widely available. 
Surveying their options, hungry residents of Mombasa looking for an inexpensive breakfast in the 
city could without too much trouble find a tea cart or a larger street-food vendor offering highly-
sugary and milky tea (chai) with either stewed chickpeas (mbaazi) or a spiced doughnut (mahamri) 
to complement it. For lunch and dinner, food kiosks (kibanda, [s.] vibanda [pl.]) were cooking and 
serving Swahili dishes such as the rice-based plates of pilau and biriyani, or for a more modest 
meal simple white rice or chapatti was also available. Common upcountry menu items included 
the staple porridge ugali (also called sima) with a meat or vegetable relish, as well as the Central 
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Province staple githeri, a mixture of maize and beans.19 These vendors provided variety, but also 
food that the poor could afford, as larger restaurants with their high overhead were financially out 
of reach for most of the city’s residents. A man who worked as a food vendor during this period 
remembered that prices in restaurants were “gharama (expensive)” and even double those in 
vibanda for the same food, citing that one could get chapatti on the streets for 30 cents, while in a 
restaurant it would cost 60.20 
 The easing of intensive prosecutions and mass demolitions during the 1980s and 1990s not 
only expanded prepared food options throughout Mombasa for the poorer classes, but it also 
opened the potential of stability for the people working in the industry. Women such as Josephe 
(no last name given), a migrant who arrived in Mombasa in 1980 from the Rift Valley, could even 
accumulate small amounts of capital and establish themselves as notable people in their urban 
communities. Josephe, after working in a larger restaurant as a waitress during the early 1980s, 
opened a kibanda next to United Touring Company, an area highly trafficked by bus travelers and 
the drivers who worked in transport who needed meals before leaving or upon arrival. With 
multiple cooks and wait-staff under her employ, she described business during this period as 
“Supa, kabisa [amazing],” and observed that “at the end of the day it was huge money.”21 Like 
Josephe, Mohamed Amir Temu, who had migrated to Mombasa from Moshi in Tanzania during 
the late 1960s and worked as a repair man (fundi) and in construction until the 1980s, also started 
a kibanda in 1985. Compared to his time a construction laborer, Temu remembered that to cook 
“sima, to cook chapatti,” this work was “rahisi [easy].” Financially, there was no comparison. 
Even as a headman working construction, a rare job indeed, he recalls that the pay might be 1000 
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conducted in Mombasa from November 2014 to January 2015, especially those with  
20 Mohamed Amir Temu, Interview, Mombasa, Kenya, 5 December 2014. 
21 Josephe. Interview, Mombasa, Kenya, 26 November 2014. 
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Kshs. a day, while running a kiosk on good day could net 1500 and he could eat all his own meals 
at work rather than buying them from someone else. While Temu had problems with municipal-
council harassment during the 1980s, they were not so much that he could not operate, and he 
recalls a general easing of administrative pressure during the 1990s.22 
 Aligning with these two anecdotal experiences, the archival record also suggests that this 
process of legitimation for vendors began during the mid-1980s, and accelerated during the 1990s. 
Officials both local and national began to build patrimonial bonds between themselves and street 
traders, securing much needed mutual, though still asymmetrical, support. These relations were 
becoming visible on Mombasa’s landscape as, upon surveying the working-class neighborhood of 
Mwembe Tayari in 1984, a provincial official noted that several kiosks in the area were operating 
“with full license from the council.” However, these relations of patrimonial dependency were not 
made between a cohesive “state” and a unified block of “vendors,” but instead were embedded in 
complex, overlapping and at times competing political, governing and social networks. In 1988, 
providing evidence both of the emergence of these dependencies as well as that not all officials 
agreed about how they were to be constituted, the Mayor of Mombasa complained at a meeting in 
his office that the removal of kiosks was made more difficult because of “interference by 
Politicians.” However, perhaps not wanting the nature of these relationships to become too public, 
the Mayor at the same meeting ordered his Municipal Inspector to not investigate them, but instead 
to allow the mayor himself to inquire, and that the inspector “should go on doing his job and leave 
the politicians to the politicians.”23   
 The experience of James Kubai’s effort to have his tea-kiosk business legitimated during 
the 1980s is illustrative of the overlapping and at times conflicting webs of dependency and 
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obligation that shaped the emergence of subaltern “land-grabbing” in Mombasa. Kubai, who had 
operated his kiosk since 1978, tried to build a relationship with the coast’s provincial 
administration, a nationally-appointed political entity that had jurisdiction over certain parts of 
Mombasa, especially land. By 1984, Kubai had won the sympathies of key figures in the provincial 
office, who seemed inclined to grant him access to land through the Commissioner of Lands, also 
a federal body. However, simultaneously, other vendors in Mwembe Tayari where he operated 
had been building their own relations of support with locally-elected municipal officers, who had 
granted them licensing and land without going through federal procedures. Part of the land they 
were issued included that on which Kubai’s kiosk was located. The municipal government allotted 
this land to Shariff Tata in order so that he could expand his restaurant in a transaction arranged 
by the Municipal Health Inspector, William Karisa, who then also sent an eviction notice to Kubai.  
In response, Kubai drew on his federal supporters, and B.R. Maina, the Provincial Planning 
Officer, wrote to the Town Clerk of the municipal government, and asked that he refrain from 
“pulling down [Kubai’s] kiosk.” While the archive does not provide evidence for the eventual 
conclusion of this dispute, it does suggest that by the mid-1980s vendors in Mombasa were not 
only trying to legitimate their squatting rights through creating patrimonial relations, but that in so 
doing they also had to negotiate the complex and often competing layers of Kenya’s bureaucracy 
in order to find officials to back their claims.24 
 However, as can be seen in Kubai’s experience, the actual formal procedures for who 
controlled Mombasa’s urban land were in dispute even between officials, not simply the vendors. 
The municipal council unambiguously controlled business licensing in the city during the mid-
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1980s, and so could decide who was a licensed vendor and who was not, but the administration of 
the city’s public lands was more controversial. The exact contours of how Kenyan urban land was 
administered during the 1980s and 1990s are hard to figure in precise terms, and not simply 
because the documentation is inconsistent, but more fundamentally because so many of the 
transactions were at least in part illicit. That the municipal health inspector’s office had authorized 
Shariff Tata to expand his restaurant onto the neighboring plot was well beyond its authority. We 
can sketch the outlines of the general legal framework for how vendors and hawkers were 
administered, but the ways in which these laws actually functioned can only be figured by studying 
how they were applied and enforced in practice. 
 Much of the land in Mombasa came under federal, not local, jurisdiction, and this was 
especially true in those areas where food vendors wanted to build kiosks. The many road reserves, 
sidewalks and spaces left open for public projects on the side of roadways were specially 
administered by the federal Kenyan Highway Authority.25 However, while Highway Authorities 
claimed legal control, the federal Commissioner of Lands, as Kubai understood and tried to work 
through, also claimed jurisdiction, and was responsible for issuing the Temporary Occupation 
Licenses (TOL) that granted traders temporary permission to squat on public land.26  
However, while much of the administrative power over land was federal, municipal 
authorities in Mombasa in practice also built patrimonial relationships through granting access to 
land. City offices often issued licenses to vendors, and did not require them to also apply for federal 
TOL. Since the laws were enforced by local police and inspectors, bribery schemes emerged in 
which vendors paid, in effect, a tax to municipal authorities for permission to occupy their land, 
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and were left alone to conduct their business, and at times even those without licenses could pay a 
bribe to avoid prosecution.27 In 1987, the federal government tried to reassert its control over land 
allocation in Mombasa by appropriating municipal authority over licensing by requesting that “all 
future kiosk applicants channel their requests” through the federal Divisional Development 
Committee “for approval” before being issued. However, two years later, the evidence suggests 
that municipal authorities had not disinvested themselves from the political patronage and business 
of land allocation, as a representative for the District Commissioner, a federal official, felt it 
necessary to restate that “the [municipal] Town Clerk is advised to instruct his officers to desist 
from issuing licenses for any hawking or kiosk business on government land without prior 
consultation of this officer.”28 At stake in these intra-governmental conflicts was the question of 
which agencies and officials would control urban land, and thus the patronage networks stemming 
from it. During this period, the Mombasa Municipal Council was, a former vendor told me, “like 
a business.”29 Therefore, legitimation, for the operators of roadside eateries, quite literally came at 
a price, but the cost nonetheless provided them with protection from wanton prosecutions and the 
potential demolition of their restaurants, allowing them to achieve a stability rare for people 
working in their industry during the second-half of the twentieth century. 
Despite this easing of prosecutions and demolitions, though, vendors and hawkers still 
lived and worked in an ideological context in which, as had been true since the institutionalization 
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of a particular form of urban development during the late-colonial period, their working-class 
eateries were seen to be antithetical to a particular, elite vision of “modern” Mombasa. Many of 
the ideological contents for this vision of Mombasa were generated under colonialism, and then 
carried through decolonization and indigenized into a certain classed and racialized view of post-
colonial urban modernity. As during colonialism, the people in independent Mombasa who sold 
cheap food to the city’s poor were rendered as bio-medically insanitary, aesthetically “ugly,” and 
their status as squatters called into question the normalization of land as alienated, private 
property.30 Within this definition of African urbanism, the economic and bureaucratic informality 
of street-food vendors needed to be excised from the social body of the city, or at least segregated 
within it, in order for Mombasa to achieve its modernity. Even with the increased recognition and 
legitimation during the 1980s and 1990s, these ideas of modernization and development remained, 
and continued to inflect the relationship between vendors and the state. 
For example, the ways in which this process of legitimation intersected with ideas about 
modernization and development reinvigorated an older, spatial segregation of the city with roots 
in the colonial period. As street-food kiosks were increasingly allowed to operate in the city, a new 
urban geography of where it was permissible for them to conduct business emerged 
simultaneously. While the colonial state for the most part never legalized street-food vendors, their 
laws were most vigorously enforced in those areas in which African bodies were not supposed to 
be present except as laborers, especially the Central Business District (CBD). During the 1980s 
and 1990s, the spaces where vendors were allowed to build their businesses mapped rather closely 
onto those same areas where the colonial state had also tacitly and reluctantly permitted them, in 
African neighborhoods and around large areas of working-class employment. Outside these 
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spaces, vendors and the hawkers during the colonial period risked prosecution, as they were barred 
from operating inside elite geographies, such as the major streets in the CBD on Mombasa Island, 
near government buildings, hospitals, upper-class neighborhoods such as Kizingo, the former 
segregated white quarter that was now also filled with wealthy Kenyans, and in areas frequented 
by tourists. 
To enact this vision of Mombasa’s urbanism, authorities began by the end of the 1980s to 
formalize the new, controlled comestible geography of the city that it had been haphazardly already 
enforcing. In 1989, the municipal council met to discuss the “Proper Planning of Kiosks in 
Mombasa,” and the chairman of the meeting emphasized the need to manage and confine vendors 
and hawkers in order to cultivate their desired urban aesthetic, claiming that if informality “is not 
checked, the town will soon lose its good image.” If they acted, the chairman noted, they could 
“make the town look clean and retain its planned face.”31 As they drew borders, places like Airport 
Road in the mainland neighborhood of Changamwe, where vendors were visible to arriving 
tourists, officials resolved that kiosks should “be removed and placed in the open area of Chaani-
Port Reitz Road,” a more secluded street that ran parallel to the road from the airport. However, 
vendors already situated in spaces that had long been raced and classed in certain ways were less 
vulnerable to relocation campaigns. Food and tea kiosks in Likoni, Mwembe Tayari and other parts 
of Changamwe, all lower-income and predominantly African neighborhoods, were mostly allowed 
to remain as they were. Additionally, the industrial neighborhood of Shimanzi on the island was 
already rendered as a working-class space, was infrequently seen by elites and tourists, and the 
committee, not insignificantly, also understood the practical impossibility of removing the vendors 
and hawkers who served meals to workers in perhaps the largest area of employment in the city. 
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They commented that the street-food vendors in the “labour compound provide an essential service 
to the 98% [of] industrial workers who eat there,” as “the industries do not have canteens to feed 
the workers.”32 
When thinking about how they wanted to shape the urban geography of Mombasa, 
government and private elites were also concerned that kiosks were potential vectors for the social 
“contamination” of racialized and classed space. For example, in March of 1985, B.R. Maina, the 
same Provincial Planning Officer who had advocated for Kubai and his tea stand in working-class 
Mwembe Tayari, rejected the idea of kiosks being put up near government buildings, as such 
businesses “would expose the surrounding Government officers and properties to people of 
unknown character who would patronise the kiosk.”33 More generally, the 1980s and 1990s saw 
the creation of a new set of classed ideas in which officials, upper- and middle-class Kenyans and 
other elites came to associate vendors and hawkers with criminality, as in 1987 when a police 
official wrote to Mombasa’s DC that “kiosks have also proved to be the hide out of criminals at 
night. These are the places where criminals waylay the public” and that “Many people have been 
killed because of these black sports.”34 Foreign officials made the interpretative leap as well that 
vendors were to be equated with criminality, as R.G.C. Diamond, the Honorary British Consular 
Representative, wrote to the Mombasa Town Clerk to complain that the kiosks around their 
compound “attract gangsters. We have had several breakings and visitors have been mugged whilst 
entering and leaving our premises.”35 Meanwhile, middle-class Mombasa residents also were 
suspicious, and accused vendors of drawing in criminality and unknown people to their 
																																																						
32 Kiosks in Mombasa working sub-committee, no date, c. March 1989 (CQ/20/55), KNA-Coast. 
33 B.R. Maina, Provincial Planning Officer, Coast Province to the District Land Officer, Mombasa District, 21 
March 1985 (CQ/20/55), KNA-Coast. 
34 James B.O. Mblero [check], for Officer Commanding Police Division to the DC, Mombasa 24 November 1987 
(CQ/20/55), KNA-Coast.  
35 R.G.C. Diamond, Honorary British Consular Representative to the Town Clerk, Mombasa 16 May, 1996 
(CQ/18/10), KNA-Coast. 
	 256 
neighborhoods. As just one example, the residents of an apartment in Ganjoni on Mombasa Island 
wrote the Mayor, Najib Balala, in 1998 to complain that “these Kiosks … bring in strange people 
loitering in the area without knowing their intentions.”36 Pushing back against this discursive 
current that criminalized their very presence, some vendors tried to assure the government that 
they were simply industrious wananchi trying to earn income, as kiosk owner C.N. Mukwana did 
in 1999 when explaining that “we are only innocent and obedient citizens of this town who are just 
struggling for our survival and with no security threat whatsoever.”37 
However, as much as Mombasa’s government and private elites wanted to spatially 
segment the city’s social classes, the reality was that people selling prepared food and drink were 
highly incentivized to operate in the very areas in which they had been barred. The quarters from 
which the government tried to exclude food kiosks were in fact spaces of high employment, heavily 
trafficked by low-wage earners looking for affordable meals while at work. With this potential 
customer base, vendors and hawkers continued to risk prosecutions and demolitions by operating 
in these restricted areas. In 1986, the District Public Health Officer wrote to the Town Clerk about 
the growing presence of hawkers around the Coast Provincial General Hospital, a large employer 
in the town, and complained that despite promises, “To date not action has been taken and more 
structures are coming up every day.”38 Thinking about the CBD, Mombasa Mayor A.S. Mwindani 
complained in August of 1989 that “there are too many hawkers within the Town,” and especially 
on “the main streets such as Digo Road, Moi Avenue, Jomo Kenyatta Avenue and Haile Sellasie 
Road.” Concerned here about the aesthetic implication of such classed bodies and their structures 
in the center of town, Mayor Mwindani complained that the “hawkers were an eye-sore” and 
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37 C.N. Mukwana, kiosk owner to the Town Clerk, Mombasa, 31 May 1999 (CQ/18/10), KNA-Coast. 
38 J.C.M. Azenga, District Public Health Officer to the Town Clerk, Mombasa 16 September 1986 (CQ/20/55), 
KNA-Coast. 
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ordered that they “must be removed immediately,” as during August many “V.I.P.’s will be 
visiting … especially during the ASK [Agricultural Show of Kenya].” The mayor requested that 
after their removal “sub-inspectors should then intensify their patrols and ensure that [vendors and 
hawkers] … do not return.”39 
In addition to elite anxieties about social and aesthetic contamination, street-food vendors 
were also made vulnerable during this period through the very nature of their legitimation. In the 
arrangements between officials and kiosk operators, the vendors were provided access to road 
reserves, parks and other public spaces to conduct their business, but it was always explicitly 
awarded on a temporary basis, with no (legally-recognized) long-term rights to their plots. Without 
the capital to purchase or rent such land, street-food operators accepted these terms as an 
improvement on the alternative of explicit illegality. Consequently, while urban land was being 
increasingly distributed to poor vendors as patronage during this period, these arrangements could 
be easily rescinded, and thus had economic precarity built into them. In August 1984, vendor 
Sammy Wanbua was made to understand this when he received a license to conduct his business 
on federal land, but under the caveat that he could stay only “till such time that it is required for 
permanent development.”40 The inherent ephemeralness of vendors’ occupation rights was also 
reflected in the restrictions placed on the architecture of their kiosks, as they could only construct 
and operate their eateries from temporary, moveable structures. J.K. Lulu was informed of such 
parameters to his legitimacy when he was issued a license for occupation rights in an unused car 
park, and was instructed that his “Kiosk must be of a moveable nature,” like the “coca-cola type 
or such similar structure. No permanent or semi-permanent structure is allowed,” and “You will 
																																																						
39 A.S. Mwindani, Mayor of Mombasa to the Municipal Inspector, Mombasa. 17 August 1989 (CQ/20/55), KNA-
Coast.  
40 J.R. Njenga, Commissioner of Lands to Sammy Wanbua, 7 August, 1984 (CQ/20/55), KNA-Coast.    
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be required to vacate the site on notice from this office, and in such event, leave the place in a tidy 
condition.”41 
This precarious temporariness was present whether one acquired a TOL or not. As the 
occupation license could be revoked at any time, it was not particularly better than simply, as many 
people did, registering for a trading license from the council, and then paying bribery fees to local 
authorities to be granted access to land. Whichever option vendors chose, they were vulnerable to 
eviction from either public development projects or elite land grabs. During the later 1980s, 
Sylvester Obanda Ogwell tried to establish a kiosk, and chose to deal mostly with the local 
administration. Ogwell received a municipal trading license, received permission “to build a kiosk 
on the ground of the former United Sports Club,” and connected to water and power through the 
Ministry of Water and Kenya Power and Lighting. He decorated the inside “with beautiful wall 
painting and put a wooden floor, glass windows and high roof,” and furnished it with “round tables, 
table tennis birds in cages and an aquarium.” All this was paid for with a K.Shs. 64,000 co-
operative bank loan. After being in operation for less than three months, in March of 1987, a 
representative of the District Commissioner arrived at Ogwell’s kiosk with two police officers, 
informing him that his business needed to close immediately and then confiscated his municipally-
issued trading license. The next day, the same district official returned and informed Ogwell that 
in a week his kiosk would be demolished because “the government … sold this land to a rich 
person who wants to build flats,” finding out later that the “rich person” was a company called 
Cresent Investment.42 
																																																						
41 D.T.A. Owino, District Land Officer to J.K. Lulu, 3 December 1987 (CQ/20/55), KNA-Coast. 
42 Sylvester Obanda Ogwell to the Mombasa Lands Officer, Coast Province, 2 March 1988 (CQ/20/55), KNA-Coast, 
and Sylvester Obanda Ogwell to the Provincial State Council 4 March 1988 (CQ/20/55), KNA-Coast. 
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In technical bureaucratic terms, Ogwell had erred. He had been licensed by the municipal 
government to operate as a trader, but had only received undocumented “permission” to occupy 
the land, and had not been granted a TOL by federal land authorities. We do not know whether 
Ogwell was aware that he needed an occupation license from federal authorities, but what is clear 
is that he followed the same procedure that many of his vendor contemporaries did to gain a level 
of official legitimacy. He was issued a trading license from the municipal government, tacitly 
granted permission to occupy public land and, we cannot know this for sure as it would not have 
been prudent to admit this in writing, but he almost certainly paid regular bribes as well to 
municipal inspectors and/or police officers to retain his hold on the plot. However, as the tea-kiosk 
operator Kubai experienced back in 1984, federal and municipal authorities often competed over 
the same parcels of urban land, and vendors often found themselves caught in between. Crucially, 
and revealingly, it was federal, not municipal, officials that were threatening to oust Ogwell from 
the land he occupied and demolish the kiosk he had built on it. In discussing the issue with the 
state attorney, the federally-appointed District Commissioner, K.P.A. Langat, rejected outright any 
notion that Ogwell had rights to the land, asserting that “the basis of any occupation or 
development of land is ownership,” and that “Ownership is either freehold, leasehold or temporary 
occupation license.” Reasserting his office’s control over the land, the DC argued that “Connecting 
water, electricity and council licenses does not give anybody any right to occupy government land 
illegally.”43 According to the laws of Kenya in 1988, DC Langat was actually quite correct, but 
even if Ogwell had acquired a Temporary Occupation License, his situation would not have been 
improved when threatened with eviction. As per procedure, if the state wanted to “develop” the 
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plot, they would have had full legal authority to evict Ogwell or any other vendor occupying the 
land.  
 By the middle of the 1990s, despite the continuing challenges that street-food vendors 
faced, they took what advantages they could from the overall easement in prosecutions and 
demolitions, and they lined Mombasa’s streets, parks and other open spaces with tea stands, grills 
for roasting meat and cereals, and larger eateries selling whole meals. As this dramatic 
transformation of the city’s landscape became increasingly evident to both municipal and federal 
officials, the government faced increasing pressure to curtail and manage street-food vendors, as 
well as other hawkers and kiosks. For example, by the mid-1990s, informal traders had reclaimed 
their space on Airport Road in Changamwe where the state had tried to expel them in the late 
1980s. As the state tried to clear them again, they did so with the idea of creating a controlled 
transport corridor in which tourists arriving in Mombasa would see only a tailored vision of urban 
Kenya that did not include the architecture of economic informality.44 In order to socially engineer 
this corridor, in December of 1996, municipal authorities announced that they would demolish 
kiosks on Airport Road under the stated purpose that they needed to do infrastructural 
improvements and grading work.45 While it certainly is possible the road was due for repairs, the 
Town Clerk J. Mutuma Angaine, in a letter the following month, also revealed that an additional 
motivation was “to urgently remove the unsightly kiosks along the Airport Road—
Changamwe/Port Reitz area.” Wanting to change the aesthetic experience for arriving tourists, the 
Town Clerk wrote “that to create a more favourable first impression by visitors from abroad to 
																																																						
44 For a broader examination of the tourism image that independent Kenya officials were trying to create to market 
the country to potential tourists, see my “‘Safariland’: Tourism, Development and the Marketing of Kenya in the 
Post-Colonial World,” currently under review. 
45 A.M. Kijivu, Chief Municipal Inspector, Town Clerk, Mombasa to the Kiosk Owners along Airport Road, 19 
December 1996 (CQ/18/10), KNA-Coast. 
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Kenya and Mombasa, it is important to carry out the above exercise [the removals] and 
immediately follow it up with planting of flowers and ornamental trees where the kiosks now 
stand.”46 
The exact dates are not evident in the archival record, but what is clear is that, sometime in 
1997 or perhaps 1998, demolitions crews moved in and evicted the vendors from Airport Road 
and demolished their kiosks. However, like in the CBD and elsewhere, in a city wracked by 
poverty and unemployment, the incentive for vendors to return to a place highly-trafficked with 
potential customers was too hard to resist. During October of 1998, the District Commissioner, 
P.P. Olando, expressed his disappointment to the Town Clerk “that kiosks and hawkers are once 
more encroaching slowly … on Airport Road after we demolished all the Kiosks and removed all 
the hawkers there!” Observing its retransformation, he lamented: “It will be unfortunate if the road 
will revert to the old ugly state it was earlier.”47 
Outside the restricted areas, the state also worked to reclaim land in the middle- and 
working-class housing estates that had been built for government employees during late-colonial 
and post-colonial urban development campaigns. Filled with open areas in an otherwise densely-
populated city, these estates had proved a popular source of land that federal authorities doled out 
to kiosk operators, and where people with municipal trading licenses could squat. In April of 1996, 
the Provincial Works Officer noted that “so many kiosks and other structures have been 
mushrooming all [over] government pool housing premises,” and requested the assistance of the 
district commissioner “in the demolition of all undesirable [kiosks].”48 Similar to the idea to plant 
flowers and trees on Airport Road to create barriers to would-be kiosk builders, federal authorities 
																																																						
46 J. Mutuma Angaine, Town Clerk, Mombasa to the Provincial Commissioner, Coast Province, 21 January 1997 
(CQ/18/10), KNA-Coast. 
47 P.P. Olando, DC, MD to the TC, Mombasa, 14 October, 1998 (CQ/18/10), KNA-Coast. 
48 Provincial Works Officer, Coast to the DC, MD 2 April 1996 (CQ/18/10), KNA-Coast. 
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also proposed walling off and landscaping these estates to block outside access to them and to also 
inculcate a new appreciation of a particular form of urban aesthetics. Jesse Gitou, the Chief Public 
Health Officer, advised Iwiya wa Mpare, the Provincial Works Officer, “to erect a permanent 
perimeter fence around all Government Quarters and proceed to demolish all the unauthorised 
structures and kiosks within your compounds,” and to employ gardeners and repair crews to clear 
“overgrowth of vegetation and grass” and fix “existing building and drainage systems.” If 
completed, Gituo predicted that “Such activities aimed at [the] cleanliness of the estate will instill 
discipline and discourage the erection of kiosks and unauthorised structures.” He then combined 
his aesthetic and security desires by suggesting they plant kai-apple or bougainvillea trees along 
the chain-link fence, both of which flower but also have sharp, piercing thorns.49 
However, vendors used their political connections, as well as the media, to push back 
against these and other state efforts to clear them from the land they had claimed. As Mpare, the 
Provincial Works Officer, worked to implement the request of the municipal Chief Public Health 
Inspector to clear and secure government housing estates, he had to consider the political 
implications of evicting vendors who had been licensed by the council. He reported to the Town 
Clerk, with what appears to have been some annoyance, that “it was found that most of the illegal 
structures have been licensed by your council.” Nonetheless, sensitive to the political 
ramifications, Mpare also conceded that “To forestall any undue publicity associated with 
demolitions we are working on a formula to allow some of the kiosk operators to continue running 
their businesses on a temporary basis.”50 National officials were also concerned to cultivate 
relations with vendors, as in 1998 when newly-elected Member of Parliament Emmanuel Maitha 
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of Kisauni, who won the mostly African and working-class neighborhood after defecting from 
KANU and joining the Democratic Party (DP), wrote directly to the Mombasa District DC to 
complain that it had come to his “notice that the group of 100 hawkers” in his constituency, who 
“have been doing business for many years to support their families,” have recently been 
“constantly harassed by the area chief/The council askaris [police].” He suggested the DC “look 
into their case” and that he do his “best to assist.”51 The next year, the vendors operating in the 
government-staff housing quarters in Tononoka, part of Bondeni Ward, a small neighborhood on 
the northwest portion of Mombasa Island, were told by the area chief that their kiosks were 
schedule for demolition. In response, more than 150 vendors of a diverse variety went to their 
municipal councilor, Mohamed Abdalla, and with his support they successfully petitioned the 
District Commissioner who rescinded the demolition order.52 
Therefore, even with this renewed emphasis at the end of the twentieth century on 
controlling vendors and their place in the city, the relations that these small-scale proprietors had 
been cultivating with government officials since the 1980s served as a buttress that guarded them, 
at least some of the time, from being forced off the land on which they made their living. In October 
of 1999, the new Provincial Works Officer, J.Z. Ruwa, still wanted to demolish most of the kiosks 
in the housing estate in Tononoka, but, after speaking with the elected officials of the municipal 
council, he realized that “It would be impossible to get rid of all the kiosks at once due to its 
political implications.”53 However, not all elected politicians in the region were so bounded to 
these vendors and hawkers, most of whom were migrants from upcountry. In fact, as KANU’s 
control of Kenyan politics began to precipitously slip during the first years of the twentieth century, 
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the ruling party came to see the “upcountry” constituencies as a liability. For long-time KANU 
MP Shariff Nassir, who represented the Mvita constituency on Mombasa Island, the prospect of 
demolishing kiosks did not present a political vulnerability, as it did for so many, but instead 
represented a political opportunity. 
Demolishing Democracy: Elections, Violence and Vendors in Mombasa, 2001-02 
 By the early 2000s, KANU’s control over Kenyan politics was threatened in a way 
unprecedented since the party’s rivalry with and eventual defeat of Oginga Odinga’s Kenya 
African Democratic Union (KADU) during the 1960s, which ushered in KANU’s dominance first 
under President Jomo Kenyatta and then Daniel arap Moi. The cracks first appeared during the 
1990s when Moi reintroduced multiparty democracy, after being pressured to do so by internal 
resistance and the international community that leveraged aid payments. However, with political 
infrastructural advantages and violent tactics, KANU survived the 1992 and 1997 elections with 
continued control of the presidency and parliament. However, with Moi having reached his term 
limits and the growing popularity of multiple opposition parties, both the highest executive office 
and the legislature were at risk for a party that had to varying degrees run Kenya’s government 
since independence.54 
 KANU’s power was slipping at the national level, and so too was it under threat in 
Mombasa. The personage and symbol of the party in Mombasa and the wider coast since the early 
1970s had been Nassir, the Mvita MP, who during the Moi years was labeled derisively by critics 
as one of the president’s “ethnic kingpins,” regional-ethnic rulers meant to enact centralized 
authority on the local-level throughout Kenya. Nassir held a seat in parliament from the 1970s 
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until the end of Moi’s rule, and had a portfolio with numerous influential posts in the federal 
government. Though an adept politician who often chose his words carefully, he also occasionally 
verbalized the authoritarianism at the root of his and his party’s politics, as when, while installing 
the mlolongo electoral reforms during the 1980s, a queuing voting system criticized for being 
undemocratic, he informed the Kenyan public that the changes were happening “wapende, 
wasipende,” translated roughly as “whether they like it or not.”55  
While Nassir and KANU maintained control during the 1990s, their popularity nationally 
and in Mombasa was on the wane as competitive elections presented Kenyans with the opportunity 
for change. This became clear during the first multi-party election in 1992 when, despite spending 
far more on his campaign than did opposition candidate Omar Mwinyi of Forum for the 
Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-Kenya), Nassir was only able to win his Mvita seat by 
around 100 votes, even with the reported ballot-stuffing. Not only Nassir, but KANU more 
generally was faltering in Mombasa during the elections of 1992, as the party’s rising young star, 
Emmanuel Maitha, lost the Kisanui seat to Rashid Mzee from FORD-Kenya. KANU’s brewing 
political crisis in Mombasa was not simply a result of the reintroduction of multi-party elections, 
but also, as journalist Wycliffe Muga argues, of the creation of a more unified, multi-ethnic 
“upcountry” voting bloc, a change from the 1980s when voting patterns fell more along ethnic 
lines.56 Voters who fell within the “upcountry” constituency, those being primarily migrants and 
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the descents of migrants from regions such as Ukambani, Central Province and Nyanza, tended to 
favor opposition candidates and, since as a bloc they represented the majority of Mombasa’s 
residents, this did not bode well for KANU’s political future in Kenya’s second city. The ruling 
party’s problems only mounted during the 1997 election. While KANU had won the Changamwe 
seat in 1992, the party lost it in 1997 and during the same election, while Maitha managed to defeat 
Mzee for the Kisauni MP position during their second contest, KANU actually lost the seat because 
Maitha had defected to the DP.57 Nassir himself retained his parliamentary seat once again in the 
1997 election, but KANU, the party he represented, was losing its hold on Mombasa. 
 As the 2002 election approached, the situation appeared to be worsening for KANU and 
its coastal stalwart. For the election contest for the Mvita seat, Nassir faced a charismatic and 
popular opposition candidate in Najib Balala, Mombasa’s former mayor who it seemed could win 
Muslim voters and was also reportedly popular within upcountry constituencies. Ironically, Nassir 
had actually in part created his vulnerability to the upcountry constituency, as KANU had 
gerrymandered Mvita district during the 1980s to protect him from intra-party rivals by excising 
the predominantly Muslim Old Town from the district once the neighborhood had grown 
“disillusioned” with him after more than a decade in power. Following the re-districting, most 
Mvita voters were from Tononoka and Majengo, diverse middle- and working-class 
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neighborhoods in Mombasa that had sizable Muslim populations, but also were also home to 
generations of migrants and their descendants. This gerrymandering had fixed a short-term 
problem during the 1980s, but also exposed Nassir to the changes in voting demographics during 
the 1990s.58 Rather than accept these changing political realities, Nassir chose to instead try to 
socially engineer through coercion and violence an electoral map more favorable to him and 
KANU. 
Mombasa’s twentieth-century history of urban planning and modernization schemes that 
had rendered informality and in particular street-food as antithetical to what made the city modern, 
sanitary and aesthetically pleasing provided Nassir with ample resources from which to justify the 
actions he determined necessary to survive Kenya’s period of political liberalization. Migrant 
Africans and their descendants, the political constituency that threatened Nassir, worked in a 
variety of industries in early twentieth-first-century Mombasa, but they were especially prominent 
in the business of selling prepared food to the city’s working classes. Coastal communities were 
involved too, especially Swahili and Arabs in tea and coffee hawking, as well as Mijikenda in all 
aspects of the industry, but more generally “upcountry” Africans comprised the majority of the 
people working as street-food vendors in the city.59 While urban demolitions of such comestible 
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businesses and other informal structures have always been political, KANU repurposed them as a 
strategy, Jacqueline Klopp as argued,  to socially-engineer new electoral maps in Kenyan cities by 
using property destruction of poor opposition supporters as a way to cleanse them from districts in 
which ruling-party candidates were under threat. In the early 2000s, therefore, neither urban 
demolitions nor using them as a form of political cleansing were novel in Kenya. However, the 
scale of destruction to which Nassir demonstrated he would resort was indeed a new and disastrous 
experience for Kenya’s urban poor. 
 The timing of the 2002 election was opportune for Nassir. As described in the previous 
section, after more than a decade of expansion and reduced harassment and demolitions of food-
kiosk operators, the city had been tightening its controls, and shown an increased wiliness to evict 
hawkers and demolish their structures. By 2001, hawkers and vendors in Mombasa faced yet 
another “beautification” campaign. However, the state’s aims were limited, and placed within the 
logic of urban administration that had been developing since the mid-1980s. The state accepted 
the reality and necessity of street-food in the city, but it needed to exist outside protected zones, 
especially the Central Business District (CBD). Combining aesthetics and sanitation, the Council 
justified its new initiative against hawkers and vendors with its 2001 motto to create a “Cleaner 
and Heathier Environment for all,” which in practice meant segregating vendors and their poor 
and working-class customers into tightly-controlled urban geographies. The statements of most 
public officials demonstrate that they were aware of the need to placate vendor and hawker 
constituencies, but while still wanting to refashion and segregate the city along their preferred 
urban-planning designs. This tension was evidence when the Acting Town Clerk noted that “All 
over the town you will see residents busy either selling or purchasing items. This is good and 
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encouraged. However, the sellers have gone beyond acceptable area,” and “jammed the main 
streets.” As a consequence, “The Council has for the last one year appealed to hawkers to move 
out of Digo Road, Moi Avenue and Kenyatta Avenue [all streets in the center of the CBD],” and, 
as they remain, “The Council has resolved that it will invoke its by-laws to remove all hawkers on 
those three main roads.”60 
 However, for the vendors who had staked claims to land on these roads, moving was not 
as simple as the state wanted to believe it to be. The governing authorities often framed 
“relocation” as the solution to the “hawker problem,” but this did not take into consideration how 
a food kiosk’s location within the city’s urban geography was determinative of its economic 
viability. The people who continued to operate street-food stalls on major urban avenues despite 
drawing official ire were not irrationally obstinate, but were trying to maximize the small returns 
they could with their street-food eateries. With the town center full of shops, schools, universities, 
government buildings and, not incidentally, many other non-food hawkers and vendors needing 
meals, this meant that thousands of low-income people required food for purchase in these areas 
on a daily basis. Tapping into this market was crucial, and vendors’ customers needed them as 
well. For people surviving on low-incomes in Mombasa, without street-food, the city’s town center 
was effectively a “food desert.” Many fully-licensed and rent-paying restaurants existed on the 
island, but these were beyond the means of most who either lived on or came to the island for the 
day. For example, students from the nearby Mombasa Technical Institute, a short walk from a 
street-food market on Tom Mboya Avenue, observed that “95% of the college population are 
commuters hence they cannot travel back home for lunch therefore they take their meals at the 
Kiosks.” Moreover, in their particular section of Mombasa, no other restaurants were available, 
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but, as they pointed out, even if they were “mere students cannot afford their rates.” The closest 
restaurant, Cool Breeze Inn, was “too expensive,” as “The least cost per meal in Cool Breeze Inn 
[was] … Kshs 120/= compared to the Kiosks which one can take a meal at a price of less than 
Kshs. 20/=.” In addition to price, kiosks provided flexible opening hours that allowed students, 
and certainly others, to “take their meals at any time of the day,” and they “appreciate their services 
since they are clean and decent.”61 
 Despite the geographical advantages that vendors and their customers found in these 
informal market spaces, the state remained determined to reconfigure the landscape of urban street 
food and, by the end of February 2001, these plans were becoming more ambitious. The Municipal 
Council had initially limited its aim to clearing the main roads, but later in the month, as federal 
authorities became involved through the Ministry of Roads and Public Works, they decided to try 
to clear all hawkers off the city’s road reserves. During the 1980s and 1990s, despite demolitions 
continuing, they were usually localized to specific streets and neighborhoods, such as the multiple 
attempts to create the tourism corridor in Changamwe. However, this new directive was a 
qualitatively more structural endeavor, moving towards clearing all hawkers squatting on and 
around roads throughout the city.62 
 The authorities were cautious, though, only publishing notices in local newspapers 
requesting that all such hawkers operating on road reserves vacate the area. However, people 
ignored the order, and for months little happened.63 By June 2001, though, new District 
Commissioner Reuben Rotich had taken over the project, and tried to enact it within a “relocation” 
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framework, which was more politically palatable than demolitions with no alternative sites. 
Vendors and hawkers, as Rotich saw it, had to leave the road reserves, but they would be relocated 
to state-controlled markets, a policy framework with antecedents to the original urban-planning 
schemes of the colonial state during the 1950s and early 1960s.64 During June and July, district 
officers from Island, Changamwe, Kisauni and Likoni divisions sent in proposed sites for new 
hawking grounds, but over the following months no evidence indicates that any substantive work 
was done to prepare these areas for vendors.65 
 After months of inactivity, the plan to remove all hawkers and vendors from the city’s road 
reserves was taken up again in December 2001 by Mombasa’s federal administration. Provincial 
authorities ordered the city’s chiefs to issue quit notices in their areas to all the people operating 
kiosks, and that they be required to demolish and remove their own structures. After issuing two 
orders, and with vendors continuing to ignore them, the provincial and district authorities held a 
meeting on December 21 that was attended by the Town Clerk, municipal councilors, people from 
the tourism industry, representatives of the army and police and many others. Nassir was in the 
room, and the meeting was led by DC Rotich. We do not have minutes for the meeting, and our 
best source is a somewhat compromised description of it by attorneys who represented Nassir and 
the Municipal Council when they were later sued. However, with all those competing interests in 
the room, some with their power derived from the support of upcountry constituencies, it seems 
likely there were dissenting opinions in a meeting described as “stormy” by a reporter from the 
Daily Nation.  Nonetheless, whatever the arguments and disagreements, with Nassir and Rotich in 
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control, the meeting concluded with the resolution “that illegal structures (read, structures erected 
on road reserves) be removed” from Mombasa.66 
 On December 23, privately-hired crews guarded by the police began to move through 
Mombasa and started demolishing kiosks on road reserves. While Nassir had remained in the 
background during the planning phase, allowing Rotich to chair the final meeting, he quickly 
became the public face of the demolitions. Provincial officials and the mayor refused to comment 
about the operation, but Nassir followed the demolition crews in a limousine, monitoring their 
activities. With kiosks being ripped apart, their debris littered across Mombasa’s roads, some of 
them burning with black smoke filling the city’s air and “as hired men continued to terrorize 
hawkers on the streets,” officials from opposition parties quickly erupted in protest against the 
demolitions and KANU. Luyai Liyali, Kennedy Muthini and Aaron Mutele, three municipal 
councilors from the Social Democratic Party (SDP) who represented predominantly “upcountry” 
African, working-class constituencies, proclaimed that “the demolitions were not authorised by 
the council,” and demanded that the MP Nassir and DC Rotich “explain their position and clear 
the air over who is in charge of this town – the council or the government.” These advocates for 
hawkers and vendors were joined by an odd ally, representatives and supporters of the tourism 
industry, as it seems that, whatever their view may have been on removing hawkers from Airport 
Road or other public areas, they were nonetheless dismayed that the extremity of this operation 
would damage the image of Kenya. One observed that “This looks like Mombasa is in the throes 
of a civil war,” though while also identifying the political nature of the demolitions, noting that it 
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“could not escape the accusation that they were targeting upcountry people who owned most of 
the demolished businesses.”67 
 The next day, a group of people whose kiosks had been demolished mobilized, and 
employed a tactic vendors had long used to assert their right to the city. Over 200 vendors marched 
on Mombasa’s Town Hall to confront city authorities and demand an end to the demolitions, and 
they were joined in solidarity by Councilor Liyali from the opposition SDP who had the day before 
criticized the legality of the demolitions. At Town Hall, Liyali asked, “Bwana Town Clerk, can 
you tell these people why Mr Nassir is demolishing their kiosks without the council’s authority?” 
Opposition Councilor Mohamed Bashir, from the National Democratic Party and representing the 
Port Reitz constituency, part of the wider northern suburb region that included Changamwe and 
Chaani, was also with the protesters, and he too engaged in a “bitter exchange” with the town 
clerk. Sensing a lack of control over the situation, the town clerk negotiated with Liyali for a little 
time so the municipal government could discuss the situation, retreating back into the offices. 
However, instead of meeting with other councilors, he spoke with police officials in his office, and 
then 45 minutes later a group of 50 paid youth militia arrived with rungu (clubs) and “stormed the 
Town Hall, pounced on the unsuspecting hawkers and kiosk owners before flushing them out of 
the Town Clerk’s office corridors,” and “a number” of the protesters were “seriously injured.” 
Once outside the building, kiosk owners began to throw stones at the youth militia, but then fled 
as the National Youth Service showed up to control the area.68 
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 The nature of the evidence does not allow us to definitively know if the municipal council 
may have initially, through some of its members, at least tacitly signed off on the operation at the 
December 21 meeting, but what does seem clear is that city officials had lost control of the 
administration of their city to a KANU-led federal administration. The Daily Nation, in its editorial 
the day after the attack on the hawkers at Town Hall, characterized the organization of the 
operation as one in which Nassir “has personally supervised the demolitions,” while “The 
Mombasa Municipal Council has been reduced to a by-stander in the whole exercise,” and that 
“The Mombasa police and the provincial administration have provided back-up for Mr Nassir’s 
forces.” Nassir, reminding the city of the power he still had, warned those who may consider 
questioning the legality of his actions that “anyone who dares think of suing him should first reckon 
with the fact that he holds the exalted office of Ministry in the Kenyan Government and that his 
lawyer is the attorney general.”69 
 However, while faced with the destruction of their property and even physical violence, 
vendors and hawkers nonetheless continued to protest the demolitions, and they were supported 
by their government advocates. Councilor Liyali, recovering from his injuries after being attacked 
at Town Hall, was becoming increasingly radicalized during the campaign, and argued that “The 
demolition of kiosks in Mombasa was tantamount to a declaration of war against the poor by the 
government” and “asked all the kiosk owners and hawkers whose property was either destroyed, 
looted or set ablaze to arm themselves and fight back.”70 The next day, whether responding to 
Liyali’s call or acting of their own initiative, hawkers and vendors in Changamwe engaged in their 
largest form of organized resistance to that point, strategically protesting in way that was both 
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visible and costly to the Kenyan government. Though Changamwe was generally poor and 
working-class, tremendous amounts of capital still circulated through it, even if such wealth rarely 
stayed in the community. The home of the airport, tourists and the foreign exchange they brought 
to Kenya had to traverse Changamwe in order to travel by air and, in addition, the Nairobi-
Mombasa road that cut through the neighborhood was the major automotive transport artery 
through which commodities entered and left the country via the Mombasa port. With such a 
valuable transport corridor in their community, vendors and hawkers made use of the visibility it 
would bring to their struggle.71 As demolition crews arrived to knock down more kiosks on 
December 26, vendors were busy pulling debris and tires into the streets. After building barricades 
and then setting the tires on fire within them, they had succeeded in temporarily shutting down 
major parts of two of the most important sectors of the Kenyan economy: tourism and commodity 
transport. The Changamwe protesters then banded up, were even joined by their MP, Rhamadhan 
Kajembe, and went to stop the demolition crews. As the protesters approached demolition crews 
at work near the Akamba bus stop, Kajembe took to the offensive and “threw himself in front of 
the bulldozer.”72 
 Following this confrontation, the scale and the intensity of the protests and the state’s 
reaction quickly escalated. At the Akamba Craft kiosks on Airport Road, an important and visible 
space for Kamba curio carvers, protesters tried to physically stop the demolition crews, and the 
police officers guarding the operation opened fire. After the police shot their guns, people in the 
area turned to looting in what seems clearly to have had class undertones within the trading 
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community, as they targeted shops inside licensed buildings and reportedly were “accusing their 
owners of being behind their predicament.” The protesters then failed in their attempt to burn down 
a gasoline station, but were able to immobilize a firetruck that had been sent to put out the fires on 
their barricades. At one point, the protesters actually found Nassir who then had to be “rescued by 
police after his convoy was set upon by small-scale traders armed with stones and other weapons.” 
During all this, the roads shut down, and “Holiday makers were forced back to their hotels, unable 
to take their flights,” as “a queue of vans carrying tourists and other passengers [formed] on both 
side of the flashpoint,” though some were eventually allowed through. By the end of the day, the 
authorities reported that one person had died, but people from the community claimed more deaths 
had occurred.73 
 These Changamwe protests would prove to be the most intense during the period of 
demolitions, but vendors also used other tactics to push back. Some used the court system, as many 
hawkers had been doing since at least the 1990s.74 On December 27, despite Nassir’s threats about 
his connections to the attorney general, a group of vendors filed a lawsuit against him claiming 
that he did not have the legal authority to conduct the demolitions. Other vendors used visibility 
as a way to pressure officials, as with the hundreds of people whose kiosks had been destroyed 
and who then came together and set up a temporary camp and market on Mama Ngina Drive, a 
popular island location on cliff-buffs where people spent leisure time socializing. In defiance of 
the authorities, they started to again “cook and sell food in the open” and, with nowhere else to go, 
“They vowed not to move until the government allocated them an alternative site.”75 
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 Nassir, meanwhile, on the same day he was sued held a press conference in which he tried 
to defend and justify his actions. Situating his actions within an urban planning and development 
framework, as well as drawing on more recent elite anxieties about criminality, Nassir argued that 
Mombasa “must be kept clean … to attract more tourists and investors,” and urged that “Those 
against the move should now go around the town and see the difference.” He continued “that 
although kiosks were originally meant to help poor people earn a living, they had been misused as 
they have been turned into outlets for chang’aa [illicit liquor] and drugs.”76  Nassir made these 
ideas his own, and put them to use for his as well as his party’s specific political ends. However, 
the preceding decades in which these informal businesses had been marked as something to be 
excised from the urban landscape, as antithetical to what would make Mombasa “modern,” and as 
vectors for criminality, had provided Nassir with a diverse arsenal of justifications for his 
demolition campaign. 
 After this initial burst of coercive, administrative violence, the demolitions subsided during 
the last days of December. Nassir was briefly taken ill and went to the hospital, and President Moi 
was scheduled to arrive for a New Year’s Celebration in Mombasa.77 As scholars have noted, 
Moi’s was a decentralized authoritarianism in that he preferred for his “ethnic kingpins” to carry 
out central directives in their communities, which allowed the Nairobi government to maintain 
plausible deniability. Local rulers carried out acts of bribery, coercion and violence, and Moi 
shielded them from prosecution, keeping him a safe distance from the daily administration of his 
repressive regime in the country’s provinces.78 These demolitions in Mombasa were no different, 
and by the politics of Moi’s Kenya it would have been “unseemly” for him to have been in the city 
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with these demolitions occurring. As a consequence, we have no direct evidence as to whether 
Moi explicitly or tacitly called for the demolition program, but he also made no concerted effort 
to stop them while he was in town, and they recommenced soon after he left. Less than two weeks 
into January, with Nassir out of the hospital and Moi safely out of town, authorities again sent out 
additional quit notices to hawkers and vendors in Mombasa.79 
 These demolitions had and would continue to shatter, crack and splinter not only the wood 
and corrugated iron that composed the materiality of city’s kiosks, but also the social and economic 
relationships that had been built between street-food vendors and their customers. Among the 
many vendors with an impending demolition date were those operating on Tom Mboya Avenue, 
the same ones who served students at Mombasa’s polytechnic college. Warned that the eateries 
would be pulled down on January 12, 2002, the students who frequented them wrote the Provincial 
Commissioner, and explained how the demolitions would destroy the dense networks of credit 
between vendors and customers that allowed the industry to function. They explained how many 
students deposit their money with a vendor at the beginning of a school term, which many had 
already done, and pointed out that, if the food stalls were to be destroyed, “the Kiosk owners may 
not be in position of refunding the money,” leaving already money-strapped students in a more 
difficult situation. Moreover, such debt relations were often reversed, with vendors extending 
credit to trusted and known customers who needed it and, with many students away from Mombasa 
for break, food sellers would “suffer losses as they have not recovered the credit offered.”80 For 
food-kiosk owners, the threat of eviction from their physical location also meant not only losing 
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the structure of their business, but also the potential loss of their connection to social networks of 
credit and debt in which they had outlaid money to customers who they afterward may not be able 
to find. Conversely, during the demolitions, many of Mombasa’s poor residents may have lost the 
money they had deposited with particular food vendors who they may not have been able to find 
after their kiosks were destroyed. 
 Nonetheless, despite such pleas, the demolitions began again on January 13. As detailed in 
the introduction to this chapter, crews destroyed kiosks in Makadara Park, just on the edge of Old 
Town on Mombasa Island, and then the following day engaged in one of the largest demolitions 
of the operation, tearing down over 1,000 kiosks in Bombolulu on the mainland, north of the island. 
Over the next month, the demolitions continued, unabated. The crews went into new 
neighborhoods, and swept back over old ones to be sure all the kiosks had been destroyed. While 
in previous and smaller-scale demolitions during the 1980s and 1990s, kiosks that fed the city’s 
working classes were usually spared, if only because of their functional necessity, but no such 
concessions were issued by Nassir. Railway authorities, one of the city’s largest employers, had 
long since allowed vendors to operate a food court near their facilities so their workers could have 
food while on shift, but in mid-January the police “descended on a cluster of kiosks near the 
Railway Station,” while around the same time 80 kiosks were destroyed in the nearby industrial 
neighborhood, Shimanzi, and an additional 200 trading structures were flattened by the port.81 
During the same week, the operation also focused on finishing the clearing of highly-visible 
spaces, as around 20 kiosks were destroyed on centrally-located Haile Salassie Road, and the areas 
around government buildings were cleared out too, as “they demolished food kiosks near the 
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Mombasa Law courts, Customs department and Mbaraki police lines.”82 Nassir’s operatives spent 
some time off the island as well, moving through the peri-urban area of Likoni to the south, 
demolishing around 500 kiosks and other structures.83 
 By the final week of January and into the first of February, the crews had mostly finished 
demolishing kiosks on Mombasa island, and so intensified their focused on the peri-urban suburbs 
on the northern and western parts of the mainland. The northern mainland area was a starkly 
divided space, as the eastern coastal side was filled with elite tourism hotels and upper-class 
residential space, while the western portion was the home to large communities of the city’s poor 
and working-classes. However, food vendors operated not only in the workingclass parts of the 
north mainland, but also in its elite areas because hotel workers and people working in upper-class 
homes also needed food-for-purchase during their shifts. Therefore, during the final week of 
January, approximately 800 kiosks were pulled down in the working-class, and mostly migrant, 
neighborhoods of Kisauni, including in the sub-locations of Bombolulu, Vok, Kengeleni and 
Kongowea, but crews also conducted smaller sweeps and demolished structures near the hotels in 
the elite, north-mainland enclave of Nyali, including around Reef and Kenol.84 The next week, the 
operation turned to mainland west, a working-class space further from the tourist beaches and golf 
courses, but while also being home to the airport. As we have seen, in the effort to create a tourism 
corridor, this area endured some of the most intense demolitions during the relative calm of the 
1990s, but those operations were usually tightly-focused on Airport Road and the other connectors 
on which tourists would drive. However, Nassir’s vision was more totalizing. Despite the protests 
of late December, over only a matter of days in early February, demolition crews destroyed 
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approximately 1,250 kiosks in the neighborhoods of Changamwe, Msikiti Nuru, Kisumu Ndogo, 
Wanyani, Magongo, Chaani and Birikani.85 
 Within these aggregates of thousands of kiosks being demolished between December 2001 
and February 2002, there were also just as many individual stories of hardship wrought by this 
destruction. When pulling down a kiosk, authorities were often not only denying the proprietor 
their income, but were also threatening the stability of the lives of the many dependents vendors 
often had. One such person was Letty Grace Aluoch, who started a street-food kiosk on Mombasa 
Island in 1997 and, like many others, does not appear to have had a federal TOL, but was licensed 
by the Municipal Council. During her time as a food vendor, she transgressed the boundary of 
where it was officially permissible to operate, setting up in the government quarter, but, lasting for 
nearly six years, she was able to maintain her foothold in that contested space and sold workday 
meals to the employees of the Provincial Commissioner’s office, the Law Courts, the Municipal 
Council and even the State-House police officers. However, in January 2002, along with thousands 
of others in Mombasa, her kiosk was demolished, which likely would have happened even if she 
had a TOL. Before the demolition, the money she earned from her business had to be stretched to 
provide for herself and six dependents, and had to cover expenses ranging from “medication, 
school fees, uniforms, book[s], food, clothing and shelter.” With such a household economy, she 
certainly struggled before the demolition, but she descended into crisis after losing her business. 
Without money for rent, she was evicted from her apartment, and was made homeless along with 
her four and her deceased sister’s two children. Once the owner of a restaurant, after the 
demolition, hunger became part of her family’s daily existence, surviving only on the occasional 
generosity of her old neighbors, who would “at times … give us a sufuria [pot] of porridge.” With 
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few other options, on January 30 she wrote the very authorities who had taken her livelihood, 
asking for another opportunity to work as a vendor and, in the meantime, needing to survive day-
to-day, “if you could assist us with food for the time being and also if you could request any church 
to give us shelter.”86 Aluoch’s kiosk, and with it her livelihood, was only one of the many 
thousands that were destroyed from December 2001 to February 2002. 
 These demolitions and the destruction of the material, social and economic infrastructures 
of Mombasa’s poor sparked fierce debate in the city and Kenya more widely. A question of 
fundamental importance, both then and now, remains: why did this occur? Nassir himself 
vociferously denied that the operation had any connection to the approaching 2002 national 
elections, or that he was specifically targeting upcountry communities to drive them from the city’s 
electoral rolls, but many commentators saw this destruction of the property of the poor as just the 
latest episode of a familiar KANU tactic. Only days into the demolitions, Daily Nation columnist 
John Mbaria wrote that Nassir was “afraid for his political survival” with the election only months 
away and, “So, what to do? Chase the upcountry folk away.”87 When challenged by reporters about 
the political motivations behind his operation, Nassir pushed back and “denied that the demolitions 
were selective and said all kiosks next to roads would go,” and added that “Even a kiosk belonging 
to my nephew was demolished along Digo Road. So this talk of selective demolition is all 
nonsense.”88 However, whether his nephew’s kiosk was demolished, for which there is no 
corroborating evidence other than Nassir’s word, what is clear is that the crews tended to avoid 
kiosks that were owned by party officials and that, demographically, the majority of kiosks were 
																																																						
86 Letty Grace Aluoch to DC, MD, 30 January 2002 (CQ/18/18/), KNA-Coast. 
87 John Mbaria, “Why kiosks had to go,” Daily Nation, 27 December 2001, McMillan. 
88 “Kiosks: Nassir sued,” Daily Nation, 28 December 2001, McMillan. 
	 283 
owned and run by upcountry people.89 So, selective or not, this was still a campaign aimed 
primarily at upcountry communities and, despite Nassir’s denials, questions persisted. Robert 
Odual, also writing for the Daily Nation, reported on December 31 that “speculation abounds of a 
wider political plot,” in particular since “demolitions were largely focused on Mombasa’s major 
thoroughfares including Moi, Kenyatta, Haile Selassie avenues, large chunks of which fall within 
Mr Nassir’s Mvita constituency,” and since voter registration was only a month away, people 
“cannot help but discern a scheme similar to the 1997 violence in Likoni mainly directed at 
upcountry communities.”90 
 For the opposition, the nature of the demolitions was clear. As Moi celebrated New Year’s 
Day in Mombasa, Musikari Kombo, an MP from FORD-Kenya, explicitly politicized the 
operation, and put his party behind the vendors and hawkers. He wrote in a Daily Nation letter to 
the editor that “We, in Ford-Kenya are shocked that a government that is supposedly for the good 
of the people, is turning against them.” Kombo defended the “hawkers in Mombasa and elsewhere 
in the country” who were “law-abiding Kenyans whose only crime is to try to make an honest 
living in a hostile economic environment created by a corrupt and inefficient Kanu regime.” Not 
mincing words, he concluded by linking such actions as the kiosk demolitions to the violent 
politics that it undergirded and produced, arguing that “Kenyans should say no to clashes, and to 
a regime that thrives on tribal cleansing and economic genocide.”91 As these criticisms were aimed 
not only at Nassir but KANU more broadly, we need to also see how this was a project of political 
cleansing designed to help not only the Mvita MP, but also his party. During January and February, 
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as the demolitions had mostly moved well outside Nassir’s district and into Changamwe and 
Kisauni, the sweeps were targeting constituencies who had swept KANU from power in previous 
elections.  
For Nassir, these demolitions also served a double purpose, both removing opposition 
voters, while at the same time potentially gaining him additional ones within his core 
constituencies. This was because, as much as Nassir was intensely criticized, many others were 
overjoyed with the operation. In particular, for more conservative sections of Mombasa’s society, 
upcountry communities and their new migratory cultural institutions such as street-food kiosks 
that they had created represented part of a more general sense that coastal society was on the 
decline through a diminishment and a tainting of its past “glories.” These views cannot be easily 
separated from a longer racial history in which Swahili and Arab communities on the East African 
coast have often constructed coastal, Muslim urbanity as “civilization” (ustaarabu) and people 
from upcountry (watu wa bara) as embodying “barbarism” (ushenzi), a set of ideas that had in the 
past justified the enslavement of Africans from the interior, especially during the nineteenth 
century.92 As proclamations of support for Nassir emerged, one particular sub-genre evoked a 
sense of opportunity that these demolitions could reinstall Mombasa back into the hands of its 
“original” inhabitants. One such letter was titled in a way that most observers would have 
understood its implicit message, written as it was from the “True Citizens of Mombas ‘Town’” to 
Nassir. Not only did its authors claim their coastal authenticity, but they also made reference to an 
older Mombasa, referring to it as “Mombas,” a common appellation for the city from the nineteenth 
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century. They wanted to “out right congratulate [Nassir]” for his “determination and courage 
shown by demolishing the ILLEGAL kiosks and other structures which had been erected all over 
our beautiful TOWN. KUDOS & KEEP IT UP!”93 Another supporter, Seif Sheyumbe, wrote a 
letter to the editor in early January during the lull in demolitions, in which he also drew on a 
nostalgic rendering of Mombasa, conflating aesthetic modernization with restoration, writing that 
“The beautiful place that Mombasa is needs beautiful roads, which is why Mr Nassir’s endeavour 
to restore Mvita and other areas to their former glory deserves support,” while also reducing 
vendors to a social infection, noting that the “Erection of illegal structures … led to an influx of 
jobless people, who gradually turned them into dwelling places—harboring carjackers and 
gangsters, besides making the streets dirty.”94 
 However, Nassir, who had survived for decades as a politician, chose his words quite 
carefully to try to avoid any explicit or even implicit reference to the underlying racial and political 
components of the demolitions. By mid-February of 2002, with the street-food industry in ruins, 
the demolitions of kiosks were winding down, but Nassir’s vision of political and racial cleansing 
was wider than vendors and hawkers, and he moved on to his next project to clear shack settlements 
from the city. By late February, this next operation had left more than 2,000 people homeless. 
When speaking to journalists, he momentarily broke from his usual controlled, calmly bureaucratic 
language, and let slip a comment revelatory not only about his views on shack dwellers, but 
certainly kiosks as well, quipping that “Slum dwellers will not be spared. Let them go back to their 
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homes.” Such language was not ambiguous in Mombasa. He wanted to cleanse Mombasa of poor, 
“upcountry” residents, and send them back to the interior, to bara.95 
Conclusion: The Political Economy of Urban Struggle in Twenty-First Century Africa 
 The people making their living selling prepared food and drink in Mombasa have much in 
common with others in similar “informal” industries throughout Africa. With economic 
opportunities in rural areas few, and with those that do exist offering little promise of social 
mobility, people in Kenya and across the continent look to the city as a space of potential, the 
possibility, even if slim, to improve one’s earning power and achieve social mobility and 
respectability. Cities do, in fact, provide that potential possibility. With denser concentrations of 
salaried or higher wage-earning jobs, many Africans throughout the twentieth century and during 
this one have come to cities and found work that has allowed them to find a level of stability hard 
to find in rural agricultural and pastoral economies. However, as with most “bootstrap” narratives, 
these people tend to be the exceptions, and for most people living in urban Africa, life is a difficult 
struggle to earn enough money for food, shelter, basic commodities and, when possible, for 
enjoying the leisure activities the city has to offer. 
 In Mombasa, a political economy of narrow opportunity has existed for as long as we have 
records, but the number of people struggling in this coastal city dramatically increased during the 
twentieth and into our current century. One of the key decades for Mombasa’s labor economy, as 
it was for much of the world, was the 1930s. That decade, through the combination of the Great 
Depression and increased migration from rural areas with deteriorating economies, saw the 
transition from a scarcity of waged workers to an overly saturated labor market. While longitudinal 
data in thin, combined quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests that Mombasa’s labor market 
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has effectively remained saturated since the 1930s up to the present day.96 With few opportunities 
for wage labor, and with most of the jobs that did exist being extremely low-paying given the 
structural advantages that saturation provided capital over labor, many people living in the city 
have had to survive by working in the “informal” sector. I have argued elsewhere in this 
dissertation that many of these people went into the business of providing the “comforts of home” 
by selling prepared food and drink to the growing mass market of migrants and other poor urban 
residents.97 This economy, created by the impoverished improvising means of survival, was driven 
both by the needs of the proprietors as well as the customers. With a city providing little secure, 
well-paid work, people needed jobs selling food, while their customers, with little income of their 
own, desired inexpensive places where they could buy their daily meals. This dynamic 
fundamentally shaped the formation of twentieth-century Mombasa, engendering the growth of a 
vast network of street-food vendors that allowed the city to function. Nassir destroyed the 
materiality of this social and cultural institution, smashing, crushing and burning it down, but he 
did not change the underlying political economy that had created it. 
 For government officials and others, this became increasingly clear in the months and years 
that followed the 2001-02 demolitions. In April 2002, less than two months after the operation 
ended, a representative for the new District Commissioner observed “that Kiosks are coming up 
again after a successful demolition of the same to clean up our city.”98 Later that month, the 
Medical Officer of Health was similarly concerned, noting: “Following the demolition of kiosks, 
the hawkers are back at the same areas hawking food and other wares.”99 Moreover, it appeared 
that after the devastation of Nassir’s campaign, some of these vendors took a different approach 
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to constructing their kiosks, replacing wood with concrete, as one “Concerned Mombasa Resident” 
wrote, “with great sorrow” that kiosks were being rebuilt, but that now proprietors were “using 
block and not the usual timbers.” This gradual reestablishment of vendors and hawkers caused 
great concern for those who had dreamed of a return to old Mombasa, as the city “had started to 
regain its lost glory, but with such kind of people it’s going to be very hard. We know you’re [the 
District Commissioner] hard working … don’t let small people to spoil your effort Please.”100 
 The reason hawkers and vendors returned was not only because the city’s political 
economy incentivized such economic behavior, but also because state officials began to again 
rebuild patrimonial relationships that semi-legitimized the work of selling food and drink on 
Mombasa’s streets. In the Mombasa of the early 2000s, vendors and hawkers endured incredible 
hardship, but they had also proved themselves a political force. In the end, Nassir actually showed 
how, even with the intensity of the coercion and violence to which he resorted, such operations 
did not guarantee electoral victory. In the 2002 election, Nassir lost the seat he had held for nearly 
30 years, defeated by Najib Balala, and KANU was swept from power both in Mombasa and 
nationally, losing control of parliament, and in the presidential election Mwai Kibaki defeated 
Uhuru Kenyatta, Moi’s hand-picked KANU candidate. Nassir and KANU had gambled, and lost. 
As Mombasa’s poor rebuilt their structures and their lives after this last desperate attempt of 
KANU to retain control, they worked again to make space for themselves in a city that had so 
violently rejected them, and so used the available tools of patronage and bribery to find some 
security in a precarious world. We can see this in August of 2002, as licensed traders around 
MacKinnon Market on the edge of Old Town noted with frustration in a letter to Mayor of 
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Mombasa that “Your inspectors are colluding with the hawkers, by accepting bribes and Kshs20/= 
daily rent for the hawker to operate thus them being legal,” and then continued that “There are 4 
illegal Shanty Kiosks operating on pavements and they cook food on unhygienic open grounds.”101 
 Vendors continued to use such direct bribery relations to secure space, but they also tried, 
as they had done since independence, to use the globally-circulating concepts of citizenship, rights, 
development and democratic governance to politically and practically argue that, as wananchi, 
they and their livelihoods deserved protection. In 2003, for example, a group of vendors had 
formed a new organization premised on their shared experience of displacement from a specific 
geography, the Displaced Traders of Machakos Street Mombasa. More than a year after the 
demolitions, with no viable, legal alternative trading centers created as had been promised, they 
contended that “As Tax Payers and parents we feel that as citizens of this country we are entitled 
to a good working environment whereby we pay rates to enhance the economic development of 
the country as well as raising the standard of living,” and, as such, “We condemn the act of 
demolishing kiosks without giving any alternative place for earning our daily bread as an act of 
crime against humanity.” Following this declaration, they tacitly reminded the new government of 
their voting power, writing that “we are grateful for the ouster of the Regime that victimized us 
and are responsible for the same due to our voting pattern,” and then made clear what, as they were 
writing to the new government, they wanted for their support, suggesting that “there are existing 
facilities for our rehabilitation on the same Machakos Street,” and “The road reserve between Aga 
Khan walk and Tangana road on Machakos street has enough space, which the council can utilize 
to earn revenue as well as creating employment opportunities.”102 
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 The record is not clear on whether this specific association was able to pressure the 
municipal government into allotting them part of the road reserve on Machakos Street, but what 
we do know is that street-food vendors, with or without the approval of the state, returned and 
reclaimed Mombasa as a space in which they could earn a living in the years after the demolitions. 
An East African Standard article in 2003 observed that “Hawkers have invaded Mombasa’s 
Central Business District (CBD) once again,” and that “A survey showed that hawkers have also 
started businesses in residential estates as was the case before the now infamous kiosk demolition 
exercise in December 2001,” with Chamgamwe as “the worst hit with food stalls emerging again, 
causing concerns over the effectiveness of the exercise spearheaded by former Cabinet Minister 
Shariff Nassir.” The new District Commissioner for Mombasa, John Egesa, vowed that he would 
“use the law to ensure that the hawking menace does not take root in the town.”103 Despite such 
proclamations, more than a year later, the state had clearly failed to stop vendors and hawkers, as 
evidenced when a district officer noted in October 2004 on the “emergence/mushrooming of kiosks 
on road reserves,” and thus concluded that “Now the situation is going back to the old in a big 
way.”104 
 Today in Mombasa, if you walk down Mikindani Road in the late evening, the street is 
quiet. A series of empty stalls line the sides of the road, mostly made with wooden poles and some 
with corrugated iron roofs. During this time of the evening, if looking closely, you can see the 
small charcoal remains of where a stove operated, and how the dirt floor is striated from where a 
broom was meticulously dragged across it after a day’s work. Mikindani Road is an in-between 
space in the urban geography of Mombasa, sitting on the edges of three neighborhoods, the Central 
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Business District, Kizingo, home to the islands most elite residences, and the government quarter. 
Only a short walk from this road, people can find restaurants offering a variety of cuisines from 
Kenyan to Chinese, as well as upscale cafes with espresso and prepared meals. However, for many, 
if not the majority, of the people who work in or around the government offices, businesses and 
elite homes in this part of the city, their income does not come close to allowing them to eat in 
these restaurants and cafes. Instead, during the early morning and afternoon, they frequent the 
eateries that fill these stalls each day on streets like Mikindani where, during the early morning, 
hot coals replace the charred remains from the previous evening, and heat stoves cooking tea, 
beans, and deep-frying mahamri donuts and pan-frying chapatti. After the morning rush, these 
proprietors on Mikindani, and throughout the city, regroup, still offering most of these breakfast 
items throughout the day, but they then also add the maize-meal porridge ugali, a meat or vegetable 
relish and possibly the favorite item of Central Province, githeri, a mixture of maize kernels and 
beans.105 
 The history of urban planning and development in Mombasa has placed these street-food 
vendors and others in similar locations throughout the city on a razor-thin edge. Other, less visible 
parts of the city would provide more day-to-day security, not attracting the attention of 
beautification-minded officials, but they also would not have access to such busily-trafficked parts 
of Mombasa. While I only met a few street-food vendors who seemed to have been able to 
accumulate surplus capital, nearly all of them with whom I spoke viewed the profession as a viable 
way to make a living, earning enough for housing, clothing and, if they had children, school fees 
and books. However, access to the consumer markets they needed to make their businesses 
profitable meant staking claims to urban land in the highly-visible and tightly-policed parts of the 
																																																						
105 These descriptions of Mikindani Road come from time spent living on the street during 2015. 
	 292 
city like Mikindani Road, places that urban planners had long since decided they do not belong. 
These vendors continue to work, and to feed those who rely upon them, both their families and 
customers, but Mombasa’s urban history has also produced a present in which each day potentially 





THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF FOOD IN KENYA AND THE WORLD 
 
 Global capitalism, once again, may soon transform Kenya’s food systems. During the past 
six years, Kenya has become an increasingly attractive target for the fast-food industry. However, 
as the formation of colonial capitalism in early twentieth-century East Africa did not simply 
remake the region in the image of industrial England, so too have the world’s fast-food 
corporations and their franchisers reshaped their businesses to fit Kenya’s consumer markets, 
supply chains and broader political economy.1 As this dissertation has shown, the stratified nature 
of twentieth-century urban Kenya created a food system in which the poor and working classes 
effectively were excluded from eating in the licensed and regulated confines of large restaurants, 
and instead took their food at roadside eateries. Kenyan restaurants, historically and in the present, 
quite simply, are for the middle and upper classes. Consequently, while large portions of fast-food 
revenues in the United States come from the spending of poorer classes, those recently established 
in Kenya are designed to cater to the elite. 
 Identifying this sector of Kenyan society as its market, global fast-food has grown along 
with the rise of Kenya’s middle class, which now may number somewhere close to 20 million 
people.2 The first Western fast-food chain to arrive in Kenya was KFC in 2011. They now have 
10 restaurants, with plans to expand.3 Christopher J. Bak, an American and formally part of an 
“emerging-market” hedge fund in New York City, opened Kenya’s first Subway in 2013 after he 
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had already started two others in Tanzania.4 There are now seven in Nairobi. McDonald’s, perhaps 
the most recognizable symbol of the globalization of American capitalism, has actually been 
among the most hesitant of fast-food chains in Africa, concentrating most of its restaurants in 
North and South Africa, and none in the eastern part of the continent.5 On its website, McDonald’s 
notes that “We have not set a firm date for the development of McDonald’s restaurants in Kenya,” 
but, leaving the door open, continued that “in the future we may take steps to open McDonald’s” 
in the country.6 However, in addition to Subway and KFC, plenty of other fast-food chains have 
seen in Kenya a place of profit and opened franchises, including Burger King, Cold Stone 
Creamery, Domino’s Pizza, and Pizza Hut from the United States and, from South Africa, 
Debonairs Pizza, Naked Pizza and Steers.7 Today, on a walk through the Central Business District 
of Nairobi, the city’s downtown, one can see a KFC, Subway, Cold Stone Creamery and, just 
recently opened in 2015, the Japanese fast-food chain, Teriyaki Japan.8 
 These beginnings portend a radical change in the ownership of and capital flows that 
structure Kenya’s prepared food industry. Until this recent arrival of global fast food, though with 
some exceptions, nearly all of Kenya’s eateries have been locally owned, from street-food to 
middle-income restaurants and up to fine dining.9 While important to critically understand how 
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these institutions have certainly not been free from the inequalities of a gendered and racialized 
process of class formation in Kenya, as this dissertation has shown through the experiences of 
vendors, this localized nature of ownership has, though, meant that capital produced through the 
daily consumptive practices of Africans has tended to mostly stay in the region. However, 
corporate fast-food would restructure this comestible economy so that an increasing portion of the 
revenue generated through daily eating practices in Kenya would be transferred from the Kenyan 
economy to these companies and their shareholders. At present, the primary issue preventing an 
even more rapid increase in the number of global fast-food chains in Kenya is that the region’s 
food-supply chains do not provide the consistency and uniformity of product that corporate 
standardization demands. However, the experience of another post-colonial country may be 
instructive for the future of Kenya. When McDonald’s first arrived in India in 1996, executives 
faced similar supply-chain issues, but then responded by investing $100 million and six years of 
time to create their own, compartmentalized and controlled system of food production and supply, 
which included 4,000 acres of potato farms sourcing directly, and only, to McDonald’s through a 
surrogate company, McCain Foods. With their supply chain in place, expansion became more 
possible, and as of 2015 McDonald’s had 200 restaurants in India, with the goal to grow to nearly 
500 by 2020.10 If Subway, Burger King or others decide to take this same approach, or if 
McDonald’s chooses to scale down its India plan and enter the Kenyan market, the future seems 
likely to be one in which ever more comestible capital is transferred out of Kenya. 
 The direct effects of this potential future for street-food vendors, though, depend largely 
on how dynamic and adaptive the corporatized fast-food industry wants to be in Kenya. With meals 
at these restaurants currently costing the equivalent of $6-10, they present little competition to the 
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vendors who are able to provide food to Kenya’s urban poor for less than 20 percent of such prices. 
However, as corporations have understood for some time, tremendous surplus value can be 
generated by operating at economies of scale, keeping prices low and making small profits per 
transaction, and after thousands, millions and billions of them, these totals add up. Poor Kenyans 
are not able to spend much money on food, but spend it they do every day. Coca Cola figured out 
some time ago that it can profitably produce and sell its soda locally in Kenya at dramatically 
reduced prices, and today its brand is consumed in the country by rich and poor alike, from bustling 
Nairobi to rural Samburu.11 Fast-food chains may, or perhaps already have, come to this same 
conclusion. A very imaginable future in Kenya is one in which fast-food food companies sidestep 
the existent food-supply chains they find inadequate for their purposes and instead create their own 
vertically integrated ones, as they have already done in the United States and elsewhere in the 
world. The history of fast food in the United States has shown that when these companies seize 
control of the supply chain, they can and have employed models of production and used their 
power gained through market share to greatly suppress commodity prices.12 Moreover, given the 
abundance of “cheap,” or more accurately underpaid and exploited, labor in Kenya, the use of 
these workers throughout the supply chain from the point of production to their retail outlets would 
allow companies to lower their in-restaurant prices considerably in comparison to what they charge 
in the United States and other Western economies. No clear evidence exists that this is in the 
immediate plans of the fast-food corporations that are presently in Kenya, as they seem for the 
moment to be focused on the middle classes. However, all the evidence we do have about the fast-
food industry’s past would suggest a reorientation and expansion of their market to include poorer 
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Kenyans may become part of their future plans. As Eric Schlosser has shown, the high-technology 
and minimal labor-cost restaurant model that McDonald’s and other fast-food companies created 
in the United States over the last half century has allowed them an expansive customer base that 
includes all classes in American society. Since the 1950s, street-food vendors in Mombasa have 
struggled to maintain their foothold in the city, but, if the fast-food industry figures a way to adapt 
its model to draw the urban poor to its restaurants, we may find that the corporatization of Kenya’s 
food system will do far more to destroy these businesses than demolitions ever could. 
 However, this is only one possible future. Another one exists in which global dialogues 
between food justice activists, scholars and practitioners continue to open new possibilities for 
how our collective food futures can be organized around a set of priorities other than corporate 
profits. In Mombasa, street-food vendors have already figured out a way to bring prepared food 
cheaply to the urban poor, and keep the capital they generate within these same communities. This 
was true in the early 1950s when the British instituted the first coordinated effort to drive these 
vendors from the city, and it has remained so with all the subsequent attempts of post-colonial 
authorities to demolish and destroy the comestible infrastructures that these vendors have built, 
and then rebuilt. Rather than directing state resources towards the destruction of these businesses, 
the Kenyan government should instead work towards policies that would bring much-needed, 
long-term stability to these proprietors who have been able to successfully create an urban food 
system that allows the poor to have access to a diverse variety of prepared food in the city. The 
greatest political challenge for such a future comes from the reality that their businesses thrive in 
the absence of one of industrial capitalism’s core principles: the inviolability of private property. 
As shown especially in Chapter Six, these vendors have had to pay various “rents” in the form of 
bribes and other fees, but they have also in many ways operated throughout the twentieth century 
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outside a system in which they are tied to specific parcels of rented or owned land. The savings 
they gain through their more flexible understandings of property has been key to a business model 
in which they can enter the industry with small capital start-up costs, which also allows them to 
keep their prices low and thus affordable for the urban poor. Garth Myers has perceptively pointed 
out that development schemes to grant title to urban shack dwellers could have the unintended (or 
perhaps intended) consequence of only further excluding the poor from urban Africa. More legible 
forms of title allow for the easier purchase of land, which could perhaps help some poorer 
individuals in the short term, but over a longer period is likely to lead to more exclusion with larger 
concerns buying up and “developing” the land into more expensive housing and retail space: in 
short, it would produce gentrification.13 Similarly, the more the prepared food of Mombasa’s poor 
comes from businesses tied by contract or ownership to specific parcels of land, the more likely it 
is the proprietors will be those who already had the capital resources to control the property, such 
as the well-capitalized franchisers of fast-food conglomerates. That proprietors coming from the 
urban poor would have no place in this comestible future has been made clear by the description 
from McDonald’s of who would be their ideal franchisers in Kenya. They would have a variety of 
qualities, but, among them, would be access to “significant capital.”14 Without question, thinking 
imaginatively about alternative forms of urban property presents an incredible political challenge 
given the weight of history and power behind the sacrosanct notion that it be inviolable, but such 
an imagination is necessary if the world’s cities are to become more just. 
 Additionally, not only should Kenyan authorities pay closer attention to and learn from the 
visions of the city that vendors have been struggling to create over the past 100 years, but the food 
justice movement more globally should as well. While hawkers and vendors have not had the 
																																																						
13 Garth Myers, African Cities: Alternate Visions of Urban Theory and Practice (New York: Zed Books 2011), 83-7. 
14 See note six. 
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opportunity to write position papers on urban planning, they nonetheless have also clearly 
demonstrated that they have their own ideas about how cities should be socially and economically  
constituted, and have therefore provided “theory from the south” useful to those seeking better 
food futures throughout the world.15 As food justice movements outside Africa consider more 
equitable and nourishing ways that poor communities can access prepared food while away from 
their homes, they would do well to consider the century of experience that Mombasa’s street-food 
vendors have in theorizing and practicing alternative models to “the restaurant.” In some American 
cities, restauranteurs have been experimenting with the idea of stripping down infrastructural 
overheads and focusing on providing quality food at more reasonable prices, a notion novel to the 
United States but common in Mombasa for at least one hundred years. The “food trucks” now seen 
throughout urban America as well as the growing trend of semi-permanent “food carts” in cities 
like Portland suggest that a desire for alternatives such as those practiced in Mombasa exists, but 
fast-food nonetheless remains a dominant part of the American dietary. While critically important 
to not romanticize poverty, with care and attention to global solidarity, I think “the West” has 
much to learn from the intellectual production of African street-food vendors who have found 
ways to keep ownership local, ingredients mostly fresh, prices affordable and, most crucially, have 
had the ingenuity to think beyond the idea of “the restaurant” codified in the licensing and laws of 
modern states. 
 Just as the histories of Mombasa’s and the world’s food systems were not pre-determined, 
neither are their futures. Nonetheless, the fraught history of fast-food in the United States should 
																																																						
15 Richard Pithouse has written extensively about the need to study the intellectual and political history of the urban, 
marginalized poor who have with regularity been cast off not only by the Right, but also the Left as an irrational, 
dangerous and uncontrollable “lumpenproletariat.” Pithouse, “A Politics of the Poor: Shack Dwellers’ Struggles in 
Durban,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 42, no. 1 (2008): 63-94, and his “Thought Amid Waste,” Journal of 
Asian and African Studies 47, no. 5 (2012): 482-497. For the notion of “theory from the South,” see Jean Comaroff 
and John L. Comaroff, Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving toward Africa (Boulder: 
Paradigm, 2012). 
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provoke us to question what the introduction of these industries into Kenya means for the future 
of the country’s food systems. While many Americans are now learning and thinking more 
radically about how they can acquire prepared food while out of their homes, in ways that Kenyans 
have done for a century, it would be a cruel irony indeed if Americans remade their system of 
eateries along a model similar to that of street-food in Africa at the same time as corporations from 
their country transform Kenya into a fast-food economy.  
This dissertation has been focused on an analysis of how industrial capitalism and the rapid 
growth of Mombasa transformed the food systems through which migrants acquired their food. I 
hope this leads to a new emphasis on these issues in African and food history, but also that the 
experiences and struggles of workers and small-scale proprietors to build and maintain a food 
system in their port town on the coast of East Africa has something to tell the world about how we 














Image 7: Kibanda eatery, 2015 
   










    Image 8: Burning Kiosks, 2001                           Image 9: Bulldozing kiosks, 2001 
 
 






Image 7 (top left), of two vendors in the Central Business District (CBD) on Moi avenue carrying away what 
goods they can during demolitions in late December 2001, and, Image Eight (top right), a bulldozer 
demolishing structures in Bombolulu, a peri-urban Mombasa neighborhood, north of  
the island. Image Seven: Daily Nation, 26 December 2001, McMillan. 
 
Image 10: Demolished kiosks, 2002 
             











The street protest in Changamwe on 26 December 2001, which shut down traffic on the main access route 
to Nairobi and the airport for part of the day. Daily Nation, 28 December 2001. 
 
 
Image 12: Rhamadhan Kajembe, 2002  
     
 
 
Changamwe MP Rhamadhan Kajembe, who criticized the demolitions, speaks to vendors and hawkers 
from his constituency during the 26 December 2001 Changamwe protests, during which he later laid down 
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